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Chair: Charles R. Shipan
Presidents in the modern era face daunting institutional hurdles to accomplishing their
policy goals. In this environment, presidents often rely on innovative policymaking
strategies to implement their agendas. This dissertation explores an avenue of presiden-
tial power that has received scant attention in existing scholarship. I examine how and
when presidents use a waiver strategy to pursue policy reform at the subnational level.
Presidents have approved hundreds of waivers in welfare, Medicaid, and education, yet
we lack a theory that examines the incentives that shape how presidents exercise waiver
authority. I propose a theory of presidential policymaking through waivers in which I
examine the horizontal and vertical relationships that motivate (and constrain) the presi-
dent’s use of this strategy.
I argue that the president is initially motivated to use a waiver strategy when it is dif-
ficult for him to implement policy reforms through legislation. If the president seeks a
route that circumvents Congress in order to implement national-scale reform, a waiver
strategy is only viable if enough governors participate. While the president enjoys broad
waiver authority in welfare, Medicaid, and K-12 education, he cannot force states to adopt
reforms via waivers. Ultimately, I propose that the president pursues a waiver strategy
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when he is ideologically far from Congress, contingent on the share of the nation’s gov-
ernors in his party. I assess the core theoretical propositions using an original dataset
of submitted and approved waivers in welfare, Medicaid, and K-12 education from 1984
through 2012.
The results here suggest that the president can indeed use a waiver strategy to by-
pass Congress, although he faces a vertical constraint from the nation’s governors. This
analysis provides insight into the paradox of presidential power in the modern era. The
president enjoys broad authority, but the system of checks and balances often frustrates
the president’s efforts to exercise this authority. A waiver strategy provides the presi-
dent with a policymaking avenue where otherwise one might not be available given the
horizontal constraint imposed by Congress. In turn, the federal system’s distribution of





On September 23, 2011, President Barack Obama seized the reins of education reform
from Congress. In public remarks introducing his administration’s new waiver initiative,
President Obama criticized Congress for failing to address the widely noted failings of
the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB):
I’ve urged Congress for a while now, let’s get a bipartisan effort, let’s fix this.
Congress hasn’t been able to do it. So I will. Our kids only get one shot at
a decent education. They cannot afford to wait any longer. So, given that
Congress cannot act, I am acting.
The president leaves little room for interpretation – in this speech, he announced his in-
tention to act without Congress. This statement alone may not be surprising, given the
strong incentives for the president to act decisively (Howell 2013) and the many types
of unilateral action at the president’s disposal (Mayer 2009). However, the waiver strat-
egy that President Obama introduced in this speech and subsequently used to bypass
Congress was indeed unexpected.1 Despite the many pages that have been written on the
president’s strategies for acting without Congress, the president’s use of a waiver strategy
is almost completely absent from the literature on the president’s alternative policymak-
ing routes.2
1Specifically, in this speech President Obama introduced its waiver strategy as the ESEA Flexibility
initiative. "ESEA" refers to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965; NCLB was the 2001
reauthorization of this Act.
2See Gais and Fossett (2005) for a notable exception.
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This absence is striking given that presidents can and do use waivers strategically
in pursuit of their own policy goals. The Obama administration’s use of waivers from
NCLB is a case in point: this waiver strategy provided states with an opportunity to
apply for flexibility from NCLB, one of President George W. Bush’s signature domestic
policy achievements, and in turn required states to implement components of President
Obama’s education agenda. By the fall of 2015, 43 states and Washington, D.C. were
implementing reforms to NCLB via waivers authorized by the Obama administration.
This use of waivers is impressive in its own right. But presidential use of this policy-
making tool is not confined to President Obama’s revision of NCLB.3 In core domes-
tic policy areas, including welfare, education, and Medicaid, presidents from Reagan
through Obama have used waivers to substantially revise existing laws at the subnational
level and, in doing so, have facilitated implementation of their preferred policies. The
implication is startling: over the past three decades, revisions to federal law, authorized
by the president’s administration without oversight from Congress and implemented at
the state level, have shaped policies that bear on millions of Americans’ everyday lives.
And yet, the president’s systematic use of this tool remains largely unexamined.
In this dissertation, I explore this unconventional presidential policymaking strategy.
As I discuss below, waivers are exemptions from federal law granted by the president’s
administration. Waivers are often designed to facilitate experimentation with innovative
policies at the state level. A key feature of waivers is the necessity of state cooperation:
presidential administrations cannot mandate that states use waivers. Rather, individual
governors must apply for waivers and receive approval from the administration in order
to implement policy changes. Perhaps because a waiver strategy neither fits into the cate-
gory of formal powers outlined in Article II of the Constitution nor constitutes unilateral
action, we lack an explanation of presidents’ strategic use of waivers.
3The Obama administration’s use of conditional waivers, which required states to implement new poli-
cies not found in existing law, is an important innovation compared to how previous presidents have exer-
cised waiver authority (Skinner and Feder 2012).
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The chapters that follow address two related questions: how do presidents use waivers,
and when do presidents pursue this subnational strategy? Two central observations shape
this inquiry. First, a waiver strategy offers the president a remarkable opportunity to cir-
cumvent Congress. But second, despite the relative freedom the president enjoys, his
use of a waiver strategy is constrained by a group of actors we rarely consider when
discussing presidential policymaking: governors. This strategy, then, is paradoxical. It
offers the president a surprising degree of flexibility but, at the same time, does not offer
a unilateral route to policymaking.
This dissertation makes an important contribution to our understanding of presiden-
tial power by investigating the horizontal and vertical constraints that influence the presi-
dent’s use of a waiver strategy. The vast majority of scholarship on the presidency focuses
on how the president exercises power at the national level; in turn, scholars ask how the
president navigates the constraints imposed by the system of checks and balances. As a
result, this scholarship generally considers horizontal constraints on presidential power
– that is, constraints imposed by other national actors, such as Congress. In this project,
however, I examine how the president exercises power at the subnational level through
waivers. Given the nature of waiver authority, as discussed at length in Chapter 2, the
president faces a vertical constraint as well as a horizontal constraint when using a waiver
strategy. Specifically, a waiver strategy may allow the president to implement national-
scale policy reform absent legislative revision if enough governors are willing to partici-
pate in this strategy. By investigating how and when presidents use waivers, I assess not
only the constraints imposed on the president by the system of checks and balances, but
also how the federal system’s distribution of power between levels of government shapes
the president’s exercise of power.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, given that waivers are not well-known policy
tools, I provide an introduction to waivers. I then describe the types of waivers that I focus
on in this dissertation and summarize the policies implemented through these waivers to
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provide a more concrete basis for subsequent discussion and analysis. Next, I introduce
the central argument of the dissertation. Finally, I outline the plan of the dissertation,
explaining the role each chapter plays and the relationship between these chapters.
1.1 An Introduction to Waivers
Waivers are exemptions from federal law granted by the secretary of the relevant de-
partment. These exemptions are often granted to allow states to implement new pro-
grams, frequently referred to as demonstrations or demonstration projects.4 This defi-
nition is admittedly quite broad, but with good reason – other than this distinguishing
feature, waivers vary quite a bit. In this project, I focus on a specific subset of waivers.
Specifically, the theory-building and analyses here are based on waivers granted in three
policy areas during specific time periods: welfare from 1984 through 1996, Medicaid
from 1992 through 2012, and K-12 education from 1995 through 2012.5
1.1.1 Policies Studied: Welfare, Medicaid, and K-12 Education
I focus on waivers granted in these policy areas for three reasons. First, the waivers
I study within these policy areas allow states to implement substantive policy changes
rather than mere administrative adjustments. While the extent of these changes varies,
across each type of waiver considered here, the potential exists for presidents to authorize
substantive revisions to existing law. And indeed, presidents and their administrations
have exercised this authority extensively in these three policy areas during the years I
4Waivers may or may not require an evaluation component, depending on the requirements set by the
administration. Waivers are not grants, and waivers are not competitive across states. If the administration
makes waivers available, the invitation to apply is open to all states, and one state’s receipt of a waiver does
not impact whether or not other states will remain eligible for approval.
5Specifically, I focus on Section 1115(a) waivers in welfare and Medicaid and Section 14401 (later known
as Section 9401) waivers in K-12 education. Chapter 2 explains the nature of waiver authority in each of
these policy areas in depth. Throughout this project, when I discuss "welfare" waivers, I am referring to
waivers granted from the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. When I discuss "education"
waivers, I am referring to waivers granted from federal requirements governing kindergarten through high
school, or K-12 education.
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include.
Second, and critically, presidents enjoy a high degree of discretion over exercising
waiver authority in each policy area during the years considered here. Specifically, as
Chapter 2 discusses at length, the relevant secretary enjoys authority over waiving pro-
visions of federal law and, in doing so, approving each governor’s proposed program
change. It is important to note here that throughout this dissertation, I often refer to the
president’s use of waiver authority, although this authority is directly vested in the rele-
vant secretary. Welfare and Medicaid waivers fall under the purview of the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, while the Secretary of Education enjoys authority over K-12
education waivers. In practice both the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the
Secretary of Education are reliable agents of the president who work closely with his ad-
ministration to develop and implement the president’s waiver strategy. As such, I refer to
the president’s use of waivers.
Despite the broad discretion granted to the relevant secretary, the secretary cannot
instruct or mandate that a state use a waiver. Rather, a governor must apply for a waiver.
An administration’s use of waivers, then, depends fundamentally on cooperation from
governors. Throughout this project, I focus on the governor as the primary state actor
with whom an administration interacts throughout the waiver process. This is of course
a simplification – bureaucrats, other elected officials, and interest groups at the state level
may contribute in important ways to a state’s waiver application and subsequent imple-
mentation of a demonstration program. However, as the chief state executive, governors
are ultimately the actors who decide whether or not to apply for a waiver, who sign off
on waiver applications, who interact with members of the president’s administration, and
who agree to implement a waiver if approved.6 Evidence in Chapter 2 speaks to this inter-
action between the president’s administration and governors; as I argue throughout this
project, whether or not a critical mass of governors cooperates with a president’s waiver
6For example, see Thompson (2012) for a discussion of the prominent role that governors play in the
waiver process with respect to Section 1115 Medicaid waivers.
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strategy is an important constraint on the president’s use of this policymaking tool.
Third, a substantial degree of variation characterizes presidents’ waiver strategies
within and across these three policy areas.7 In the case of welfare, for example, Pres-
ident Clinton dissolved the Interagency Low Income Opportunity Advisory Board (IL-
IOAB) that President Reagan established and relied upon to centralize review of welfare
waivers in the White House (Teles 1996). In addition to presidents revising their prede-
cessors’ systems for reviewing specific types of waivers, individual administrations often
develop different approaches to waivers across these policy areas. For example, President
Clinton offered governors expedited review of welfare waivers that implemented his ad-
ministration’s five preferred reforms, while his administration made no comparable offer
in the case of Medicaid waivers. Further, immediately after President George W. Bush
signed the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, his administration made it clear that they
were unwilling to entertain requests for waivers from this law; in contrast, his admin-
istration actively courted Medicaid waivers as part of the Health Insurance Flexibility
and Accountability initiative (Thompson 2012). In all, these three policy areas provide
for meaningful variation in terms of when and how presidents use waivers in pursuit of
their own policy goals.
This analysis of welfare, Medicaid, and education waivers is well-suited to reaching
generalizable conclusions about the president’s use of waivers. Most existing work on
waivers focuses on these policy areas individually, and as a result, conclusions remain
specific to each policy (Teles 1996; Arsneault 2000; Thompson and Burke 2007, 2008;
Weissert and Scheller 2008; Weissert 2008; Thompson 2012; Shelly 2012, 2013). Here, I
use welfare, Medicaid, and education waivers to assess my theory of presidential policy-
making through waivers. By assessing my theoretical propositions using data on three
policy areas, the results are not specific to one type of policy, but rather, can be used to
gain insight into the president’s strategic use of waivers across policies.
7Chapter 2 describes this variation in detail.
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Further, these policy areas do not address niche issues or populations. Indeed, each of
these three policies perennially occupies an important place on the president’s domestic
agenda.8 Consider, for example, that funds distributed under programs in these policy
areas impact millions of Americans. Medicaid covered more than 62 million Americans
in 2013, including "more than one in every three children" (Kaiser Commission on Medi-
caid and the Uninsured 2013, 7). In the case of welfare, 3.3 million households received
public assistance benefits in 2012 (Irving 2014). Finally, more than 21 million children
attended schools that received Title I funds in the 2009-10 school year; over 56,000 pub-
lic schools received these funds (National Center for Education Statistics 2015). In short,
these policy areas occupy an important role in mainstream government service provision
and politics; we can be confident that results from this analysis may be generalizable to
additional domestic programs.
There are two potential limitations to the generalizability of the results here. First,
programs administered in these policy areas are intergovernmental in nature; power and
authority is shared, to varying degrees, between the federal, state, and local governments.
As such, these results may not be generalizable to programs operated only at the national
or state levels. However, this limitation is inherent to the inquiry at hand. If the goal is
to investigate how presidents use subnational policymaking strategies in the context of
waivers, we should not expect the results to bear on presidential strategy vis-à-vis policies
in which authority lies solely at the national or state level. On the other hand, these
results are indeed generalizable to policy areas in which federal and state governments
share authority.
The second potential limitation stems from the redistributive nature of all three policy
areas here. Indeed, the results may only be applicable to programs that involve govern-
ment redistribution of funds. However, these results are not specific to one type of re-
distributive spending, given the variation across welfare, Medicaid, and K-12 education.
8Chapter 2 discusses the salience of these policy areas in detail.
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For example, the current welfare program, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, pro-
vides cash transfers to individuals (Irving 2014), while Medicaid is a health insurance
program for low-income Americans (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured
2013). Medicaid remains an entitlement program, while welfare transitioned from an en-
titlement program to a block grant following passage of the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Act of 1996.
Unlike welfare and Medicaid, in the case of K-12 education, the federal government
does not redistribute funds to individuals. Rather, the federal government addresses
inequality in K-12 education through Title I, first established in the Elementary and Sec-
ondary Education Act of 1965. Title I specifies a formula grant to redistribute funds to
states, Local Education Agencies (LEAs), and ultimately schools based on the income of
their student populations (Department of Education 2015). While these results may only
be generalizable to redistributive programs, then, they are not specific to one type of
government redistribution.
1.1.2 Years of Analysis: 1984 – 2012
In each policy area, I identified the starting year for analysis based on when waivers
in each policy area were first used systematically. I begin with a description of the years
studied in welfare policy. As Chapter 2 describes, waiver authority in welfare and Medi-
caid was established in Section 1115(a) of the Social Security Amendments of 1962 (SSA).
However, welfare waivers were used only intermittently until the Reagan administration
(Greenberg and Wiseman 1992; Lieberman and Shaw 2000). In particular, President Rea-
gan developed a specific process for reviewing and approving waivers during his second
term (Teles 1996; Fishman and Weinberg 1992). For this reason, I begin my analysis of
welfare waivers in 1984. In 1996, with the passage of the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Act, welfare waivers were rendered moot in the transition to the new
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Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program.9 Consequently, in this project
analysis of the president’s use of welfare waivers extends through 1996.
As with welfare, I similarly begin analysis of Medicaid waivers well after passage of
the SSA in 1962. Specifically, in this project the analysis of Medicaid waivers begins in
1992. While Medicaid waiver authority existed since 1962, President Bill Clinton was the
first to regularly use this authority to authorize demonstration projects that allowed for
"comprehensive, enduring reforms," according to Thompson and Burke’s analysis of Sec-
tion 1115 waivers (2007, 974).10 Presidents continue to exercise Section 1115 Medicaid
waiver authority; analysis here of Medicaid waivers extends from 1992 through 2012.
An obvious question here is why presidents did not systematically use Section 1115
waivers earlier, given the availability of this authority since the Kennedy administration.
As I discuss below, the central argument of this dissertation is that waivers provide pres-
idents with an alternative policymaking strategy when presidents are unable to revise
existing law via the legislative process. A plausible explanation for the systematic use
of waiver authority beginning in the mid-1980s is the increasing difficulty of achieving
legislative goals as party polarization began to dramatically increase starting in the late
1970s (McCarty et al. 2006). This is not to say that presidents gave up on implementing
their policy preferences through the legislative process in the face of this polarization,
nor that important laws are no longer enacted under divided government (Mayhew 1991,
2005). However, with increasing party polarization and the simultaneous increase in
income inequality that McCarty et al. (2006) document, it may indeed be the case that
reaching satisfying compromises with Congress over the design of redistributive social
welfare policies became more difficult for the president in the 1980s, motivating the use
9Under TANF, states enjoyed substantial flexibility in developing their welfare programs compared to
under AFDC (Teles 1996; Lieberman and Shaw 2000; Weaver 2000). The new status quo under TANF made
it unnecessary for states to request additional flexibility via waivers. The Department of Health and Human
Services has not granted any new Section 1115 welfare waivers since passage of TANF in 1996 (Goverment
Accountability Office 2012).
10The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) records for approved Section 1115 Medicaid
waivers begin in 1992, which is why my analysis of Medicaid waivers begins in 1992 rather than at the start
of Clinton’s first term in 1993.
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of waiver authority. Indeed, Chapter 2 describes prolonged battles with Congress over
changes in welfare and Medicaid across the time period studied here.
Finally, in the case of K-12 education, comparable waiver authority that gave the sec-
retary the power to authorize state-level changes to existing federal law was first included
in President Clinton’s 1994 reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965 (ESEA). The federal government’s involvement in education policy was lim-
ited until this point in time. That is, ESEA was originally designed to redistribute funds
to schools that served economically disadvantaged students, and this was the primary
purpose the law served for the first thirty years of its existence. McGuinn (2006) explains:
ESEA laid the foundation for a policy regime in education that persisted for
almost thirty years. At the heart of this regime was a policy paradigm, mean-
ing a set of views about the nature of the country’s educational problems
and the appropriate means of government response. The core beliefs of this
paradigm were that most public schools were doing fine, that problems were
concentrated in schools located in poor areas, and that issues of school gov-
ernance and improvement were the responsibility of local and state govern-
ments. ESEA created a narrow federal role in education and proscribed both
the means and the ends of national policy – providing additional resources
and procedural safeguards to promos equity and access for disadvantaged stu-
dents (22).
In this environment, as McGuinn (2006) makes clear, the federal role in education was
quite circumscribed, such that the federal government had little say in the administration
of K-12 education. However, this paradigm began to shift in 1983 with the publication
of the federal report A Nation at Risk, which McGuinn describes as a "crucial focusing
event" that spurred reform (22). In particular, "a new push for standards, accountability,
and choice began to emerge," and as it did, education increasingly occupied a center-stage
role in presidents’ domestic agendas (22). Beginning with the Clinton administration, the
federal government began asserting a more active role in education policy. With the De-
partment of Education’s increasing involvement in the administration of K-12 education
at the state and local levels, Congress also granted general waiver authority to the Sec-
retary of Education in the Clinton administration’s 1994 reauthorization of ESEA. The
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first waivers were granted under this authority in 1995, and presidents have continued to
exercise this waiver authority through the present day. As a result, this study focuses on
waivers in K-12 education policy from 1995 through 2012.
1.1.3 Waivers as Policy Tools
In this dissertation, I argue that presidents use waivers as policymaking tools to autho-
rize substantive changes to existing law. The goal of both the qualitative and quantitative
analysis that follows is to examine how the president’s institutional constraints shape his
use of this tool, rather than to explain the specific policies implemented through waivers.
As a result, this dissertation discusses the president’s use of waivers extensively but does
not focus primarily on the programs authorized via waivers. To ground the chapters that
follow in a concrete understanding of waivers as policy tools, here I provide a summary
of the policies implemented via the waivers analyzed in this dissertation.
Welfare: 1984 – 1996
Section 1115 welfare waivers have authorized states to implement a variety of dif-
ferent programs. As Chapter 2 discusses, the Reagan administration’s goal with regard
to welfare reform was to incentivize recipients to become self sufficient. A total of six-
teen Section 1115 welfare waivers were approved by the Reagan administration (Fish-
man and Weinberg 1992); in practice, the programs proposed and implemented via these
waivers varied. For example, a Heritage Foundation report on these welfare waivers notes
that "[e]normous diversity is reflected in the initiatives sent to the [Interagency Low In-
come Opportunity Advisory] Board. Even when states address the same problem, the
approaches tend to differ" (Heritage Foundation 1989, 6).
Despite this variation, the Heritage Foundation identified several categories of pro-
gram changes implemented via these waivers, acknowledging that individual states of-
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ten adopted different approaches in pursuing each goal.11 I summarize these categories
as follows: workfare (generally, programs designed to "test work programs for mothers
with young children"); other requirements for benefits (including additional "penalties or
incentives" for teen AFDC parents to remain in high school); eligibility rules (including
adjusting formulas for determining benefits and "[creating] financial incentives for recipi-
ents to choose employment rather [than] welfare); streamlining rules ("making rules more
uniform, thereby reducing erroneous payments and administrative complexity and mak-
ing it easier for needy families to claim benefits and services"); child support ("[n]early
all states applying for waivers are seeking ways to improve the collection of child support
payments from absent parents); and entrepreneurship ("West Virginia and Pennsylvania
are proposing demonstrations that would aid welfare recipients seeking to gain inde-
pendence by starting their own small business"). The workfare programs in particular
reflect the Reagan administration’s goal of encouraging states to incentivize individuals
on welfare to transition successfully to employment. As Chapter 2 discusses, the George
H.W. Bush administration largely continued the Reagan administration’s approach to-
wards waivers (Teles 1996).
While the Clinton administration actively adapted the waiver process to meet its own
needs, the administration’s goals echoed those of the Reagan administration. For exam-
ple, in a Federal Register Notice published in August 1995, the Department of Health
and Human Services described its intent to authorize waivers that "[improve] the efficacy
of the welfare system in helping recipients become self-sufficient (42574)." The programs
the Clinton administration encouraged states to adopt via waivers reflect this goal of
encouraging individuals to transition from welfare to employment. Specifically, in this
Notice the Clinton administration identified the following five programs they considered
promising:
1) requiring people on welfare to work and providing adequate childcare to
11Please see pages 6-8 in the Heritage Foundation report, How the White House Spurs Welfare Reform
(1989), for a complete description of each category.
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permit them to do it; 2) setting time limits for welfare receipt, to be followed
by work; 3) requiring fathers to pay child support or go to work to pay off
what they owe; 4) requiring minor mothers to live at home and stay in school,
and 5) paying the cash value of welfare and food stamps to private employers
as wage subsidies when they hire people who leave welfare and go to work
(42575-6).
A 1997 Department of Health and Human Services report summarized the programs
states implemented through waivers under the Clinton administration in the following
categories: work and training requirements, time limits, family cap provisions, expanded
income disregards, increased resource limits, extended transitional assistance, expanded
eligibility for two-parent families, and improved child support enforcement.12 As in the
case of the Reagan and Bush administrations, the specific programs implemented via
waivers during the Clinton administration varied in nature and scope.13
Medicaid: 1992 – 2012
As in the case of Section 1115 welfare waivers, presidents have authorized Section
1115 Medicaid waivers that implement a variety of new, substantive programs. Thomp-
son and Burke (2007) discuss in depth the nature of Section 1115 Medicaid waivers im-
plemented under the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations.14 They argue that,
despite concerns that these waivers would be used to roll back federal Medicaid benefits,
there is little evidence of policy retrenchment, or in other words, "erosion of Medicaid,"
12For more details on these categories, please see "State Welfare Waivers: An Overview" in the Health
and Human Services Setting the Baseline report.
13These experimental programs provided an excellent opportunity to conduct rigorous analysis of which
reforms worked and which did not. The Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC), in
particular, was intensely involved in overseeing and assessing the outcomes of demonstration projects im-
plemented through Section 1115 welfare waivers. A thorough discussion of the efficacy of these programs
is outside the scope of this dissertation; see Gueron and Rolston (2013) and Manski and Garfinkel (1992)
for a thorough account of the evaluation, implementation, and results of these demonstration projects in
welfare from the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations.
14Also see Thompson (2012) for a thorough discussion of how presidents have used Section 1115 Medi-
caid waivers. For example, Thompson (2012) notes the Bush administration’s attempts to encourage specific
types of policy changes via Section 1115 Medicaid waivers: "The Bush administration evinced little interest
in learning from the Section 1115 waivers. Instead, it attempted to foster top-down diffusion by encourag-
ing states to try approaches it favored on ideological grounds. In essence it acted more as a teacher of states
than a student of them" (511).
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due to policies implemented under waivers (2007, 971). Instead, they find that "these
waivers have often enhanced health services for low-income people; above all, they have
helped preserve Medicaid as an entitlement by undercutting support for those seeking
to convert the program into a block grant" (971). Thompson and Burke (2007) show that
under both the Clinton and Bush administrations, waivers were most frequently used to
implement managed care programs. More broadly, these Medicaid waivers authorized a
variety of programs. Thompson and Burke (2007) identify the following ten major cat-
egories of policies implemented under Medicaid waivers: "managed care, broad system
reform, adult/general eligibility expansions, health care for children/pregnant women,
employer-based expansion, family planning, [Hurricane] Katrina waivers, long-term care,
patient cost sharing, prescription drug, and other" (980).
In the Obama administration’s use of Section 1115 Medicaid waivers, we see the con-
tinuing theme of using these waivers to expand, rather than contract, provision of Medi-
caid services, reflecting Thompson and Burke’s (2007) argument that Section 1115 Med-
icaid waivers have not been used as vehicles of retrenchment. For example, Bagenstos
(2012) summarizes the Obama administration’s use of Section 1115 Medicaid waivers as
such: "The Obama Administration has used its Medicaid waiver authority to grant broad
flexibility to the states in providing health care to indigent and disabled persons" (3). As
in the case of welfare waivers, a variety of policies have been implemented via Section
1115 Medicaid waivers. The programs authorized across administrations are not sim-
ply logistical or administrative adjustments; rather, they allow states to implement new
policies not found in existing federal law.
Education: 1995 – 2012
From 1995 through 2012, the substance of K-12 education waivers varies across pres-
idential administrations. Under President Clinton, the Department of Education granted
waivers to states enthusiastically. In the first Federal Register Notice describing approved
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waivers granted under the administration’s 1994 reauthorization of the ESEA, the Im-
proving America’s Schools Act (IASA), and the administration’s related education law, the
Goals 2000: Educate America Act, the Department of Education announced that "[s]tates
and communities have new opportunities for flexibility in the use of Federal education
funds in order to improve school effectiveness and academic achievement (44390)." In
practice, these waivers were granted from a wide range of provisions in IASA. Often,
waivers were granted from provisions governing the distribution and use of funds un-
der Title I, a centerpiece of the federal government’s role in education since passage of
ESEA in 1965. For example, in a March 1996 Federal Register Notice the administration
described the waivers approved thus far as such:
[i]n addition to the waivers of targeting and within district allocation pro-
visions described in the earlier notice, this notice includes, among others,
waivers that have been approved regarding provisions governing the statutory
poverty thresholds for implementing schoolwide programs under Title I, the
proportions of funds devoted to professional development in core subject ar-
eas under the Eisenhower Professional Development Program, the formation
of consortia under the Perkins Vocational and Applied Technology Education
Act, and the Public Charter Schools Program (11816).
Subsequent Federal Register Notices indicate that the Clinton administration contin-
ued to approve similar waivers throughout Clinton’s second term. In addition, according
to the Office of Elementary and Secondary Education (1997), the administration granted
Ed-Flex authority to several states under the Goals 2000: Educate America Act. This
authority delegated the Secretary’s waiver authority to a state education agency; to be
eligible for Ed-Flex authority, states were required to complete accountability plans as
outlined in Goals 2000.
With the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act in 2001 (NCLB), the federal gov-
ernment’s role in education changed dramatically (McGuinn 2006). Under IASA, the De-
partment of Education required states to adopt content standards and to assess students
regularly to increase student achievement and, further, to close the achievement gap be-
tween students at the low end of the economic spectrum compared to those at the high
15
end. However, IASA included no penalties for failing to meet these requirements. On the
other hand, NCLB included highly prescriptive testing and accountability requirements
as well as a series of escalating consequences for schools that failed to make adequate
yearly progress, as defined by NCLB (182).
In contrast to the Clinton administration’s use of waivers, as Chapter 2 describes,
following passage of NCLB in 2001 the Bush administration was not open to granting
waivers from this law through 2005. In 2006, however, the administration began to al-
low states to apply for waivers to implement specific programs that allowed states more
flexibility in limited areas, including how to measure and define student growth. The
defining feature of the Bush administration’s approach towards waivers was its limited
willingness to authorize flexibility from federal law in exchange for state experimentation
with different approaches.
I describe the Obama administration’s approach to NCLB waivers in depth in Chap-
ter 2 – here, I provide a brief summary. As discussed above, the Obama administration
introduced the ESEA Flexibility waiver initiative in 2011. In doing so, President Obama
invited states to apply for flexibility from NCLB, which had proved onerous to success-
fully implement and was widely unpopular. But the administration did not simply excuse
states from key provisions of the law and then grant states wide latitude to come up with
alternative programs. Rather, the administration outlined the specific provisions they
were willing to waive and, critically, specified four policy principles that state waiver
plans had to adopt. These policy principles were aligned with the objectives of NCLB but
were not part of existing law.15 Further, the administration quite clearly spelled out the
15Not surprisingly, however, these policy principles aligned closely with the Obama administration’s own
legislative "Blueprint for Reform" that had failed to make headway in Congress. Further, these principles
were far from agreed-upon strategies for improving student and school performance. For example, the
administration required states to adopt "college- and career-ready standards," broadly understood as a ref-
erence to the Common Core State Standards (CCSS), developed by the National Governors Association and
the Council of Chief State School Officers. The CCSS have long been a lightning-rod of debate over the
proper role of the federal government in education. Many conservatives view the CCSS as national stan-
dards, constituting an overreach of authority and an intrusion into the state domain of education (Fuller
2014). In contrast, the National Education Association (2015), the nation’s largest teacher’s union that is
also an important ally of the Democratic Party, endorses the standards as an important tool for improving
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policy options that states could choose from as alternatives to the system set up in NCLB
for identifying and intervening in underperforming schools.
In all, presidents from Clinton through Obama have taken advantage of the general
waiver authority available in both IASA and NCLB, the 1994 and 2001 reauthorizations
of EASA, respectively. However, the substance, scope, and availability of waivers granted
in K-12 education varies to a considerable degree across administrations.
1.2 The Central Argument
In this section I offer a preview of my theory of presidential policymaking through
waivers, which Chapter 4 explains in detail.16
I argue that presidents consider two factors when they decide whether to pursue a
waiver strategy. First, presidents consider whether implementing their policy goals by
signing new legislation is a viable option. The more difficult it is to secure new legisla-
tion, the more likely presidents are to begin looking for alternative policymaking strate-
gies. But if presidents anticipate an easy time working with Congress, there may be little
reason for them to pursue waivers, which require ceding some control to states and ne-
gotiating policy changes on a state-by-state basis. The president’s initial motivation to
pursue waivers, then, stems from his relationship with Congress.
However, the president’s inability to move his preferred agenda through Congress is
not a sufficient condition for him to pursue waivers. When considering a waiver strategy
in lieu of a legislative strategy, the president evaluates how many governors are likely
to cooperate with his waiver strategy. That is, if the president invites states to apply for
waivers, how many governors are willing to invest the time and resources in submitting
an application, negotiating over the details, and implementing a policy change that sat-
student achievement.
16This theory and subsequent investigation is firmly rooted in an understanding of how the president’s
institutional environment shapes his exercise of power. That is, I adopt a presidency-centered approach (in
contrast to a president-centered approach) as I investigate how and when presidents use waivers.
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isfies the president’s administration? If the answer is "not many," the president may want
to pursue a different alternative that does not rely on state cooperation. While a small
number of participants may not hurt the president in a meaningful way, it will also not
go very far in helping him achieve anything approaching national-scale policy reform.
Consider, for example, if only three or four states had applied for ESEA Flexibility when
the Obama administration offered it. President Obama would not have solved his prob-
lem of revising NCLB – while he might have gained some currency with the handful of
states that his administration helped, President Bush’s unpopular law would have still
been operating in full force while President Obama’s reform proposal remained stuck in
Congress. In turn, President Obama would not have been able to credibly claim to have
revised an unpopular law.
However, if the president can count on cooperation from a critical mass of the nation’s
governors, then a waiver strategy may in fact be an attractive alternative when the presi-
dent views the likelihood of signing a new law as low. Further, I argue that governors in
the president’s party are his natural allies. The primary constraint on the president’s use
of a waiver strategy, then, is the share of governors in his party. Based on this argument, I
propose that the president is motivated to pursue a waiver strategy when he finds himself
ideologically far from Congress, contingent on the share of governors in his party.17 To ex-
plain the incentives that motivate the president to pursue a waiver strategy, this theory
incorporates a vertical dimension as well as the horizontal dimension generally included
in the literature on presidential power.
17I also consider whether presidents who are dissatisfied with current law are more likely to use waivers
when they are far from Congress, contingent on the share of governors in their party. In this case, granting
waivers may help the president implement his preferred changes and simultaneously pressure Congress to
reach a compromise that at least weakly satisfies the president’s goals.
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1.3 Bottom-Up vs. Top-Down?
Before proceeding to develop and assess this argument, I address a potential objec-
tion to the approach here. Specifically, I anticipate the objection that this work takes
a "top-down" approach to studying waivers rather than a "bottom-up" perspective. In-
deed, I approach waivers from the president’s perspective, and as a result, my argument
is shaped primarily by the president’s motivations and constraints. However, state ac-
tors do indeed play an important role in the waiver process. For example, in the case of
welfare waivers, an expert in the field emphasized the role that state leaders played in
pushing for reform via demonstration projects.18 I do not dispute this reality. Indeed, my
theoretical framework incorporates the crucial role that governors play in this process –
in my argument, whether or not enough governors are willing to cooperate with a presi-
dent’s request for waivers is a central factor in explaining the president’s use of a waiver
strategy.
Nonetheless, as I explain in Chapter 2, I identify the president’s decision to invite
waivers as the first stage in the waiver process. One could argue, in contrast, that the first
step is in fact governors’ willingness to participate in this process. However, my argument
about the president’s decision to use waivers is rooted in his anticipation of whether gov-
ernors will respond positively to his invitation. In this way, governors’ desires to innovate
and experiment with programs via waivers is very much a part of the waiver process as I
describe it here. The choice I make, given my interest in explaining how and when pres-
idents use a waiver strategy, is to include governors’ attitudes towards waivers as part of
the president’s own decision-making process rather than investigating governors’ goals
regarding waivers in isolation. In this sense, my theory both incorporates the important
role that governors play while simultaneously identifying how the president’s goals and
constraints shape his use of this strategy. Indeed, Chapter 5 is devoted to investigating
when governors choose to submit waiver applications. Moreover, throughout this disser-
18Interview with the author, December 14, 2015.
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tation, I explore how the president and his administration interact with governors and
subsequently reflect on how governors’ preferences and behavior shape the president’s
use of this tool.
1.4 Plan of the Dissertation
This dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I begin with a qualitative investi-
gation of how and when presidents use waivers. Several scholars suggest that presidents
use waivers strategically in pursuit of their policy goals (Thompson 2012; Gais and Fos-
sett 2005; Hacker 2004; Bagenstos 2013; Arsneault 2000; Weissert 2008). However, we
lack a theory that explains the conditions under which presidents are motivated to use
this policymaking tool. The first step in this project, then, is to explore how presidents
and their administrations have used waivers in welfare, Medicaid, and education from
1984 through 2012. The goal of this chapter is to identify conditions that seem to moti-
vate and constrain this strategy. Without this work, we lack an adequate understanding
of the president’s use of this strategy and, as such, are ill-equipped to develop a theory of
presidential policymaking through waivers. Overall, Chapter 2 lays the groundwork for
the theory that I develop in Chapter 4.
Before developing this theory, in Chapter 3 I introduce an original dataset of submit-
ted and approved waivers in welfare, Medicaid, and education from 1984 through 2012.
I argue that this dataset improves on three weaknesses in existing datasets of waivers
used in quantitative analysis. First, it allows for analysis of more than one policy area at
a time, increasing the generalizability of results. Second, it covers a longer time period
than existing work, allowing for enough variation on important institutional constraints
in the president’s policymaking environment. Third, it includes submitted waivers in-
stead of only approved waivers, allowing us to investigate the conditions under which
governors submit waivers and, thus, to assess whether these conditions are consistent
with theoretical expectations.
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I introduce the dataset at this point because doing so allows me to address an impor-
tant question before developing my theory. In the small body of existing quantitative
work on waivers, the president’s role is only peripherally considered. Existing work has
not developed a theoretical framework that accounts for the president’s institutional in-
centives to use waivers, and a common assumption is that the president’s involvement in
this process is limited to him playing partisan favorites. That is, scholars reason that the
president grants more waivers to governors in his party, despite a lack of evidence sup-
porting this assumption. It is important to highlight the underlying implication of this
approach: presidents passively react to waiver applications submitted by opportunistic
governors. This existing framework poses a counter-narrative to the argument I propose
here. Specifically, omission of the president’s institutional incentives in existing work
suggests that waivers are valuable policymaking instruments that governors take advan-
tage of while the president simply authorizes proposals submitted by co-partisans.
Before developing my own theory, then, I use the original dataset introduced at the
beginning of Chapter 3 to assess whether this common assumption is borne out. This
quantitative analysis allows for a fair and perhaps even more thorough test of this as-
sumption than previous work, given the improvements in the data described above. As a
preview of the results, I find only weak and inconsistent evidence that governors in the
president’s party submit more waiver applications than governors in the opposing party.
Further, I find no support for the assumption that the president grants more waivers to
governors in his party than in the opposing party.
At this point, the qualitative evidence is clearly at odds with the way in which existing
quantitative work models the president’s role in the waiver process. While Chapter 2 sug-
gests that presidents grant waivers under certain conditions based on their institutional
constraints, existing models of waivers suggest that presidents simply grant waivers to
co-partisans. Further, Chapter 3 illustrates that tests of this model yield little to no sup-
port for maintaining that this is the case. Together, Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that we
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should move beyond current models of the waiver process that consign the president to
a passive role.
In Chapter 4, I develop a theory of presidential policymaking through waivers. This
theory is fundamentally rooted in scholarship on presidential power, and in particular,
on how the president’s institutional environment shapes his policymaking decisions. The
qualitative evidence explored in Chapter 2 informs my argument that the president is
particularly motivated to pursue a waiver strategy when he is unable to move his agenda
through Congress. At the same time, based on the nature of waiver authority explored
in Chapter 2, I consider the vertical relationship between the president and the nation’s
governors. As discussed above, my central argument is that the president’s use of waivers
depends on his ideological distance from Congress, contingent on the share of governors
in his party. The primary contribution this theory makes is the argument that the presi-
dent’s policymaking strategy is shaped not only by the horizontal constraints imposed by
Congress, but also by vertical constraints imposed by the nation’s governors. From this
theory, I develop a set of testable propositions. Using the original dataset introduced in
Chapter 3, Chapters 5 and 6 assess these propositions.
Specifically, in Chapter 5 I explore a model of waiver submissions based on my theory.
I assess the proposition that governors submit waivers strategically – that is, governors
submit waiver applications when they expect that the president is motivated to approve
waivers. Analyzing submitted waivers in welfare and Medicaid from 1984 through 2012,
I find that governors do indeed submit more waivers precisely when my theory predicts
that the president is motivated to approve these waivers. Specifically, when the president
is far from Congress and a large share of governors is in his party, governors submit more
waiver applications. This analysis offers support for the central argument in that gover-
nors’ strategic application behavior reflects the president’s own institutional incentives
that, I argue, shape his waiver strategy. Yet this analysis does not offer a complete ex-
amination of the president’s waiver strategy, nor does it provide definitive evidence that
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these conditions motivate the president’s waiver strategy.
Chapter 6 subsequently takes up the question at the heart of this dissertation: when do
presidents approve waivers? I assess this question using the original dataset of approved
waivers in welfare, Medicaid, and K-12 education from 1984 through 2012 introduced in
Chapter 3. I first assess the central proposition and find strong evidence that the presi-
dent approves waivers under the conditions my theory articulates: the president grants
more waivers as he moves farther from Congress, contingent on the share of governors
in his party. This evidence suggests that the president’s waiver strategy is motivated by
both horizontal and vertical constraints, consistent with theoretical expectations. Next,
I address directly a consideration that is implicit throughout much of this dissertation:
waivers are particularly valuable to presidents when they are dissatisfied with existing
law. Here, I find evidence that is again consistent with my theory. Presidents grant more
waivers when they are far from Congress, provided that they are dissatisfied with current
law and contingent on the share of governors in their party. Finally, I assess whether we
see waivers under conditions that predict more traditional types of legislative revisions
and find initial evidence that this is in fact the case.
In Chapter 7, I summarize the theory and findings from the previous chapters. I dis-
cuss specific contributions this project makes to scholarship on the presidency and reflect
on further implications of this argument. Finally, I enumerate a number of additional in-
quiries that would build on and extend the analysis here.
The chapters that follow explore how and when presidents use waivers, an unconven-
tional policymaking strategy that looks quite different from the approaches we generally
expect presidents to use. Fundamentally, in this dissertation I explore the possibility that
a waiver strategy allows the president to pursue policy change that is otherwise beyond
his reach via traditional avenues. As such, this inquiry contributes to existing scholarship
by incorporating vertical as well as horizontal relationships into our understanding of the
institutional constraints that shape the exercise of presidential power.
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CHAPTER II
Presidential Use of Waivers Across Policies
A growing chorus of voices suggests that presidents approve waivers in pursuit of
their own policy goals (Teles 1996; Thompson 2012; Bagenstos 2013; Gais and Fossett
2005; Hacker 2004). For example, evaluating how Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush
used Section 1115 Medicaid waivers, Thompson (2012) finds that "demonstration waivers
at the national level have become a major tool of executive action" (158). Hacker (2004)
describes the welfare waivers authorized by the executive branch in the late 1980s as "a
telling example of strategic adaptation to a political context preventing legislated policy
reform" (252). Teles (1996) similarly identifies waivers as a tool that Presidents Reagan
and Clinton used to facilitate welfare reform. More generally, Gais and Fosset (2005)
conclude that "[w]aivers have thus enhanced presidential control of domestic policy and
have diminished congressional influence" (511).
However, these observations do not amount to a theory of presidential policymaking
through waivers. This existing work establishes the plausibility of the argument that
presidents use waivers strategically. Yet, we lack a systematic examination of how and
when presidents use waivers across multiple policy areas. Existing work provides a valu-
able set of snapshots of the waiver process but does not thoroughly examine how the
president uses waivers or, in particular, how his institutional environment motivates (and
constrains) his use of a waiver strategy. This chapter takes up this task and, in doing so,
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builds the foundation for a theory of presidential policymaking through waivers.
Specifically, this chapter has three goals. First, I explain the origin and scope of the
president’s waiver authority in welfare, Medicaid, and education. To do so, I introduce
the statutes that create and define waiver authority in these areas and discuss the broad
discretion the president enjoys in exercising this authority. Second, I outline the three
steps that constitute the waiver process. Here, it becomes clear that governors’ coopera-
tion is critical to the president’s successful use of a waiver strategy. Third, the majority of
this chapter is devoted to exploring when and how presidents have used waivers as part
of a policymaking strategy. I use a qualitative approach here, examining cases in welfare,
Medicaid, and education in which waivers have been used extensively. Ultimately, the
goal is to develop an understanding of the constraints and incentives that systematically
motivate the president’s waiver strategy.
2.1 Waiver Authority
Waivers in welfare and in Medicaid are governed by the same statute in the Social Se-
curity Act Amendments of 1962, while comparable K-12 education waiver authority has
been available since President Clinton’s reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act in 1994. Both statutes grant the president and his administration broad
authority over the waiver process, with little formal oversight from Congress or the bu-
reaucracy. I begin by discussing waiver authority in welfare and Medicaid, followed by
K-12 education.
2.1.1 Welfare and Medicaid
Section 1115(a) of the Social Security Act Amendments of 1962 governs the welfare
and Medicaid waivers I focus on in this project (Swendiman 2012).1 Section 1115 explic-
1Following common practice in the literature on these waivers, I refer to Section 1115(a) simply as
"Section 1115." As mentioned in Chapter 1, throughout this discussion "welfare" refers to Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC). AFDC was originally included in the Social Security Act of 1935 as Aid
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itly authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to "waive compliance"
with certain sections of the Social Security Act "[i]n the case of any experimental, pilot, or
demonstration project which, in the judgment of the Secretary, is likely to assist in pro-
moting the objectives" of certain titles in the Act. Over time, this authority would cover
AFDC, Medicaid, and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (Swendiman 2012,
2). Section 1115 is designed to encourage state innovation and to facilitate flexibility at
the state level at the discretion of the Secretary, which President Kennedy specifically
endorsed:
No study of the public welfare program can fail to note the difficulty of the
problems faced or the need to be imaginative in dealing with them. Accord-
ingly, I recommend that amendments be made to encourage experimental, pi-
lot, or demonstration projects that would promote the objectives of the assis-
tance titles and help make our welfare programs more flexible and adaptable
to local needs (Swendiman 2012, 1).
The House and Senate reports on the Social Security Act Amendments of 1962 echo this
rationale, recognizing that "the Secretary would be authorized to waive plan require-
ments to the extent he believes this action is necessary to carry out a demonstration or
experimental project" (Swendiman 2012, 2).
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports that this waiver authority, dele-
gated to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, is indeed as broad as it sounds in
the legislative text: "While there is little legislative history accompanying this section,
what history there is suggests that the Secretary’s authority is very broad in approving
demonstration projects" (Swendiman 2012, 2). Wiseman’s description of the Bush ad-
ministration’s use of Section 1115 waivers from AFDC underscores the substantive im-
plications of this delegation: "The standards for determining just what promotes the ob-
jectives of the AFDC program are left up to the Secretary and thus reflect, among other
things, administration policy regarding the direction of welfare reform" (Wiseman 1993b,
to Dependent Children (Weaver 2000, 16), while Medicaid and Medicare were added through Titles 19 and
18 of the Social Security Amendments of 1965, respectively (Smith 2002, 13). Section 1115 also governs
waivers under the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (Baumrucker 2008).
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4). Finally, CRS also highlights the deference shown by courts to the administration’s use
of this waiver authority: "In general, the courts have been unwilling to circumscribe the
Secretary’s authority to approve experimental projects under Section 1115 and have re-
jected challenges to such waivers on numerous occasions" (Swendiman 2012, 10-11).
The original goal of Section 1115 was to provide an opportunity for states to experi-
ment with new policies, although as this discussion makes clear, authority over authoriz-
ing this experimentation was expressly delegated to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (HHS). Given that the president appoints the Secretary of HHS as a member of
his administration, this delegation effectively grants control to the president’s adminis-
tration over when and how states are authorized to implement demonstration programs
via waivers.
2.1.2 Secondary Education
The education waivers that I study in this project are governed by a statute that sim-
ilarly gives the president’s administration broad authority over the waiver process. The
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) is the centerpiece of federal
education policy (McGuinn 2006). Congress first included general waiver authority in
the 1994 reauthorization of ESEA, the Improving America’s Schools Act (IASA), which
formed the cornerstone of President Clinton’s education agenda.2 This broad waiver au-
thority was included amidst concerns over the perceived encroachment of the federal
government into education, traditionally a state domain. IASA was the first reauthoriza-
tion of ESEA to include requirements that states develop content standards and admin-
ister assessments to measure whether students were meeting "adequate yearly progress"
benchmarks (McGuinn 2006, 95).
The newly expanded waiver authority in IASA, found in Section 14401, allowed the
2Prior to IASA, the only waiver authority in ESEA was circumscribed and gave the Secretary "specific,
program-based waiver authority" in order, for example, to "waive maintenance of effort requirements as
they applied to specific programs due to exceptional or uncontrollable circumstances or a precipitous de-
cline in the financial resources of a state" (Skinner and Feder 2012, 5).
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Secretary of Education to waive requirements of the Act in order to "(i) increase the qual-
ity of instruction for students; or (ii) improve the academic performance of students" (P.L.
103-382). This provision was included to provide state and local education agencies with
flexibility in implementing federal law. The House and Senate reports on IASA reflect
this interpretation of Section 14401:
The Committee recognizes the need for greater local flexibility in the admin-
istration of Federal education programs and supports the use [of] waivers for
the purpose of improving services and student performance. Administrative
ease is not, in and of itself, a sufficient justification for a waiver of Federal
requirements (Skinner and Feder 2012, 5).3
Despite the language of flexibility, as with Section 1115, authority over K-12 education
waivers was expressly delegated to the Secretary of Education in IASA. This waiver au-
thority was "retained" in Section 9401 of the George W. Bush administration’s subsequent
reauthorization of ESEA, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (Skinner and Feder 2012).
Ultimately, the 1994 and 2001 reauthorizations of ESEA grant the Secretary of Ed-
ucation broad authority over the waiver process. Skinner and Feder (2012) in fact in-
terpret the Secretary of Education’s waiver authority as "discretionary, not mandatory" –
the Secretary of Education is not required to exercise this authority but can invoke it at
her discretion (10). Indeed, a 2006 federal district court upheld this interpretation that
the Department of Education (ED) is not required to grant waiver requests from states.4
Further, Skinner and Feder note that "thus far, there do not appear to have been legal
challenges to ED’s authority to waive statutory requirements under the ESEA" (10).
3Limits to Section 14401 waiver authority include the following: "the Secretary was prohibited from
waiving maintenance of effort requirements, equitable participation of private school students and teach-
ers, and applicable civil rights requirements" (Skinner and Feder 2012, 5).
4Specifically: "the court rejected a state’s challenge to ED’s denial of its waiver request" (Skinner and
Feder 2012, 10).
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2.2 Structure of the Waiver Process
Both statutes governing welfare, Medicaid, and education waivers were designed to
provide states with an option to experiment with programs that depart from the original
legislation but, at the same time, are aligned with the law’s intent. Crucially, author-
ity over this flexibility resides with the sitting secretary of the relevant department. To
date, the secretary’s authority over waivers in these policy areas has not been successfully
challenged. Skinner and Feder (2012) summarize:
...although individual waivers may face legal challenges and may even be
struck down on occasion, the courts will generally uphold an agency’s exercise
of its statutory waiver authority so long as the agency develops an adequate
record regarding its decision to grant a waiver and ensures that the waiver
is granted consistent with the statutory purposes and procedures set forth in
authorizing such waivers (12).
These statutes give the president, via the relevant secretary, authority over granting
and denying waiver requests. While authority is specifically granted to the secretary
rather than to the president, the Secretaries of Health and Human Services and of Edu-
cation are appointed by the president and, as such, act as the president’s agents (Lewis
2003). As Cabinet members, these secretaries are high-ranking members of the presi-
dent’s administration whose goal is to implement the president’s domestic agenda. Con-
sequently, the delegation of waiver authority to the secretary effectively provides the pres-
ident and his administration with control over this policy tool. Indeed, the qualitative
evidence below strongly suggests that the relevant secretaries and their agencies work
closely with the president and his domestic policy team in designing and implementing
waiver strategies.
Granting statutory authority over waivers to the relevant secretary has had impor-
tant consequences, perhaps unintended, for the structure of the waiver process and the
strategic value of waivers to presidents and their administrations. In practice, the waiver
process generally unfolds through the following three steps.5
5These steps are not specifically prescribed in the relevant statutes; exceptions to these steps occur, and
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First, presidents invite states to apply for waivers. Strictly speaking, states can submit
applications that have not been invited by the administration. But, the administration
retains authority over whether to review these applications, and from there, whether
to approve or deny them. As I discuss in subsequent chapters, submitting applications
when the president is not open to approving them is not in a governor’s interest. Indeed,
the only specific reference to "uninvited" waiver applications, to my knowledge, is in the
Obama administration’s 2010 report on ESEA waivers that they approved in 2009; the
Department of Education lists these "uninvited" waivers in contrast to those waivers the
administration invited. However, the administration at that point had indicated that it
was open to using its waiver authority to approve flexibility from federal law for states,
rather than specifically discouraging states from requesting flexibility in general.
Inviting states to apply can entail issuing guidance for the application process, send-
ing formal invitations to governors or other relevant state actors, such as the Chief State
School Officer, and public speeches by the president that announce a waiver initiative.
The administration must also create a system to process these applications; unlike pro-
posed rules and regulations, waiver applications are not vetted through existing chan-
nels. The administration must decide, for example, whether the review process should
take place in the White House or in the relevant department and what role the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) should play.
One objection to this framework is that states (governors, in particular) initiate the
waiver process by pressuring the administration for flexibility. For example, according to
an independent evaluator of welfare waivers, the Reagan administration began granting
waivers from AFDC in response to an outpouring of innovative ideas from states.6 This
type of bottom-up pressure may motivate presidents to pursue a waiver strategy if they
see governors as potential allies. It may in fact be in the president’s own interest to in-
these steps look different depending on the administration and the political context, as I discuss in the next
section.
6Interview with the author, December 14, 2015.
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vite states to apply for waivers once the administration is already confident that enough
governors are willing to submit applications in response to the president’s request. But
as discussed above, the secretary’s authority over waivers is discretionary. If the presi-
dent and his administration feel that granting flexibility from federal law is not in their
interest, they are not obligated to offer states the opportunity to apply for waivers.7 Ul-
timately, I interpret the president’s decision to invite states to apply for flexibility from
federal law as the first step in the waiver process.
Second, states submit applications. While the relevant secretary enjoys broad latitude
in exercising waiver authority in all three policy areas considered here, the secretary can-
not simply hand out waivers. Each governor’s decision to submit a waiver may depend on
many factors, ranging from partisan allegiance to the president and his administration,
ideological agreement on relevant policy goals, the governor’s own re-election concerns,
pressure from fellow governors, state capacity, and public attitudes towards the relevant
federal policy. Which factors are salient may vary, depending on the broader political
context and on the specific policy at hand. Governors may be eager to submit waiver
applications or, on the other hand, the administration may need to actively encourage
governors to participate in this process. How successfully the administration secures co-
operation from governors is, in large part, a determinant of a waiver strategy’s success.
Without participation from governors, the president will not be able to pursue his pre-
ferred policy changes at the state level.
Third, the administration reviews each application and decides whether to approve
each request. Secretaries might grant intermediate approval based on subsequent fulfill-
ment of certain requirements. For example, the Department of Education has offered this
type of intermediate approval for states that have not yet implemented the four policy
principles required under the Obama administration’s ESEA Flexibility initiative (U.S.
7For example, the George W. Bush administration refused to consider substantive waiver applications
from the No Child Left Behind Act during the president’s first term despite repeated state requests for
flexibility from the law.
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Department of Education 2015). The length of the authorized implementation period
varies by policy area, as does the opportunity to extend or renew a waiver.
In their account of evaluating Section 1115 welfare waiver proposals, Gueron and Rol-
ston (2013) illustrate that this review process can be a complicated negotiation between
actors with different priorities and goals, including administration officials, the Office
of Management and Budget, bureaucrats in the relevant agencies, governors, and inde-
pendent evaluators. Additional evidence from welfare and Medicaid waiver negotiations
suggests that members of Congress may advocate on behalf of their state’s governor dur-
ing the review process (Teles 1996; Bagenstos 2013; Thompson 2012). Underscoring the
interaction between state and federal actors during the negotiation process, in his anal-
ysis of Medicaid waivers Thompson (2012) discusses the pivotal role that governors can
play.
While the review process may involve many actors, the administration’s ability to
modify the standards of review and the structure of the review process gives the ad-
ministration significant influence over the content and design of policies implemented
through waivers. For example, the Reagan administration created the Interagency Low
Income Opportunity Advisory Board in 1987 to centralize the review of welfare waiver
proposals under chairman Charles Hobbs, the director of the Office of Policy Develop-
ment in the White House (Gueron and Rolston 2013; Teles 1996).
2.2.1 Implications for Presidential Policymaking
While these statutes provide a mechanism for states to implement new programs in
place of existing federal law, authority over the use of waivers lies with the relevant sec-
retary and by extension, as discussed above, with the president. In practice, presidents
can make waivers available to states at their own discretion. Recall that the Congres-
sional Research Service made a distinction between mandatory and discretionary author-
ity, finding that waiver authority is discretionary. The central implication here is that
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presidents are not in fact required to review applications submitted by states, allowing
the president to deny states the opportunity to deviate from federal law via waivers. On
the other hand, if presidents are motivated to use waivers, they are free to pursue this
option by inviting states to apply.
Beyond making the final decision on whether or not to approve state waiver applica-
tions, presidents enjoy many opportunities to shape the policy content of waivers. The
administration can decide the standards by which applications will be reviewed. These
standards can have substantive implications – for example, by requiring that the cost of
a program would not increase under Section 1115 waivers, the Reagan administration
prevented waivers from being used as vehicles for additional federal funds (Gueron and
Rolston 2013). Presidents can also explicitly outline the policy changes that they prefer
and can offer to fast-track the approval process for waivers that implement these pro-
grams, as the Clinton administration did in the case of welfare. And as mentioned above,
in the case of Obama’s use of No Child Left Behind waivers, the administration required
states to adopt policies that were not a part of existing law as a condition for receiving
(and maintaining) waivers. Although presidents cannot implement a waiver strategy uni-
laterally given the necessity of state cooperation, presidents enjoy a high degree of control
over the waiver process.
2.3 Exploring Waivers across Presidencies
When and how presidents exercise waiver authority remains an open question that I
investigate below. This qualitative work addresses the third goal of this chapter. Specif-
ically, through cases in welfare, Medicaid, and education, I explore the president’s use
of waivers and begin to identify the constraints and incentives that appear to shape this
strategy. This qualitative work is not meant to test or assess a specific idea about when
and how presidents use waivers. Rather, it is designed as a theory-generating analysis of
relevant evidence.
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As such, in the sections below I review different types of sources, including archival
documents from the Clinton Presidential Library, secondary academic sources, inter-
views, public opinion data, reports from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and
Government Accountability Office (GAO), Congressional Quarterly (CQ), and primary
sources including the text of policy documents and speeches.8 The goal is to identify
how presidents and their administrations approach waivers and to explore how the po-
litical context influences the president’s use of this policy tool.
2.3.1 Welfare Waivers: 1984 – 1996
In this section, I examine how presidents Reagan and Clinton approached the waiver
process in the context of welfare reform. While Section 1115 created waiver authority
in 1962, Lieberman and Shaw (2000) note that "fewer than a dozen significant welfare
reform waivers were granted prior to 1977" (223). Following passage of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, this tool gained prominence (Shaw and Lieberman
2000). As a result, most accounts of welfare waivers begin with the Reagan adminis-
tration (Greenberg and Wiseman 1992; Teles 1996; Lieberman and Shaw 2000; Gueron
and Rolston 2013). The opportunity to invite states to apply for waivers dovetailed with
President Reagan’s domestic agenda that involved dismantling federal social programs
through devolution, which may help explain the increased role this type of policymaking
tool played during his administration.9 This discussion of welfare waivers ends in 1996,
when President Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act
(PRWORA). Welfare waivers were rendered moot with the transition to welfare as a block
grant rather than an entitlement.
8The rhetoric typical of public speeches is certainly tailored to the audience and as such should not
be interpreted as a forthright explanation of the president’s goals or policy preferences. These speeches
are nonetheless informative, particularly given the inquiry at hand. If presidents never mention waivers in
public speeches, this could indicate that this tool did not play an important role in advancing their agendas.
However, if presidents mention waivers in public speeches, this may indicate that the administration thinks
strategically about this policy tool.
9And as discussed in Chapter 1, the increase in partisan polarization in Congress beginning in 1977 may
similarly have contributed to presidents’ uses of alternative policymaking strategies.
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Reagan’s Welfare Strategy: "Up from Dependency"
I begin by discussing the Reagan administration’s approach to waivers. Reducing the
federal role in welfare was one of President Reagan’s primary domestic objectives during
his second term (Fishman and Weinberg 1992; Teles 1996; Weaver 2000; Conlan 2010).
President Reagan introduced his focus on welfare reform in his 1986 State of the Union
address, in which he charged the Domestic Policy Council with developing a strategy
for decreasing dependency.10 Following this call to action, the White House Domestic
Policy Council created the Low Income Opportunity Working Group, which researched
and published its findings in a report entitled "Up from Dependency: A New National
Public Assistance Strategy" (Fishman and Weinberg 1992, 116). Reagan’s subsequent
welfare reform strategy, and in particular his administration’s approach to waivers, was
shaped by this report (Teles 1996), which concluded, perhaps not surprisingly, that na-
tional meddling in welfare reform was not productive. Rather, the Up from Dependency
report concluded that states should be allowed additional flexibility to pursue innovative
solutions:
Our mandate from the President was to study the welfare system and to pro-
pose a strategy to change that system so that it better serves the poor and
the society...The federal government should first of all do nothing to add to
the confusion of the current system by introducing more changes or "reforms"
until this country better knows what both relieves poverty and reduces depen-
dency. Instead, the federal government should initiate a program of widespread,
long-term experiments in welfare policy through state-sponsored and community-
based demonstration projects (3).
Reagan subsequently introduced a "new national welfare strategy" in his 1987 State of
the Union address; this strategy relied on "reform through state-sponsored, community-
10"After hundreds of billions of dollars in poverty programs, the plight of the poor grows more painful.
But the waste in dollars and cents pales before the most tragic loss: the sinful waste of human spirit and
potential. We can ignore this terrible truth no longer....Tonight I am charging the White House Domestic
Council to present me by December 1, 1986, an evaluation of programs and a strategy for immediate action
to meet the financial, educational, social, and safety concerns of poor families. I’m talking about real and
lasting emancipation, because the success of welfare should be judged by how many of its recipients become
independent of welfare."
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based demonstration projects," echoing the recommendations of the Up from Depen-
dency report almost verbatim. However, Reagan’s legislative proposal to reform welfare
via this avenue of state experimentation was not embraced by Congress. As Teles (1996)
explains, Charles (Chuck) Hobbs, an assistant to the President who worked in the White
House Office of Policy Development, designed the administration’s waiver strategy after
this failed legislative effort:
Facing a Congress that was at best indifferent and at worst hostile, Hobbs fol-
lowed an alternative course, acting on the changes that the administration
desired without adjustments to law - in fact, as if those changes had already
occurred. [Hobbs said:] ‘So I went to Reagan and said, what we need to do
is put together some kind of administration task force that’s going to look
at these waivers, because the secretariats are reluctant about granting waivers
because their own bureaucracies are telling them, ‘you don’t want to let a state
do that’ (126).
Given these conversations between the president and one of his top policy advisors
about how to approach waivers, it seems that despite the rhetoric of state flexibility, the
administration viewed waivers as a valuable policymaking avenue after failing to decen-
tralize welfare through legislation. Reagan took Hobbs’s advice and created the Intera-
gency Low Income Opportunity Advisory Board (ILIOAB) via Executive Order on July
20, 1987 (Fishman and Weinberg 1992). Hobbs chaired the board, signaling the shift in
authority over waiver review from different agency heads to this centralized board within
the White House. According to both Fishman and Weinberg (1992) and Teles (1996), this
reorganization was designed to give the administration more control over not only the
review process but also the policy content of programs operated through waivers.11
11Indeed, Fishman and Weinberg (1992) describe how "[the] purpose of the Board was to enhance coor-
dination of federal public assistance programs and policies that cut across department lines and to create
a focal point for intergovernmental coordination. During its first year in existence, the Board focused its
efforts on encouraging the submission and review of state welfare reform demonstration proposals" (117).
Teles (1996) describes the substantive effect of creating this board: "Centralizing authority in the White
House facilitated the subsequent explosion in waiver activity in three significant ways. First and most
obvious, it simplified the administrative process of approving waivers. Second, it centralized, in the gover-
nors’ mind, the relevant actors and motivations that they had to take into account. Third, it permitted the
White House to take over the waiver process and use it as a means for pursuing long-term political goals,
such as restructuring the federal nature of the program and encouraging welfare reform, and it convinced
the governors that more petty, partisan motivations were no longer active considerations in the waiver
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Specifically, the review criteria for waiver applications included consistency with the
president’s policy goals, cost neutrality (the demonstration implemented through the
waiver would not result in increased federal spending), and an evaluation designed to
measure the "net effects upon dependency and the cost effectiveness of the demonstra-
tion as a whole" (Fishman and Weinberg 1992, 118). Waiver applications were sent to the
Board, and the Chairman would make a recommendation to the Secretary. Although the
Board was technically advisory, "the formal Board recommendation was followed in all
cases" (119). This case suggests that the Reagan administration capitalized on the broad
authority granted to the Secretary of HHS in Section 1115 to design a waiver process that
allowed his administration to authorize state-level innovation that aligned with Reagan’s
domestic agenda.
The Reagan administration’s invitation for states to apply for waivers was met with
twenty-six applications between July 1987 (creation of the ILIOAB) and October 1988,
when Congress passed the Family Support Act (FSA). In only one year, just over half the
nation’s governors had submitted waiver applications. Of the twenty-six waivers submit-
ted, sixteen were approved and ten were withdrawn or denied (Fishman and Weinberg
1992, 119).12 These welfare demonstrations allowed the administration to at least par-
tially follow-through on its promise to expand the state role in welfare while simultane-
ously working to reduce dependency absent a legislative success for the administration in
this arena. In his 1988 State of the Union address, Reagan pointed to two specific demon-
strations in Wisconsin and New Jersey as evidence of his reform strategy in motion; he
also used these "successes" to advocate for his legislative proposal that relied primarily on
state experimentation rather than federal intervention to reduce dependency on welfare.
President Reagan subsequently signed a welfare reform bill, the Family Support Act, on
process" (Teles 1996, 127).
12Fishman and Weinberg’s (1992) review of the sixteen approved AFDC waivers shows that the final
evaluation methods in the approved waivers were in general more rigorous than the methods originally
proposed by the states, reflecting that "approval of a state’s demonstration request was related to its will-
ingness to adopt a fairly rigorous evaluation design" (126).
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October 13, 1988. By many accounts, the administration’s use of waivers between his
1986 State of the Union address and this legislative victory in 1988 were a key part of his
overall efforts to reform welfare.13
Clinton’s Quest to "End Welfare as We Know It"
Similar to the Reagan administration’s strategy, the evidence discussed below suggests
that President Clinton adapted the waiver process as he pursued legislative reform of the
nation’s welfare system. Within weeks of taking office, in February 1993 Clinton spoke
at the National Governors Association winter meeting and specifically invited the na-
tion’s governors to experiment with innovative approaches to welfare reform via Section
1115 waivers.14 This public appeal for waivers was not an anomaly; throughout his first
term, Clinton encouraged governors to apply for waivers repeatedly via public speeches
and touted his record on approving states’ proposals.15 The Clinton administration also
made its own procedural mark on the waiver process, dissolving the Interagency Low In-
come Opportunity Advisory Board (ILOAB) created under Reagan and shifting primary
responsibility for review of waivers back to HHS (Teles 1996, 136).
Ultimately, Clinton aspired to sign the national welfare reform law that he promised
in his campaign for president would "end welfare as we know it." Clinton introduced
his first (and long-awaited) welfare reform proposal, the Work and Responsibility Act of
1994, on June 14, 1994. However, the House Ways and Means committee never reported
13While waiver activity continued under the George H.W. Bush administration, there were few substan-
tial changes between the Bush administration’s waiver process and the Reagan administration’s waiver
process. As Teles (1996) notes, welfare was not a central pillar of President Bush’s domestic agenda; Teles
interprets President Bush’s discussion of welfare reform via waivers in the 1992 State of the Union as a re-
sponse to then-Governor Clinton’s focus on welfare reform during the presidential campaign. As Wiseman
(1996) reports, twenty-two waiver applications were submitted between Bush’s 1992 State of the Union
address and the end of his administration the following January. Of these, fourteen waivers were approved
during the Bush administration and eight were later approved under Clinton (617).
14As described in Chapter 5, Clinton reassured the governors that "[my] view is that we ought to give you
more elbow room to experiment."
15For example, on July 20, 1995, President Clinton addressed the National Conference of State Legisla-
tures and proudly advertised his administration’s record on approving welfare waivers: "I’ve also tried to
give you more say in your own affairs...In the last 2 1/2 years, more States have received waivers than in
the previous 12 years of the previous two administrations combined."
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it to the full chamber (248).16 A year and a half into his presidency, Clinton’s welfare
agenda had barely gotten off the ground in Congress.
Approximately at the same time as Clinton’s first welfare legislative proposal sank in
Congress, HHS published a Federal Register Notice outlining the administration’s welfare
waiver policies and procedures. This timing suggests that the Clinton administration
began investing more heavily in a waiver strategy as the prospects of legislative reform
dimmed. Specifically, on September 27, 1994, Secretary of HHS Donna Shalala issued
a Notice inviting Section 1115 waiver applications and describing the procedure HHS
would use to evaluate these waiver proposals. Simultaneously, this Notice underscored
the administration’s discretion over the process:
The Department desires to facilitate the testing of new policy approaches to
social problems. Such demonstrations can provide valuable knowledge that
will help lead to improvements in achieving the purposes of the Act. The De-
partment also is committed to both a thorough and an expeditious review of
State requests to conduct such demonstrations. In exercising her discretionary
authority, the Secretary has developed a number of policies and procedures for
reviewing proposals.
Through this Notice, the administration outlines its expectations for waiver applica-
tions, much as Reagan’s ILIOAB outlined its own criteria for waiver approval. While the
Clinton administration did not stake out clear policy preferences here, they note that
"the Department will work with States to develop research and demonstrations in areas
consistent with the Department’s policy goals" and that HHS would also "[consider] pro-
posals that test alternatives that diverge from that policy direction." Trying to walk this
line of encouraging innovation and pursuing the Department’s policy goals, the Notice
also states that the Secretary reserved the right to "disapprove or limit proposals on policy
grounds." This approach reflects the administration’s broader strategy regarding welfare
reform. As Weaver (2000) observes, Clinton did not stake out clear policy positions re-
16The bill’s fate may have been sealed by the approaching midterm elections; according to Weaver, "many
House Democrats...viewed the House consideration of welfare reform in 1994 as a potential political disas-
ter in the November elections...committee markup and floor debate on welfare reform legislation posed a
series of threatening "Bad choices" on amendments that the Republicans were certain to propose" (247).
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garding welfare reform (324), rather remaining broadly committed to reform in general.
Concurrent with setbacks in the legislative arena during the administration’s drawn-
out and often frustrating negotiations with Congress over welfare reform, Clinton himself
frequently pointed to his administration’s authorization of welfare waivers as evidence of
successful reform. He drew a sharp contrast between Congress’s inability (or refusal) to
work with him on welfare reform and his active efforts to work with states on welfare
reform via waivers. Repeatedly, he emphasized that his administration had approved
more welfare waivers than previous administrations combined. An interview with Tom
Brokaw on NBC Nightly News on January 26, 1995, exemplifies this rhetoric:
I sent welfare reform legislation to the Congress last year, and when they
didn’t pass it, we just kept on giving States permission to get around the Fed-
eral rules to move people from welfare to work and to support responsible
parenting, 24 States, more than were given waivers from the Federal rules in
the previous 12 years combined.
In the fall of 1995, the president faced the unpleasant task of threatening to veto a
welfare reform bill that Secretary Shalala argued "would push more than a million more
children into poverty" (Weaver 2000, 312). In this atmosphere HHS announced an up-
dated waiver review process on August 16, 1995. HHS offered an expedited approval
process (30 days) for applications that proposed programs which implemented five poli-
cies the administration endorsed.17 As Clinton’s legislative battle with Congress over
welfare reform dragged on, and the president’s veto threat left him vulnerable to Repub-
lican charges of obstruction, the administration remained committed to granting waivers.
However, the waiver process was not frictionless. The administration’s difficulty in
working with Republicans in Congress over welfare reform extended to negotiations with
Republican governors as well.18 Defending the president’s waiver program from these
17These policies included: "(1) Work requirements, including limited exemptions from such require-
ments; (2) time-limited assistance for those who can work; (3) improving payment of child support by
requiring work for those owing support; (4) requirements for minor mothers to live at home and stay in
school; and (5) public-private partnerships under which AFDC grants are diverted to private employers to
develop jobs and training programs (42574)."
18The administration clashed periodically with the Republican Governor’s Association (RGA). For ex-
ample, an internal White House memo from July 7, 1996, notes that a Republican congressional proposal
40
partisan attacks was a priority for members of the president’s Domestic Policy Council.
For example, in preparation for the National Governors Association winter meeting in
1996, the administration anticipated questions such as, "Several Republican governors
have complained that the Clinton Administration is holding up reform by refusing to
grant states waivers. How do you respond?" (Welfare Waivers Briefing Book for NGA
1996). The administration’s prepared response echoes the theme in Clinton’s speeches
on the subject, highlighting that the administration had approved more waivers than the
Bush administration and maintaining that "[our] record on state flexibility is consistent
and clear, and we’re working hard with the states to approve the pending waiver re-
quests."19 Further, the HHS welfare waivers briefing book shows that the administration
was prepared to defend its efforts to compromise with Governor Merrill, a Republican, if
asked whether the Clinton administration was "refusing" to grant his waiver:
No. In fact, after substantive and productive conversations with Governor
Merrill’s staff, we offered to "fast track" part of his waiver application in Oc-
tober. On November 8, having received no reply from New Hampshire, we
again wrote Governor Merrill’s human services director, restating our willing-
ness to work with him. On January 24, after more than two months, we re-
ceived the state’s responses to our "fast track" offer, and we’re currently work-
ing with Governor Merrill to resolve any remaining issues. In fact, Secretary
Shalala personally called the governor this week to restate our desire to move
promptly on his request (Welfare Waivers Briefing Book for NGA 1996).
The extent to which top members of President Clinton’s Domestic Policy Council were
briefed on how to respond to pushback on the waiver process suggests that the adminis-
tration worked hard to create (and protect) a narrative in which the administration was
that the White House opposed was initially adopted in response to a letter from the RGA. This battle was
one among many that suggests an ideological divide between not only members of Congress and the White
House, but Republican governors and the administration as well.
19The briefing book in preparation of the 1996 NGA contains talking points for each state waiver ap-
plication and illustrates that the administration consistently negotiated with states over specific details of
each request. Anticipated questions about specific negotiations revealed that the administration stood its
ground on certain policy issues rather than rubber-stamping proposed demonstrations. Specifically, the
administration was prepared to answer questions about its negotiations with California over its proposed
"family cap" waiver: "a family cap should be designed to limit benefits to an AFDC recipient if she has
additional children, not to deny a teenage mother assistance when she has her first child...under Califor-
nia’s proposal, a dependent minor could not receive benefits for her first child if she were living in a family
receiving AFDC" (Welfare Waivers Briefing Book for NGA 1996).
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committed to authorizing welfare reform via state-level demonstration projects. It ap-
pears that this message was not simply empty rhetoric. States responded quite positively
to the administration’s repeated invitations for waiver applications, and in turn, the ad-
ministration approved many of these applications, as Table 2.1 shows below.20
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996
Submitted 24 27 37 34
Approved 10 14 32 28
Table 2.1: Clinton Administration Section 1115 Welfare Waivers
2.3.2 Similarities Across Reagan and Clinton
Section 1115 authority provides presidents and their administrations with broad dis-
cretion over the waiver process, and the Reagan and Clinton administrations appear to
have used this authority to their advantage. The evidence reviewed above suggests that
both presidents viewed waivers as a valuable mechanism of policy change. It is also
worth noting that both presidents pursued waivers while they simultaneously worked to
reform welfare via legislation, a process that proved to be an uphill battle for both ad-
ministrations. During these legislative efforts, both presidents routinely highlighted their
commitment to authorizing reform via waivers, allowing them to claim credit for revising
a widely unpopular program even in the absence of successful legislative revision.
This approach may have been particularly useful given the thorny nature of welfare
politics. Indeed, Weaver (2000) observes that in the 1990s, "rather than a firm advan-
tage for a single party on the welfare issue, poll data show a public that had high hopes
and demands for reform but was quick to lose faith when politicians failed to deliver
or delivered a program the public believed had serious flaws" (191). With these high
20Please see Chapter 3 for a discussion of the rate of waiver approvals. Please note that throughout this
dissertation, the reported number of approved and submitted waivers omits waivers for which I could not
identify the relevant year of submission or approval, or the state of the applicant. The tables and graphs of
submitted and approved waivers also omit territories and Washington, D.C., as these waivers are omitted
from quantitative analysis since U.S. territories and D.C. do not have governors. The goal is to discuss the
number of submitted and approved waivers relevant for the analysis consistently throughout the entire
dissertation.
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stakes, promoting state reform via waivers may have helped both administrations insti-
gate reform at the state level that aligned with their own goals while diffusing some of
the tension characteristic of debates over welfare reform.
2.3.3 Medicaid Waivers: 1992 – 2012
As with the welfare waivers discussed above, Medicaid waivers are governed by Sec-
tion 1115 in the Social Security Act Amendments of 1962.21 Here, I continue my investi-
gation of when and how presidents use waivers in the context of the Clinton, George W.
Bush, and Obama administrations’ use of Section 1115 Medicaid waivers.
Clinton and Healthcare Reform
At the beginning of Clinton’s first term, there was widespread support for revamping
the nation’s healthcare system; similar to the issue of welfare, Clinton had campaigned
heavily on achieving legislative reform in this area.22 Upon taking office, President Clin-
ton quickly signaled his willingness to authorize revisions to Medicaid through waivers.
At the same February 1993 National Governors Association winter meeting in which
President Clinton encouraged governors to apply for welfare waivers, he made public
remarks reassuring governors that he had ordered HHS "to take immediately a series of
actions designed to streamline the Medicaid waiver process to enable the States of our
country to serve more people at lower costs."
21While Medicaid waiver authority has technically been available since 1962, Thompson and Burke
(2007) note that these waivers were "used sparingly during the first quarter century of the Medicaid pro-
gram" (2008, 23). Beginning with the first Clinton administration, these waivers came into more regular
use. For this reason, this analysis of Medicaid waivers begins with the first Clinton administration.
22Congressional Quarterly (CQ) highlights the salience of this issue in President Clinton’s first year in
office: "the subject [of the U.S. health-care system] dominated the pages of the nation’s newspapers; it was
on prime time television; and it was the chief topic of conferences and seminars held not only by health
groups, but by teachers, churches, unions and corporations" (Health-Care Debate Takes Off). Not only
was the topic the subject of much public discussion – as with welfare, many Americans were ready for
change, yet exactly what that change should look like was the subject of intense debate. CQ summarizes
this atmosphere: "Most Americans also felt strongly about the system’s failings. A Wall Street Journal/NBC
News poll published March 12 showed that 74 percent believed an overhaul was needed...While there was
broad agreement that something needed to be done, however, disputes quickly arose when the topic turned
to what trade-offs to make and how to pay for a new system" (Health-Care Debate Takes Off).
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The Clinton administration continued to publicly highlight this commitment to au-
thorizing Medicaid waivers even as the president’s legislative efforts to reform healthcare
moved sluggishly. President Clinton had originally announced that his healthcare task
force would produce a legislative proposal within 90 days, but this deadline came and
went with no proposal while controversy plagued the task force (Health-Care Debate
Takes Off). Finally, on September 22, 1993, President Clinton announced a sweeping leg-
islative plan to overhaul the nation’s healthcare system (Health-Care Debate Takes Off).
However, by this point Congress was distracted with the Clinton administration’s North
American Free Trade proposal, and healthcare reform stalled again (Health-Care Debate
Takes Off). Following the administration’s failed efforts to secure legislative overhaul of
the health care system, the Federal Register published a Notice from the Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA) in HHS on January 13, 1994, that highlighted the ad-
ministration’s interest in working with states to reform welfare via waivers.23
As in the case of welfare reform, HHS and President Clinton worked in tandem to
encourage governors to submit waiver applications. In particular, Clinton continued to
publicly highlight his administration’s commitment to reform via waivers as his legisla-
tive agenda continued to meet with resistance in Congress. For example, on July 19,
1994, Clinton discussed his personal commitment to authorizing state demonstrations
via waivers in a meeting with the National Governors Association:
Finally, let me make this statement and ask for your help, I very strongly sup-
port the continued issues of comprehensive waivers in the areas of health care
and welfare reform...I received a report before I came here on all the applica-
tions that any of you have pending for comprehensive waivers, and I reviewed
them, and I have taken a personal interest in trying to push them through.
23This Notice also reflects growing concerns over budget deficits, warning that the administration would
pay close attention to the cost of proposed demonstrations: "the [State] agency must furnish the estimated
yearly costs, before waivers and after waivers, for both service costs and administrative costs. These budgets
are substantially more extensive than the budget for other applications." It is worth noting that although
this Notice was published in January 1994, an editorial note in the Notice indicates that it was originally
dated July 20, 1993, and authored by Bruce Vladeck, the Administrator of HCFA. This suggests that the
administration was developing a Medicaid waiver process even as they worked on healthcare legislation
during the summer of 1993.
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By September 1994, Congressional Quarterly reported that the Clinton administra-
tion’s ambitious healthcare reform plan was "laid to rest" – only two months later, the
administration would suffer another setback when the Republican party took over both
houses of Congress in the midterm elections (Clinton’s Health Care Plan Laid to Rest).
On the legislative front, the administration’s ability to deliver on its campaign promise of
healthcare reform seemed weak, at best. At the same time, HHS continued encouraging
states to submit proposals for reforming Medicaid via waivers. A Federal Register Notice
published in September 1994 detailed the administration’s procedure for approving Sec-
tion 1115 Medicaid waivers and specifically noted that the Department was "committed
to both a thorough and an expeditious review of State requests to conduct such demon-
strations."24
However, this is not to say that the administration rubber-stamped state applications.
For example, archival documents show a lengthy back-and-forth between the adminis-
tration and Republican Governor George Pataki over New York’s Section 1115 waiver
proposal. In a memo dated May 18, 1995, Chris Jennings, a member of the White House
Domestic Policy Council, advised a fellow administration member of the contentious pol-
itics surrounding this waiver proposal:
It is important to note that Governor Pataki’s recent proposed cuts in Med-
icaid are creating firestorms of protest from our traditional "base." Many of
the inner-city hospitals and the unions that represent them are claiming that
the Governor’s proposals...could result in significant layoffs, particularly in
New York City. This controversy has already attracted the personal atten-
tion/involvement of Harold Ickes and [Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices] Donna Shalala. In short, there are some major league politics here (Med-
icaid Waivers [3] 1995).
While President Clinton repeatedly reached out publicly to governors, asking them to
submit applications and promising his administration’s cooperation during the review
24The Notice also indicates that it will apply the principle of cost neutrality "flexibly" and will consider
the cost of the demonstration over the life of the demonstration, rather than on a year-by-year basis. This
criterion is a more flexible interpretation of cost neutrality compared to the Reagan administration’s appli-
cation of this principle.
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phase, these negotiations suggest that the administration remained committed to pro-
tecting its own political interests throughout this process. Further, this exchange suggests
that negotiations over waivers with Republican governors were at times heated, echoing
the partisan discord between President Clinton and Republicans in Congress.
In addition, perhaps sensing the policymaking opportunities that waivers provided
the administration absent a compromise with Congress over legislation, the Republican-
led Congress questioned the administration’s use of Section 1115 waivers. The House
Budget committee requested a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the
administration’s use of waivers, and memos between members of the administration in
March and April of 1995 suggest that the draft did not reflect well on the administration.
In fact, archival evidence suggests the administration defended itself from a number of
what it perceived as inaccuracies in the GAO draft report. For example, the adminis-
tration’s response to the GAO draft report contested GAO’s finding that the Medicaid
waivers would increase spending, an accusation that Republicans could use to their ad-
vantage given the high salience of balancing the federal budget at this time.25 Further,
the administration justified its approach to reviewing Section 1115 demonstration waiver
applications in response to the GAO draft report’s finding that the Clinton administration
had modified the Section 1115 waiver review policies (Medicaid Waivers [4] 1995).
As in the case of welfare, it appears that not only did high-level officials defend the
administration’s use of Section 1115 waivers, but the Clinton administration emphasized
its role in promoting reform via waivers even as President Clinton found himself in the
unfortunate position of vetoing healthcare reform legislation passed by the Republican
Congress.26 In all, states responded positively to the administration’s repeated invitation
for Section 1115 Medicaid waivers, as Table 2.2 shows. The administration approved
25Specifically, the administration drafted this response: "We believe that each demonstration is budget
neutral and disagree with GAO’s preliminary analysis of the financing provisions of four Statewide Medi-
caid demonstrations discussed in the draft report" (Medicaid Waivers [4] 1995).
26Clinton vetoed the 1996 budget reconciliation bill HR 2491 on December 6, 1995 (Presidential Veto
Message).
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the majority of these waivers before Clinton signed into law healthcare reform via the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA), which included the State Children’s Health Insurance
Program (SCHIP).27
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Submitted 4 13 24 20 8 7 3 2 2
Approved 2 18 4 18 6 4 4 2 2
Table 2.2: Section 1115 Medicaid Waivers, 1992-1996
After passage of the BBA of 1997, it was not guaranteed that states would eagerly im-
plement a law that was passed not because of wide bipartisan consensus, but after years
of contentious debate and grudging compromise. While Republicans in Congress were
politically motivated to compromise over healthcare reform, governors and state actors
responsible for implementing the federally-mandated changes did not necessarily face
the same political pressure to cooperate with the administration’s healthcare overhaul.
This political context may help explain why the administration continued to approve sev-
eral Section 1115 demonstration waivers following passage of the BBA. A former White
House policy advisor explains that the administration was interested in extending flexi-
bility to governors to incentivize implementation of the new law while ensuring that the
president’s priorities were maintained.28 Specifically, the administration was willing to
waive requirements for states if doing so would result in expanded coverage for the unin-
sured.29 In particular, waiver negotiations were useful in working with governors whose
goals aligned with the president’s focus on coverage expansion.30
George W. Bush and HIFA
The George W. Bush administration continued to seek and grant Section 1115 Med-
icaid waivers. According to Thompson and Burke (2007), compared to the Clinton ad-
27Clinton signed the BBA on August 5, 1997. According to CQ, the law "made sweeping changes" (Big
Medicare, Medicaid Changes Enacted in Budget Bills).
28Interview with the author, April 20, 2015.
29Interview with the author, April 20, 2015.
30Interview with the author, April 20, 2015.
47
ministration, the George W. Bush administration more clearly articulated specific pol-
icy goals for these waivers through its Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability
(HIFA) initiative. But in many ways, the administration’s use of waivers continued along
the path set out by the Clinton administration (Thompson and Burke 2007). Here, I
briefly describe a particular aspect of the Bush administration’s approach toward Section
1115 Medicaid waivers notable for its failure to generate state interest, in contrast to the
episodes discussed above.
While the Bush administration successfully incorporated some of its preferred re-
visions to Medicaid in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, including market-based re-
forms, the administration failed to achieve its goal of transforming Medicaid into a block
grant (Thompson 2012, 144). As Thompson explains, the administration’s response was
to "strongly encourage" states to adopt this change via waivers (144). Indeed, the Bush
administration went out of its way to incentivize such waiver applications: "States that
proved amenable to this approach would gain vast flexibility to reinvent their programs
but would need to accept a five-year global cap on their Medicaid expenditures" (144).
Despite pressure from the administration to adopt these reforms, Thompson finds that
in fact, "[m]ost states resisted this approach" (144). This episode suggests that while the
president can exercise control over the waiver process by inviting waivers and creating
the standards for review, cooperation from governors is not a foregone conclusion. In
this case, even when offering broad flexibility, the administration could not implement
its preferred reforms via waivers.
The Unfolding case of "Obamacare" Waivers
Debate over and passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)
was infamously polarizing – not a single Republican voted for President Obama’s land-
mark domestic achievement. As passed by Congress and signed by President Obama
in March 2010, the ACA (otherwise known as "Obamacare") required states to expand
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Medicaid coverage. Here, I discuss the Obama administration’s approach toward Section
1115 waivers in the wake of the June 28, 2012, Supreme Court ruling National Federa-
tion of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius that effectively made state Medicaid expansion
optional.
Bagenstos (2013) explains that the Obama administration was open to granting gov-
ernors flexibility in order to facilitate implementation of the ACA, similar to Clinton’s
willingness to approve waivers following passage of the BBA in 1997:
With the statute already a target of vigorous political attack, Obama Admin-
istration officials felt an acute need not to unnecessarily alienate the state offi-
cials on whom they would rely for its implementation. And with the Medicaid
expansion specifically under attack in the courts for being burdensome on and
coercive of the states, administration officials were keen to limit the burdens
imposed by Medicaid to the extent that they could do so. The Administration
(in a process implemented by the Department of Health and Human Services,
but encouraged if not driven by the White House) thus adopted a relatively
general policy of flexibility toward states’ efforts to carry out their obligations
under the ACA (4).
However, given the divisive nature of Obamacare, opting into the ACA’s Medicaid ex-
pansion via a waiver could be politically costly for governors, particularly Republicans.
Indeed, Republican presidential candidate Governor John Kasich of Ohio has been criti-
cized by Republicans during the primary campaign for using a waiver to expand Medi-
caid (Laszewski 2015). Nonetheless, governors appear to be pursuing the waivers on offer
by the administration. As of November 2015, six states had Section 1115 waiver propos-
als from the ACA approved (Musumeci and Rudowitz 2015).31 Musumeci and Rudowitz
(2015) seem to agree with Bagenstos’s assessment that the administration has an incen-
tive to use waivers to make Medicaid expansion more politically palatable for governors:
"In some cases, alternative models to implement expansion through waivers are seen as a
politically viable way to extend coverage and capture enhanced federal matching funds
for newly eligible adults" (2015, 1). Nonetheless, the Center for Medicare and Medi-
31In addition, New Hampshire is moving from a state plan amendment to a waiver, and Pennsylvania had
a waiver approved but is instead using a state plan amendment. Two other states, Arizona and Michigan,
have waiver applications pending (Musumeci and Rudowitz 2015).
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caid Services (CMS) has denied several Section 1115 waiver proposals under the ACA.32
Musumeci and Rudowitz underscore this point that the administration has not ceded all
leverage to governors for the sake of implementing the law:
CMS has issued guidance that establishes some parameters for such waivers.
Through this guidance, CMS has indicated that states cannot receive the en-
hanced federal funding available for newly eligible adults unless they imple-
ment the full expansion to cover all newly eligible adults through 138 percent
FPL; it also will not approve enrollment caps for the adult expansion group"
(2015, 4).
Facing repeated attempts by Republicans in Congress to repeal the ACA, the Obama
administration appears to be using Section 1115 waiver authority to facilitate implemen-
tation of its central domestic achievement that is continuously vilified by Republican law-
makers. This case and the Clinton administration’s use of Section 1115 Medicaid waivers
post-BBA suggest that waivers are useful to presidents not only when negotiating with
Congress over legislative revisions, but after passage of a new law as well.
Discussion of Section 1115 Medicaid Waivers
The evidence reviewed here suggests that presidents have used Section 1115 waiver
authority to pursue their agendas in Medicaid reform. This approach involves a degree of
decentralization and is arguably less efficient than other policymaking options available
to the president, such as executive orders. Nonetheless, it seems that presidents can and
do incorporate waivers into their domestic agendas. How they do so varies with the polit-
ical context and the particular goals of each president; two observations seem particularly
important here. First, Clinton pursued Medicaid waivers most aggressively when his ef-
forts to revise healthcare via legislation were stymied by Congress. This suggests that
presidents see waivers as particularly valuable instruments of policy change when their
32Specifically, CMS has denied "[proposals that] include premiums for individuals with incomes under
100 percent FPL as a condition of eligibility; requirements to omit wrap-around benefits for Early and
Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) and free choice of family planning provider; and
work requirements or incentives as a condition of Medicaid eligibility" Musumeci and Rudowitz (2015, 2).
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legislative goals are frustrated. Second, the George W. Bush administration’s unsuccessful
effort to incentivize block grant reforms through waivers indicates that presidents may
not always be successful in implementing their preferred reforms through this mecha-
nism. Although the Bush administration communicated a clear desire to approve specific
waivers, governors were not interested in applying for these waivers. This episode high-
lights the critical role that governors appear to play in the waiver process and suggests
that their participation may serve as an important constraint on the president’s use of this
strategy.
2.3.4 Education Waivers: 1995 – 2012
In the final section of this chapter, I explore how Presidents Clinton, George W. Bush,
and Obama have used the general waiver authority in the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act (ESEA). As in the preceding sections, I examine how each president has
attempted to use their broad discretion over waivers to pursue their goals as well as the
conditions under which presidents seem to use this strategy.
Clinton Exercises IASA Waiver Authority
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the Clinton administration introduced
the General Waiver Authority in Section 14401 of the Improving America’s Schools Act
(IASA), the 1994 reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA).
Less than three weeks after Clinton signed IASA into law on October 20, 1994, the Re-
publicans took over both chambers of Congress. At this point, many saw IASA as an un-
wanted federal intrusion into education policy. McGuinn (2006) explains why the Clinton
administration’s approach to education reform sparked such backlash: "Clinton’s ESEA
proposal generated a great deal of resistance from many members of Congress on both
the left and the right because it was seen as essentially mandating standards and assess-
ments" (93). In this climate, it was far from a forgone conclusion that the administration’s
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new education law would be implemented smoothly or that it would be able to withstand
legislative attacks from the Republican Congress. Indeed, it did not take long for the con-
servative Heritage Foundation to publish an attack on IASA following its passage (Olson
1994).
In this context, the administration quickly invited states to apply for waivers from
its own law, perhaps to counter Republican attacks that IASA paved the way for un-
warranted intrusion by the federal government into states’ education decisions. In early
December 1994, the Department of Education (ED) published a report entitled "Flexibil-
ity and Burden-Reducing Provisions in the Improving America’s Schools Act" (Flexibility
Materials [2]). As the title indicates, this document details strategies for providing states
with flexibility from Clinton’s landmark education law. Consistent with this approach,
a draft memo dated December 19 from Michael Cohen, a member of the White House
Domestic Policy Council, discussed the administration’s plan to highlight the flexibility
available to states under the new law:
As States continue to work on the implementation of Goals 2000, IASA, and
School-to-Work, we need to take some visible steps to highlight the increased
emphasis on results and the significant new flexibility in federal programs.
This is important to support implementation at the state and local level, and
to strengthen our position with the Congress in the next session.33
As we saw in the cases of welfare and Medicaid, waivers were the subject of policy
debates among the president’s top advisors. This memo also suggests that the admin-
istration actively reached out to governors to invite them to apply for waivers. Specifi-
cally, Cohen recommended creating a "clear description of the waiver authority we have
in Goals, ESEA, and STW [School to Work Opportunity Act], with examples of how it
can be used." Working with governors from the outset appeared to be a high priority for
the administration. Cohen suggested that the White House should "invite states (Gover-
33A hand-written note on this memo underscores the administration’s awareness of public concerns, and
its subsequent efforts to reach out to state and local actors: "While we need governors[,] public is far more
concerned about their local schools[,] not state[,] so we need to keep that in mind also" (Flexibility Materials
to Governors and Chiefs).
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nors???) to send teams to meet with us – starting immediately – to work with our staff
to figure out how they can best take advantage of these authorities" (Flexibility Materials
to Governors and Chiefs).34 The administration also communicated to the public their
intent to use waivers and to collaborate with governors throughout this process. Cohen
suggested that Secretary of Education Richard Riley hold a press conference "ideally with
Gov. Romer and Gov. Engler participation if they are available and willing" (Flexibility
Materials to Governors and Chiefs). Cohen even recommended that it would be "ideal" if
the President participated in this press conference.
Ultimately, it seems that the administration implemented these recommendations for
a swift and public waiver strategy. On January 25, 1995, Secretary Riley issued a state-
ment that underscored the Clinton administration’s commitment to granting waivers:
"The department has created new partnerships with states that emphasize unprecedented
flexibility in its programs, fewer regulations, and broad waiver provisions from red tape."35
Consistent with this message, President Clinton publicized state flexibility as a central
component of IASA in his remarks to the American Council on Education in February
1995:
This goes right to the heart of the whole approach of the national role in ed-
ucation...to set national standards and then give State and local governments
the control, the power, the opportunity, and, where we can, the resources to
get the job done, to give them the flexibility through waivers of complex Fed-
eral rules and reforms like charter schools and public school choice.
It seems clear that the Clinton administration was eager to exercise the new waiver
authority delegated to them in IASA, and further, to promote the Department of Educa-
34Emphasis, "(Governors???)," in the original.
35Further evidence shows the administration’s continued efforts to work with states on waivers. A draft
letter from Secretary Riley to governors and/or state school chiefs dated January 8, 1995 outlines the "num-
ber of ways in which your state can tailor federal program resources to best meet your needs" and offers
teams from the Department of Education (ED) to "help you understand how to take advantage of these
opportunities" (Flexibility Materials to Governors and Chiefs). The letter then outlines the opportunities
for flexibility, including the Ed-Flex program under Goals 2000 and the general waiver authority available
under IASA. ED worked quickly to set up a streamlined waiver process; a draft of a guidance document
circulated January 6, 1995, indicates that ED would "act upon waiver requests as expeditiously as possi-
ble" and attempt to make a decision on each waiver application within 60 days (Flexibility Materials to
Governors and Chiefs).
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tion’s (ED) willingness to work with its state and local counterparts. Even the language
ED uses in the August 1995 Federal Register Notice that announces the first batch of
waivers awarded under IASA echoes this message, describing the administration’s efforts
to provide "significant new opportunities to seek waivers of certain requirements of Fed-
eral education programs in order to improve teaching and learning (44390)."
ED ultimately granted many waivers following passage of IASA and Clinton’s two re-
lated education laws, Goals 2000 and the School to Work Opportunities Act, as Table 2.3
shows.36 This suggests that the Clinton administration accurately predicted that states
would be eager to take advantage of the flexibility offered by the administration. This use
of waivers in many ways seems to parallel the Clinton administration’s use of Medicaid
waivers following passage of the BBA, although the volume of waivers granted is quite
different. Nonetheless, it seems that in a contentious political environment, the admin-
istration saw the waiver authority as an opportunity to facilitate implementation of their
new law while granting state-level exceptions.
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Approved 87 61 91 112 101 0
Table 2.3: Clinton Administration K-12 Education Waivers, 1995-2000
2.3.5 George W. Bush and No Child Left Behind
Next, I discuss how the George W. Bush administration pursued two distinct strategies
with regard to waivers from the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB). From 2002 to
2004 the administration had a firm policy of not offering states flexibility via waivers, but
from 2005 onward they distinctly shifted this strategy and invited waiver applications
from specific components of the law.
36States could (and did) apply for more than one waiver in a year, sometimes on behalf of local education
agencies, making possible more than fifty approvals per year.
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The Bush Administration Enforces NCLB, 2001-2005
In 2000, Bush campaigned heavily on education reform, responding to multiple polls
in which voters ranked education reform as the most important issue (Landmark Edu-
cation Bill Signed). Within three days of taking office, Bush introduced No Child Left
Behind, his legislative proposal to reauthorize ESEA (Executive Summary).37
Similar to IASA, Bush’s NCLB proposal relied on standards, testing, and accountabil-
ity measures to increase student achievement. But Bush’s proposal increased the federal
government’s ability to enforce the accountability provisions. A high-powered bipartisan
group, including Reps. John A. Boehner (R-OH) and George Miller (D-CA) in the House as
well as Sens. Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) and Judd Gregg (R-NH) in the Senate, guided
the bill towards passage (Landmark Education Bill Signed).
However, partisan differences over the federal government’s proper role in education
reform persisted. According to Congressional Quarterly, "Democrats wanted to hold on
to Clinton-era education budget expansions. Republicans wanted to streamline federal
education spending and leave program design to the states" (Landmark Education Bill
Signed). And although House Republicans backed Bush’s initial proposal, Republicans
and Democrats alike were wary of the annual testing required in the law.38
Despite these disagreements, Bush enjoyed important advantages in moving his reau-
thorization of EASA through Congress compared to Clinton in 1994. Bush introduced
education reform at the beginning of his presidency and enjoyed a Republican-controlled
House and Senate, although the Republicans lost control of the Senate by one seat in June
2001 (Party Division). NCLB ultimately passed with wide bipartisan margins: 381-41 in
the House and 87-10 in the Senate.39 IASA could hardly be described as bipartisan, and
37The previous reauthorization, IASA, expired in 2000.
38Democrats and Republicans had slightly different complaints about the testing provisions. Republicans
worried that the "testing proposal could lead to a national test and curriculum that was outside the control
of the states. Liberal Democrats argued that any testing plan had to be accompanied by a substantial
increase in aid to poor schools to ensure that their students were equally prepared for the tests" (Landmark
Education Bill Signed).
39In the House: 182 Republicans and 198 Democrats in favor, 33 Republicans and 6 Democrats against.
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the Clinton administration subsequently worked hard to protect this law from detractors.
In contrast, NCLB was strongly bipartisan, and Secretary of Education Rod Paige made
it clear that the administration was planning to enforce, not grant flexibility from, the
accountability provisions in NCLB.40 In a letter to state superintendents on February 7,
2002, Paige wrote: "...No Child Left Behind is now the law of the land. I took an oath to
enforce the law, and I intend to do just that" (Paige 2002a). A week later, Paige specifically
clarified the administration’s position on flexibility through waivers: "we do not intend
to waive fundamental requirements on standards, assessments, adequate yearly progress,
and accountability in the new law" (Paige 2002b).
Recall the Congressional Research Service’s conclusion that waiver authority in NCLB
is "discretionary, not mandatory" (Skinner and Feder 2012). The Bush administration’s
decision here illustrates how a president can exercise this discretionary authority to deny
states the opportunity to deviate from existing law. Indeed, the Bush administration may
have capitalized on political support to implement their law to the fullest extent possi-
ble. For example, in a national poll, the January 2003 Demanding Quality Education In
Tough Economic Times Survey, 40 percent of respondents said that they favored NCLB,
while only 8 percent opposed the law.41 In this political climate, the Bush administration
denied flexibility through waivers through the first three years of NCLB implementation.
As Table 2.4 shows, Secretary Paige’s Department of Education approved a total of 41
waivers in 4 years (2002-2006), compared to 461 waivers approved from 1995 to 1999
under Clinton. The few waivers the Bush administration granted from 2002-2005 pro-
vided flexibility in various funding formulas and funding extensions, not flexibility from
In the Senate: 43 Democrats and 44 Republicans voting in favor, 6 Democrats and 3 Republicans op-
posed. In comparison, IASA passed 261-132 in the House (230 Democrats and 31 Republicans in favor, 4
Democrats and 128 Republicans opposed) and 77-20 in the Senate (54 Democrats and 23 Republicans in
favor, 0 Democrats and 20 Republicans opposed).
40As discussed above, NCLB retained the general waiver authority included in IASA. NCLB moved the
waiver authority to Section 9401 rather than Section 14401.
41Favor: 24 percent strongly, 16 percent not so strongly. Oppose: 4 percent strongly, 4 percent not so
strongly.
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substantive components of NCLB.42
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Approved 0 1 19 8 11 28 22 38
Table 2.4: Bush Administration K-12 Education Waivers, 2001-2008
NCLB Under Attack: 2005-2008
However, the administration was forced to alter this strategy as support for NCLB
eroded. The law’s mandated accountability system proved deeply unpopular. As Tom
Loveless describes in a 2006 Brookings Institution report: "The public favors the core
idea of NCLB–testing students and holding schools accountable for student learning–but
does not want accountability to include negative consequences" (8). This discomfort with
negative consequences may help explain waning support for NCLB. In the June 2005
Attitudes Toward The Public Schools Survey, support for the law seemed shaky at best:
28 percent of respondents had a favorable opinion of the law, while 27 percent had an
unfavorable opinion.
Opposition to NCLB did not just grow among the public during the implementation
phase; state governors and legislatures pushed back on the Bush administration’s imple-
mentation policies. In a study of "formal state resistance" (445) to NCLB, Shelly (2008)
finds that by 2006, thirty-eight states had considered legislation "critical of NCLB" while
five of those states actually passed laws critical of NCLB (444). Similarly, Loveless (2006)
analyzes state legislation and legal action related to NCLB and shows that 16 states were
neutral or supportive of NCLB, while 34 states opposed NCLB to varying degrees. In
addition to dwindling support among the public and active legal challenges from states,
congressional support for the law eroded. Letters exchanged in March 2004 between
Senator Edward Kennedy, one of the key members of the bipartisan coalition that passed
42The Department of Education did not publish a single Federal Register notice enumerating the waivers
granted under Section 9401 authority until March 12, 2007, over five years after Bush signed NCLB.
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NCLB, and Secretary Paige indicate disagreements about the flexibility offered through
the Department.43
Facing this rising tide of criticism, the Bush administration altered course. Signaling
a shift in its implementation strategy, President Bush nominated Margaret Spellings as
Secretary of Education on November 17, 2004 to replace Paige. Within a year of taking
office, Spellings began inviting flexibility via waivers from substantive components of
the law. The types of policy changes available via waivers were carefully circumscribed
by the administration. For example, on November 21, 2005, Spellings announced the
opportunity for states to apply for waivers that would allow for a less stringent measure
of student achievement than the original measure required in NCLB.44
Even as she offered flexibility, Secretary Spellings made it clear that her invitation to
apply for flexibility should not be mistaken for the administration’s retreat from NCLB’s
core principles. A few months after inviting states to apply for waivers to implement
growth model pilot programs, in early 2006 Secretary Spellings clarified that states would
only be eligible for these waivers if they continued to follow the "bright line principles"
of NCLB, including administering the law’s prescribed annual assessments:
...I remind you that, in order to remain in compliance with the law and to
be eligible for additional flexibility, your State must meet the assessment re-
quirements of NCLB and administer that system this school year...As States
submit their growth model proposals, Department staff will conduct an ini-
tial review to determine basic eligibility, including examining how well States
are implementing the "bright line principles" of the law (Spellings 2006).
Under Spellings, the Department of Education would eventually offer two additional
types of waivers from NCLB, including flexibility in whether and how to offer supple-
mentary education services and school of choice options, as well as flexibility in structur-
ing differentiated accountability systems. With each additional offer of flexibility, how-
43Sen. Kennedy petitioned for retroactively recalculating adequate yearly progress from 2002-2003 us-
ing more flexible formulas for students with significant cognitive disabilities; Secretary Paige denied this
request for retroactive application of the more flexible standards (Paige 2004).
44Specifically, Spellings announced the availability of waivers to implement growth model pilots in a
letter to chief state school officers (Spellings 2005).
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ever, Spellings reminded states that eligibility was dependent on continued adherence to
the "bright line principles" outlined in NCLB.
NCLB was due for reauthorization in 2007. But given the growing opposition to its
core principles, the Bush administration might have been wary of opening up discussions
about how to revise the law. NCLB was President Bush’s signature domestic law, and
providing the growing ranks of NCLB’s opponents with an opportunity to reauthorize the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act might have resulted in a substantial rewrite or
even repudiation of NCLB’s original framework. Indeed, in September 2007, Education
Week reported an outpouring of congressional proposals to revise the law: "Members of
Congress have introduced more than 100 bills to amend the main federal law in K-12
education...While some of those bills would revise one or more provisions of the 5-year-
old law or add new programs, a handful would go much further by comprehensively
reworking its accountability system" (Klein 2007). Further, following the 2006 midterm
elections, the House and Senate were controlled by the Democrats; reauthorization of
ESEA under that Congress would in all likelihood not preserve NCLB as written six years
earlier.
Ultimately, the 2007 reauthorization deadline came and went without a serious effort
by the Bush administration to reauthorize NCLB. At the same time, the administration
appeared to respond to rising opposition to NCLB with flexibility via waivers, perhaps
deflecting some criticism. Overall, the administration carefully exercised discretion over
how to use waivers as it worked to implement one of President Bush’s primary domestic
achievements.
Obama and ESEA Flexibility
In contrast to his predecessor, President Obama had no incentive to preserve NCLB –
quite the opposite. But similar to the Clinton administration’s experience with welfare,
revising this unpopular law proved frustrating. By the time President Obama took office
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on January 20, 2009, the No Child Left Behind Act was not only past due for reauthoriza-
tion, but the public was ready for change. In the June 2008 Attitudes towards the Public
Schools Survey, 42 percent of respondents said that the next president should "change
the law significantly," while only 16 percent thought the next president should "extend
the law without change." The Obama administration had a clear mandate for reautho-
rizing and significantly reforming the law. Further, reauthorization provided a chance
for the Democratic administration to overhaul one of President George W. Bush’s central
domestic achievements.45
However, the Obama administration did not initially attempt to reauthorize ESEA via
Congress, as it was preoccupied with addressing the financial crisis that was in full swing
when Obama took office. But a comparison of Table 2.4 with Table 2.5 shows that in 2009
and 2010, the Obama administration granted more waivers from NCLB than the Bush
administration ever did, including 158 waivers available using funds from the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act in 2009. The Obama administration also continued to
grant waivers under the pilot programs started in the Bush administration. While a 2010
waiver report distinguishes between invited and uninvited waivers, signaling that the
administration preferred some types of state flexibility and innovation over others, the
administration did not set a specific agenda through the waiver process during this time
period, instead signaling general openness to state innovation and a willingness to allow
states to depart from NCLB.46
45On the same survey a year later, public opinion continued to tilt against the law; only 28 percent of
respondents viewed the law either favorably (9 percent very favorable, 19 somewhat favorable), while 48
percent of respondents viewed the law unfavorably (24 somewhat unfavorable, 24 very unfavorable, while
24 percent of respondents said they did not know enough about the law).
46In the conclusion of the 2010 report, there is no clear statement of administration policy other than
receptivity to state requests for flexibility from certain provisions of the law: "We believe that these waivers
can serve as useful tools in facilitating State and local efforts to raise student academic achievement. While
it is typically very difficult to measure the impact that particular waivers have on student academic achieve-
ment, we believe that they provide States and districts with needed flexibility by removing, under partic-
ular circumstances, specific statutory or regulatory impediments to State or local education reform efforts.
The Department is conducting evaluations of the impact of the growth model, differentiated accountability,
and SES pilot waivers on student academic achievement and, as data become available, we will include this
information in future reports" (9).
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Year 2009 2010 2011 2012
Approved 283 218 0 415
Table 2.5: Obama Administration K-12 Education Waivers, 2009-2012
Over a year into his first term and just weeks before signing the divisive Affordable
Care Act into law, on March 13, 2010, President Obama unveiled his legislative proposal
to revise NCLB in his "Blueprint for Reform" (ESEA Reauthorization: A Blueprint for
Reform). Despite opposition to NCLB across the political spectrum, President Obama’s
prospects for building a successful bipartisan coalition to reauthorize ESEA were dim.
Not only were congressional Republicans unlikely to collaborate with Democrats, but
Obama’s proposed legislation faced detractors within the Democratic ranks as well. Specif-
ically, the nation’s two largest teachers’ unions, an important Democratic constituency,
were not thrilled with Obama’s proposal. The National Education Association (NEA)
president, Dennis Van Roekel, said the NEA could not support the plan as released (Mc-
Cabe 2010). The American Federation of Teachers’ leadership expressed similar con-
cerns.47 Those on the right also expressed opposition to Obama’s plan. The conservative
Heritage Foundation, for example, criticized the proposal in no uncertain terms: "the ad-
ministration’s blueprint offers what will likely be more lip service to reform and flexibility
than actual freedom from federal red tape, which most states desperately need" (Burke
2010). Overall, legislative revision would be an uphill battle; Klein (2010) concluded that
the chairmen of the House and Senate education committees "face[d] a difficult task" in
turning the Blueprint into a bill with a chance of making it through Congress. Indeed, in
2011, Congressional Quarterly reported that Congress was "stymied" on the reauthoriza-
tion.48
47Specifically: "Randi Weingarten, the president of the AFT, told the House Appropriations Committee
this month that she doesn’t like the proposal to ask states to adopt college- and career-ready academic
standards and implement new teacher-evaluation systems in order to tap Title I grants for districts, which
go to help disadvantaged students" (Klein 2010).
48Specifically, the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee approved a draft bill that
never made it to the floor, and the House Education and the Workforce Committee "approved three bills
to give local schools flexibility in spending federal money, but only one of them – a measure to expand
successful charter schools – won bipartisan support and was passed by the House. House Republicans also
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In fall 2011, the Obama administration initiated a new approach. Over the summer,
the administration had announced its intent to pursue a waiver strategy failing congres-
sional action.49 Unsurprisingly, by the fall Congress had not passed a reauthorization
of ESEA. As promised, on September 23, 2011, Secretary Duncan introduced the ESEA
Flexibility program in a letter to Chief State School Officers:
Instead of fostering progress and accelerating academic improvement, many
NCLB requirements have unintentionally become barriers to State and lo-
cal implementation of forward-looking reforms designed to raise academic
achievement. Consequently, many of you are petitioning us for relief from
the requirements of current law. One of my highest priorities is to help en-
sure that Federal laws and policies can support these reforms and not hinder
State and local innovation aimed at increasing the quality of instruction and
improving student academic achievement (Duncan 2011).
The waiver process outlined in the ESEA Flexibility initiative departs in several ways
from other administrations’ waiver strategies discussed in this chapter. ED initially gave
states the option to apply for ten waivers from specific provisions of NCLB – states had
to apply for all ten waivers, not a subset thereof.50 Eligibility for waivers was not defined
by fealty to NCLB’s "bright line" provisions, as articulated by the Bush administration.
Rather, states had to demonstrate that they were in compliance with four policy prin-
ciples outlined by the Obama administration that closely reflected the policies outlined
in the administration’s legislative proposal to revise NCLB. Notably, these four policy
principles were not part of existing legislation.
had difficulty tackling accountability and teacher effectiveness, the two most divisive issues, and did not
introduce legislation on either subject" (Congress Stymied on Education Law).
49In a June 2011 press release, the Department of Education released the following statement: "The
Obama Administration plans to provide regulatory flexibility around No Child Left Behind (NCLB) if
Congress does not complete work on a reauthorization bill prior to the August recess, in order to help
support reform efforts underway at the state and local level."
50In an August 2012 "FAQ" guidance document, ED explained the requirement that states apply for all
non-optional waivers, and not a subset thereof, as follows: "A [state education agency] may not request a
portion of this flexibility or implement some of its principles. This flexibility is intended to build on and
support the significant State and local reform efforts already underway in critical areas such as transition-
ing to college- and career-ready standards and aligned high-quality assessments; developing systems of
differentiated recognition, accountability, and support; and evaluating and supporting teacher and princi-
pal effectiveness. Only through such comprehensive efforts can SEAs and LEAs truly increase the quality of
instruction and improve student academic achievement" (3). Further, on June 7, 2012, ED added optional
waivers that states could apply for in addition to the original ten waivers.
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This creation of a "conditional" waiver process led to pushback, particularly from Re-
publicans. For example, in its Spring 2012 edition, the journal Education Next asked
policy experts whether attaching these conditions was legal, citing that "[k]ey Republican
leaders, including Senators Lamar Alexander (TN) and Marco Rubio (FL), and Texas gov-
ernor Rick Perry, have blasted the move as overstepping executive authority" (Derthick
and Rotherham 2012). Further, in August 2014, Senator Alexander and Representative
John Kline (R-MN), chairman of the House Education and the Workforce Committee,
formally requested a Government Accountability Office study investigating the Obama
administration’s conditional waiver requirements (House Education and the Workforce
Committee 2014).
Nonetheless, according to the Congressional Research Service, states responded swiftly
to the administration’s invitation for waiver applications:
Following the announcement of the ESEA flexibility package, 39 states, the
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico indicated that they intended to apply
for it. Eleven states applied for the ESEA flexibility package by the first dead-
line of November 14, 2011. On February 26, 2012, 26 additional states and the
District of Columbia submitted applications for the flexibility package (Skin-
ner and Feder 2012, 4).
In addition, organizations of state school leaders worked to facilitate the application pro-
cess. Less than a week after President Obama announced the initiative, the Council of
Chief State School Officers held a meeting titled "Next-Generation Accountability Sys-
tems and Waiver Strategy Meeting." In this meeting, the opportunity for state leadership
through waivers was repeatedly highlighted, and steps were outlined to clarify how states
could apply for the newly available waivers.51
The Department of Education worked quickly to grant state waiver requests. In Febru-
ary 2012, just 5 months after the administration announced the ESEA Flexibility initia-
51In the powerpoint from this meeting, the title of the first substantive slide states that "ESEA Flexibility
Is About STATE Leadership." Another slide explains that "To receive NCLB waivers, states must design
and implement college and career ready accountability, with several broad requirements and many further
opportunities for state leadership" (Wilhoit and Palmer 2011).
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tive, the administration approved waiver requests submitted by 11 states (Duncan 2013).
According to the Department, by October 2015, 43 states and Washington, D.C. were
implementing these waivers and, in doing so, complying with ED’s additional policy re-
quirements. As Table 2.5 above shows, ED granted 435 waivers through this initiative in
2012 alone – the staggering volume of waivers is in part due to the 10-waiver package on
offer from ED, and in part due to widespread state cooperation.
Secretary Duncan and President Obama alike described the ESEA Flexibility initiative
as their answer to Congress’s failure to reauthorize NCLB.52 Indeed, throughout this pro-
cess, ED remained committed to its requirement that states follow the administration’s
prescribed policy principles in order to be eligible for flexibility; these principles were
clearly outlined in guidance documents.53 Further, in letters to states Secretary Duncan
specified that waiver approval was contingent on his Department’s determination that
the state had demonstrated its commitment to the administration’s policy principles.
Discussion of Education Waiver Authority
The three cases reviewed here illustrate the different ways in which presidents have
exercised the waiver authority available in IASA and NCLB, the 1994 and 2001 reautho-
rizations of ESEA, respectively. While Clinton encouraged states to apply for waivers
after signing IASA, George W. Bush initially refused to grant waivers from NCLB but
eventually saw it in his interest to initiate this process. Finally, Obama developed yet
another approach as his administration struggled to reform NCLB, inviting states to ap-
ply for waivers that offered substantive changes from NCLB, but in exchange, requiring
states to adhere to policy principles not mandated by existing law.54 Despite these differ-
52As described in Chapter 1, in his remarks introducing the ESEA Flexibility initiative, Obama left no
room for interpretation: "I’ve urged Congress for a while now, let’s get a bipartisan effort, let’s fix this.
Congress hasn’t been able to do it. So I will" (The White House 2011).
53See, for example, the guidance document "ESEA Flexibility," as updated June 7, 2012.
54On December 10, 2015, President Obama signed the Every Student Succeeds Act, a reauthorization of
ESEA that replaces and substantially revises NCLB. The reauthorization came four years after the admin-
istration introduced the ESEA Flexibility program, and over five years after the President introduced his
Blueprint for Reform.
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ences, a common thread characterizes these cases of waiver use in secondary education:
presidents have used the broad discretion provided in ESEA waiver authority to simulta-
neously pursue their policy goals and adapt to the constraints in their institutional and
political environments.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter had three goals. I began by explaining the origin and breadth of waiver
authority. This discussion made three important points. First, despite the differences
across policy areas, waiver authority in welfare, Medicaid, and education is quite com-
parable. In each case, the secretary is authorized to grant states exemptions from federal
law in order to allow for state implementation of new programs. Second, waiver authority
does not allow the secretary to mandate that states use waivers. Rather, the secretary is
given approval authority. The implication here is key: presidents cannot exercise waiver
authority without governors’ participation in this process. Third, and crucially, the secre-
tary’s waiver authority across all three policy areas is quite broad and has rarely been cur-
tailed by courts. This characteristic is crucial for understanding waivers as presidential
policymaking tools. While governors play an important role in this process, presidents
enjoy extensive control over waivers. Not only can presidents decide whether or not to
provide states with an opportunity to apply for waivers, but their administrations can
subsequently shape the substance of waivers during the review and approval process.
Second, this chapter outlined the three basic steps of the waiver process. These steps
are not mandated by law, yet the nature of waiver authority confers this structure on
the interaction between the president and governors. Given the discretionary nature
of waiver authority, I identify the first step as the president inviting states to apply for
waivers. After extending this invitation, however, the administration cannot simply hand
out waivers. Rather, in the second step, governors must submit waiver applications in or-
der for the administration to exercise its waiver authority. While this is a crucial compo-
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nent of the waiver process, scholars have yet to examine the dynamics of the submission
stage. Finally, the administration reviews waiver applications and decides whether or
not to approve each application. The nature of waiver authority affords the president
substantial latitude in reviewing these applications, as I discuss throughout this chapter.
Third, I reviewed cases in welfare, Medicaid, and education in which presidents have
exercised their waiver authority. The goal of this qualitative work is to examine how and
when presidents use waivers. In terms of how presidents use this tool, I found substantial
variation across each president’s approach to pursuing and approving waivers in these
policy areas. The body of evidence reviewed here suggests that while presidents exercise
waiver authority strategically, the specific policy goals they pursue vary. For example, in
the case of welfare, the Reagan administration did not articulate specific policy changes
they hoped that governors would implement via waivers. In contrast, the Clinton admin-
istration listed five policies that they encouraged states to experiment with via welfare
waivers. The nature of requirements placed on states via waivers also varies. The George
W. Bush administration only offered states flexibility from NCLB if governors agreed to
continue implementing the "bright line principles" of the law. Operating under the same
statutory waiver authority, the Obama administration stirred up controversy by requir-
ing states to implement policies that were not a part of NCLB as a condition of receiving
a waiver. This variation in how presidents approach the waiver process underscores the
extent to which presidents can (and do) adapt the waiver process to meet their needs.
Crucially, this chapter also explored when presidents use waivers. Despite the mul-
tiple observations that presidents use waivers strategically discussed at the beginning of
this chapter, we have yet to identify the specific conditions under which this strategy is
both feasible and strategically valuable to the president. The evidence discussed in this
chapter suggests that two conditions are central to explaining when the president uses
this tool. First, presidents seem particularly inclined to use waivers when their efforts to
revise an existing law are frustrated by Congress. Consider, for example, Clinton’s use
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of welfare waivers and Obama’s use of education waivers. In both cases, the president’s
use of waivers coincided with drawn-out battles with Congress. Indeed, each president
actively attempted to instigate widespread policy change via waivers even as they nego-
tiated legislative changes with Congress.
Second, presidents and their administrations rely on governor cooperation in order
to implement this strategy. As George W. Bush’s failure to incentivize states to trans-
form Medicaid into a block grant via waivers illustrates, presidents can only expect to
implement their preferred policies via waivers if governors are willing to submit ap-
plications and to implement the waivers as approved by the administration. Indeed,
President Clinton’s repeated speeches to the National Governors Association in which
he solicited waiver applications reflect his administration’s consistent efforts to maintain
a steady flow of waiver applications from governors. Across the policy areas discussed
here, administrations consistently courted participation from governors. This observa-
tion suggests that presidents heavily value expected cooperation from governors when
determining the viability of a waiver strategy.
This work provides a foundation on which to build a theory of presidential policy-
making through waivers, something we currently lack. Before offering such a theory,
in the next chapter I introduce a dataset that allows me to systematically test (and ulti-
mately, dispel) a common assumption about the president’s role in the waiver process.
In contrast to the evidence discussed here, the model of waivers found in exiting large-n
analysis often assumes that presidents play a peripheral and passive role in this process.
Using my dataset, I test the argument that presidents simply grant waivers to governors
in their party. Finding little to no support for this existing empirical model of waivers, I
then offer a new theory of presidential policymaking through waivers, informed by the
observations in this chapter.
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CHAPTER III
Introducing the Data and Testing the Common Assumption
In this chapter, I assess a common assumption about the president’s role in the waiver
process that emanates from existing models of approved waivers. Large-n work on waivers,
to this point, often suggests that the president is more likely to approve waivers for gover-
nors in his party. This assumption is fundamentally different from the argument I offer in
this dissertation about presidential policymaking through waivers. Indeed, the implicit
assumption in existing work is that the president’s institutional environment does not
motivate him to pursue and approve waivers. Rather, he is assigned a passive role, ap-
proving states’ applications based on shared partisanship but not actively using waivers
in pursuit of his own goals.
While large-n work often finds little evidence in support of this assumption, alter-
native accounts of the president’s role have yet to be offered. As such, from these null
results one might be tempted to conclude that the president does not use waivers strate-
gically. But this result is inconsistent with the evidence discussed in Chapter 2, which
suggests that presidents do in fact grant waivers strategically. How are we to proceed
with an explanation of presidential policymaking through waivers, given these conflict-
ing accounts? I argue that the first step is to improve on existing data. As I explain below,
current large-n work relies on limited datasets that do not allow for sufficient variation
on key variables or for generalizable conclusions. To address these shortcomings, in this
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chapter I introduce an original dataset that improves on existing work by including sub-
mitted and approved waivers in welfare, Medicaid, and education from 1984 to 2012.
I then use these data to re-examine the common assumption about the president’s role
in the waiver process; it may be the case that the null results thus far are an artifact of
limited datasets. It is important to examine this possibility, given that existing accounts
portray the president as playing a passive role in this process, in contrast to the evidence
in Chapter 2 that suggests that presidents pursue waivers actively and strategically.
As a preview of the results, I find weak evidence that governors in the president’s party
submit more waiver applications than governors in the opposing party. In the analysis
of approved waivers, I similarly find little evidence in support of the common assump-
tion that presidents approve more waivers for governors in their party. Echoing previous
work, we are left with null results regarding the president’s role in this process. Enriching
the dataset used to assess the common assumption, then, does not resolve the inconsis-
tency between existing large-n work and the qualitative evidence discussed in Chapter 2.
Based on this analysis, I argue that it is time to move beyond the current framework by
considering the president’s institutional incentives to use waivers.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss how large-n work on waivers treats
the president’s role in the waiver process. Then, I argue that current large-n analysis
of waivers is limited for the following three reasons: 1) only approved, not submitted
waivers are analyzed, 2) models include waivers from single policy areas, and 3) analysis
is conducted over limited time periods. Next, I introduce an original dataset of submitted
and approved waivers designed to address these shortcomings. Finally, with this dataset
in hand, I test the common assumption about the president’s role in this process at both
the submission and approval stages. Given the characteristics of this dataset, this anal-
ysis provides for a generalizable and fair test of the current framework that assigns the
president a passive role in the waiver process.
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3.1 A Common Assumption about Presidents and Waivers
Existing work on waivers does not assign the president an active role in the waiver
process. Rather, the assumption is that he is simply more inclined to approve waivers for
governors in his own party. This presumption is not motivated by a theory of presidential
policymaking, yet it repeatedly surfaces in large-n work on waivers. Specifically, three
studies examine the waiver process using regression analysis – analysis of the president’s
role in this process extends no further than including a variable to measure whether the
president and governor are in the same party, or alternatively, whether the president’s
party won the majority of votes in a state in the prior presidential election. I elaborate on
each study here.
First, Lieberman and Shaw (2000) examine whether welfare waiver approvals vary
in response to state factors or national factors. Specifically, using the number of ap-
proved waiver provisions per state-year as their dependent variable, they assess whether
policy diffusion through waivers is motivated by internal state concerns or by national
factors. In doing so, they include a dummy variable that equals one if the governor and
the president are in the same party and zero otherwise. Their results are sensitive to
the inclusion of state fixed effects, and ultimately, they conclude that "[the] process of
granting waivers did not favor either governors of one party or another or governors of
the President’s party," concluding that "political gamesmanship" does not characterize
this process (230).1 The implication of their model, and of the null results on governor-
president alignment, is that waivers were approved based on administrative concerns like
the national caseload, but not based on strategic policymaking decisions by the president.
1Specifically, the coefficient on the governor-president alignment term is negative and statistically sig-
nificant when state fixed effects are omitted, but this result fails to reach statistical significance when state
fixed effects are included. Further, the authors include a dummy variable to indicate governor partisan-
ship; accounting for this term, the net effect of the governor-president alignment term is nearly zero in
both models. The exception is the case when the governor is a Republican and the president is a Democrat
(that is, when Clinton is president, the only Democrat in their sample) – in this case, Republican governors
receive slightly more approvals. Again, however, this effect is not significant in the model with state fixed
effects, which the authors point to as a more precise test of their model (230).
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In his examination of approved Medicaid and education waivers, Shelly (2013) sim-
ilarly posits that president are only involved to the extent that they are more likely to
grant co-partisans waivers. His inquiry focuses primarily on how internal state condi-
tions influence waiver approval. The dependent variable here is the number of approved
waivers, and like Shaw and Lieberman (2000), he includes a dummy variable that indi-
cates whether the president and governor are from the same party. While he cites Gais
and Fosset’s (2005) discussion of executive federalism as the motivation for doing so,
Shelly does not consider the role that the president’s institutional environment plays in
his decision to pursue waivers as an alternative policy-making strategy (2013, 459). Ulti-
mately, the variable measuring governor-president alignment does not achieve statistical
significance at conventional levels in either his model of approved Medicaid waivers or
his model of approved education waivers (467).
Similarly, in his study of state workbook amendment provisions from the No Child
Left Behind Act (NCLB) from 2005 through 2007, Shelly (2012) includes a variable that
measures the presidential vote share that George W. Bush received in each state in 2004
to examine whether "[with] Bush appointees at its head, [the Department of Education]
might have been more likely to grant flexibility requests to more Republican states" (124).
Like previous work, this variable does not achieve statistical significance. Overall, then,
this small body of quantitative work considers whether presidents grant more waivers to
governors in their own party and finds little to no evidence in support of this hypothesis.
An alternative proposition that considers the president’s institutional incentives has not
been offered. However, the qualitative evidence discussed in Chapter 2 suggests that in
fact presidents are, under certain conditions, quite motivated to use this tool strategically.
At this point, then, it appears that existing large-n analyses are missing a piece of the
puzzle.
71
3.2 Weaknesses in Existing Large-n Analyses
It may be the case that these quantitative analyses of waivers are producing null re-
sults because of weaknesses in the data. Here, I discuss three drawbacks in existing data
that may hinder the ability to assess the existing assumption that presidents grant more
waivers to governors in their own party.
First, prior studies do not include variation across policy areas in one model, leaving
them ill-equipped to produce generalizable analyses of waivers as policymaking tools.
Recall that Shaw and Lieberman (2000) investigate welfare waivers, and Shelly (2013)
analyzes Medicaid and education waivers in separate models. However, as discussed in
Chapter 2, the nature of the president’s waiver authority is in fact quite similar across
welfare, Medicaid, and K-12 education. In this case, then, we should strive to build mod-
els that include variation across policy areas to learn about waivers as policymaking tools
rather than focusing on how presidents use waivers in separate policy areas. By focusing
on individual policy areas, existing work does not allow for generalizable results about
the relationship between institutional factors and the president’s waiver strategy.
Second, and relatedly, existing analyses cover relatively short time periods, limiting
the variation on important explanatory variables. Specifically, Shelly (2013) separately
analyzes Medicaid waivers from 1990 through 2008 and K-12 education waivers from
1995 through 2008, while Shaw and Lieberman (2000) analyze welfare waivers from 1982
through 1995. However, the institutional environment changes slowly. Consider that in
most cases, each president serves for at least four years, the president works with the same
Congress for a two-year period, and governors serve four-year terms with the exception
of Vermont and New Hampshire, whose governors serve two-year terms (National Gov-
ernors Association 2015). The longer the time period considered, the more variation will
be available on the relevant components of the president’s institutional environment.
Third, and importantly, these studies neither account for nor investigate the submis-
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sion stage of the waiver process in which governors submit waiver applications.2 As
discussed in Chapter 2, governors play a crucial role in the waiver process. Without
participation from governors, presidents cannot hope to implement or claim credit for
policy changes. As such, it is certainly worth modeling and analyzing which governors
participate in this process, and in particular, whether they submit waiver applications in
anticipation of the president’s willingness to approve waivers.
3.3 Introducing an Original Dataset
The data described below is designed to improve on these limitations. I first explain
the data on waiver applications and then introduce the data on waiver approvals.3
3.3.1 Submitted Waiver Applications
The data include submitted Section 1115 waiver applications from 1984 through 2012
in two policy areas: welfare and Medicaid.4 As Chapter 2 discussed at length, these
waivers are governed by Section 1115 of the Social Security Act Amendments of 1962,
in which Congress gave the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) authority to
waive certain statutory requirements to allow for “experimental, pilot or demonstration”
projects (P.L. 87-543). Substantial variation exists both across and within these policy
areas in terms of the programs authorized.5 Despite this variation, the president’s waiver
authority in these two policy areas is highly comparable, particularly since waiver au-
thority in each policy area stems from the same statute.
2One exception is Shelly (2012), who analyzes state workbook amendment requests to NCLB. However,
these tools are distinct from waivers, although they allow the federal government to grant states flexibility.
3I refer to waiver applications and waiver submissions interchangeably.
4Waivers in these policy areas fall under the domain of two separate administrations within the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services: welfare waivers were under the jurisdiction of the the Administration
for Children and Families, while Medicaid waivers were managed by the Health Care Financing Adminis-
tration, renamed the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) by President George W. Bush.
5Please see Chapter 1 for a summary of the policies implemented via these waivers.
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Comparability of Policy Areas
To my knowledge no existing work on waivers includes data from two different policy
areas in one model. While Shelly (2013) analyzes Medicaid and education waivers, he
does not pool these waivers in one analysis. This dataset of submitted waivers improves
on existing work by including waivers from both Medicaid and welfare. The benefit of
including more than one policy area over many years is straightforward: we gain confi-
dence that our results in fact reflect strategic decisions motivated by institutional con-
straints and incentives, rather than reflecting the politics particular to one policy area or
one time period.
At the same time, it is important that when including multiple policy areas in one
model, there is sufficient comparability across observations. In this case, Medicaid and
welfare share important characteristics. They are both programs designed and autho-
rized via federal law but implemented largely at the state level. As a result, there is a
wide range in program design at the state level, although all states are governed by the
same federal standards. Further, both programs operate using federal and state funds.
Perhaps the biggest difference between these two programs stems from the conversion of
Aid to Families with Dependent Children from an entitlement to a block grant via the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996, while
Medicaid remains an entitlement program. As a result, the federal government plays a
dramatically reduced role in overseeing the design and implementation of state welfare
programs compared to Medicaid. Despite this difference, however, both programs are
intergovernmental social welfare programs that involve redistribution. Given the similar
nature of waiver authority in these two policy areas and these similarities in fundamental
program characteristics, models that simultaneously analyze waivers in both policy areas
take an important step towards producing generalizable results about this policy tool.6
6Please see Chapter 1 for an extended discussion about why these policy areas were chosen for analysis.
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Data Collection
I begin by describing the data collection process for welfare waivers. Prior to the
first Clinton administration, there is no unified record of welfare waivers. I relied on
secondary sources and archival documents to build as complete a record as possible of
the submitted waivers from 1984 through 1993.7 In 1994, the Clinton administration
initiated a monthly reporting process of submitted, approved, and denied Section 1115
waivers in the Federal Register. I used the Federal Register to collect data on these Section
1115 welfare waivers from 1994 through 1996, the last year these waivers were available.8
I also cross-referenced information from the Federal Register with secondary sources and
archival sources to track down missing dates and pieces of information.9
After passage of the PRWORA in 1996 that overhauled the welfare system, the Clinton
administration made it clear that they would no longer review these waiver applications,
and subsequent administrations have followed suit. As a result, this dataset includes
welfare waivers through 1996. In an ideal world, we would have observations on welfare
waivers covering a longer time period to allow for more variation on key dependent vari-
ables. While imperfect, the solution here is to include Section 1115 welfare and Medicaid
7Secondary sources: Wiseman (1993a,b); Fishman and Weinberg (1992). Archival sources: Setting the
Baseline: A Report on State Welfare Waivers (1997); Health and Human Services Fact Sheet (1996); and
How the White House Spurs Welfare Reform (1989).
8The Federal Register was not always consistent with archival documents. For example, cross-
referencing the Federal Register with two reports from the Clinton administration, the Setting the Baseline
report issued in 1997 and the Health and Human Services Fact Sheet from January 1996, I discovered ad-
ditional waivers that were not listed in the Federal Register. I included these waivers in my data, after
making sure that no waivers were duplicated. Nonetheless, the inconsistency in the reporting of submitted
waivers may be of some concern, as gaps in the records result in submitted (or approved) waivers that are
not accounted for. As a result, the analysis here may suffer from a degree of bias due to missing data. I
acknowledge this limitation despite my efforts to find and include all relevant data. Given my extensive
search through the available sources, I am confident that the omission of relevant data has been minimized.
However, future work could investigate relevant records in the Reagan presidential archives to further ad-
dress possible missing data.
9Despite these efforts, it was not always possible to find all relevant information for submitted waivers.
In particular, Fishman and Weinberg (1992) indicate that of the twenty-six welfare waivers submitted be-
tween 1986 and 1988, sixteen were approved and ten were withdrawn or denied. Searching all available
sources, I was able to identify approval dates for the sixteen approved waivers, but not the date of sub-
mission. For the ten waivers that were submitted but not approved, I have searched in archival records,
secondary sources, and have worked with a research assistant to conduct broad searches, to no avail. These
ten waivers, as a result, are not included in the analysis of submitted waivers.
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waivers in one model to allow for as much variation over time as possible.
As with the Section 1115 welfare waivers, there was no standard reporting system
for submitted Section 1115 Medicaid waivers until the Clinton administration imple-
mented a monthly Federal Register reporting system in 1994. I used these Federal Reg-
ister records from 1994 through 1998 to record submitted Medicaid waivers.10 How-
ever, after 1998, the Clinton administration stopped reporting these waivers, and sub-
sequent administrations did not reinstate this reporting practice, despite pressure from
the Government Accountability Office to do so (Thompson 2012). The Center for Medi-
care and Medicaid Services (CMS) maintains an online list of submitted and approved
waivers, which I used to identify Section 1115 waiver submissions and approvals from
1998 through 2012. I also used these CMS records to cross-reference data collected from
the Federal Register and to collect data from 1992 and 1993, before waivers were reported
in the Federal Register.
This dataset allows us to assess, for the first time, the conditions under which gover-
nors apply for waivers. Specifically, three features of these data allow for fair and general-
izable tests of the president’s role in this process. First, this dataset includes observations
from two policy areas, welfare and Medicaid, allowing for more generalizable results than
models that only incorporate one policy area. Second, this analysis covers 1984 through
2012, a longer time period than has been covered in existing work. Third, these data
allow for a dependent variable that measures the number of waivers submitted, while
existing work focuses on the number of waivers approved, skipping over the submission
stage of the process.
Ideally, these data would include submitted waivers in education as well as wel-
fare and Medicaid. However, I was unable to obtain data on applications for education
waivers. As a result, in this project models of submitted waivers are estimated using only
10Some waivers were categorized in the Federal Register as "welfare/Medicaid." I recorded these as wel-
fare waivers, though in terms of the data analysis, this distinction is irrelevant since none of the explanatory
variables are policy area-specific.
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observations of Section 1115 welfare and Medicaid waivers, while models of approved
waivers include observations in all three policy areas.11
Description of the Data
Figure 3.1 below shows the number of waivers submitted per year, by policy area.
This dataset includes 296 waiver applications submitted in welfare and Medicaid from
1984 to 2012. This number excludes waivers submitted by United States territories and
the District of Colombia; it also excludes waivers with missing information on the year of
submission or the state that submitted the waiver.12
Figure 3.1: Section 1115 Waiver Applications, 1984-2012
These data are used to create the dependent variable for analyses of waiver submis-
sions in this chapter and in Chapter 5. The structure of the data for analysis is by state-
year-policy.13 For each state-year, the data contain two observations: one for the number
11The Department of Education, unlike the Department of Health and Human Services, does not make
information about submitted waivers publicly available. A Freedom of Information Act requesting submit-
ted waiver applications was unsuccessful.
12Because of variation in the reporting processes over time, the same type of information is not available
for all waivers. For example, for some of the welfare waivers, the Federal Register reported information on
the date on which a waiver was submitted – but this was not the case for all waivers.
13Washington, D.C. and territories are omitted from the analysis, since they do not have governors.
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of waivers submitted in welfare, and one for the number of waivers submitted in Med-
icaid. The dependent variable in the analyses below equals the number of waivers sub-
mitted by each state, in each year, for each of these two policies. This structure allows me
to control for the policy area. For years before or after waivers were systematically used
in each policy area, the value of the dependent variable for that policy area is missing.14
The first row in Table 6.7 describes the dependent variable used in the analyses below,
while the last two rows provide information on the dependent variable by policy area.
Table 3.1: Dependent Variable Summary Statistics
Policy Years Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Welfare and Medicaid 1984-2012 0.174 0.509 0 8 1700
Welfare 1984-1996 0.265 0.667 0 8 650
Medicaid 1992-2012 0.118 0.370 0 4 1050
3.3.2 Approved Waivers
Next, I introduce an original dataset of approved waivers in Medicaid, welfare, and
secondary education.15 The data on submitted waivers discussed above is a subset of
this dataset. In addition to covering a longer time period than existing studies of ap-
proved waivers, this dataset includes observations from three policy areas: welfare, Med-
icaid, and K-12 education. These data allow for more generalizable and accurate tests
of propositions about the waiver process, including the common assumption that presi-
dents simply grant waivers to governors in their own party regardless of the president’s
institutional constraints and incentives.
In the latter half of this chapter, I use these data to assess this common assumption.
Null, weak, or mixed results in support of this assumption should convince us that it is
indeed time to move beyond this simple model and, specifically, to think more carefully
14In practice, this means that all values of the dependent variable for "welfare" observations are missing
from 1997 through 2012. All values of the dependent variable for "Medicaid" observations are missing
from 1984 through 1991.
15I use the terms "secondary education" and "K-12 education" interchangeably.
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about the president’s institutional incentives to use waivers. Before doing so, I explain
the nature of the data on approved waivers.
Comparability of Policy Areas
As with the data on submitted waivers, these data contain observations on welfare
and Medicaid waivers granted between 1984 and 2012 under Section 1115 of the Social
Security Act Amendments of 1962. I was also able to obtain the number of K-12 waivers
approved from 1995 through 2012. Overall, this dataset of approved waivers contains ob-
servations on approved welfare, Medicaid, and education waivers spanning 1984 through
2012.
Similar to the dataset on submitted waivers, including multiple policy areas allows for
stronger tests of propositions about the waiver process. With more policy areas included
in one model of waiver approvals, we add to the variation across policy areas and thus
increase the generalizability of results. However, we should pause to assess whether com-
paring approved K-12 education waivers to Section 1115 waivers is justified. As Chapter
2 described, the general waiver provision in the ESEA, as reauthorized in 1995 and again
in 2001, grants the Secretary of Education authority over waiver approvals. States may
submit applications to waive portions of the ESEA and, if their proposals are approved by
the Secretary, may implement alternative programs. The Secretary of Education enjoys
broad discretion over this process, allowing the president and his administration to tailor
the waiver process to their needs. This broad discretion also characterizes the Secretary of
Health and Human Services’ authority over Section 1115 welfare and Medicaid waivers.
Despite variation in the programs implemented via waivers, then, ESEA waivers and Sec-
tion 1115 waivers are quite comparable in terms of the scope of the president’s authority
and in terms of the structure of the waiver process. These shared characteristics are the
critical features of waivers in terms of the theory and analyses that follow.16
16Further, as discussed in Chapter 1, all three policy areas are intergovernmental, redistributive pro-
grams.
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Data Collection: Approved Medicaid and Welfare Waivers
The data on approved Section 1115 welfare and Medicaid waivers were collected from
the same sources and following the same process as that described above in the section
on submitted waivers; I spare the reader a review of that process here. Figure 3.2 below
illustrates the number of Section 1115 waivers approved in welfare and Medicaid from
1984 through 2012.
Figure 3.2: Approved Section 1115 Waivers, 1984-2012
Education Waivers: Policy Context
Before discussing the data collection process for education waivers, I briefly review the
evolution of the federal government’s role in education during the time period in which
education waivers have been used.17 This context is important given the evolution of and
continuing debate over the federal government’s role in education. A great deal of skep-
ticism, particularly on the part of Republicans, characterized the response to Clinton’s
reauthorization of EASA, which for the first time required states to develop challenging
17Please see Chapter 1 for a summary of the policies implemented via K-12 waivers from 1995 through
2012.
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content standards and to assess students regularly to measure progress towards meet-
ing these standards (McGuinn 2006, 95). After thirty years of a relatively stable policy
regime as implemented under the initial ESEA, McGuinn characterizes Clinton’s reau-
thorization, the Improving America’s Schools Act (IASA), as "the most significant change
to EASA since 1965" (95).
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) built on the framework that IASA
implemented, mandating strict accountability measures for schools identified as failing
to meet adequate yearly progress – McGuinn (2006) describes the law as "contain[ing]
a large number of prescriptive mandates that reach into ever major area of education
policy and will require states and districts to fundamentally change the way they run
their public schools" (182). As Chapter 2 discusses, however, the law was resoundingly
unpopular and widely viewed as unsuccessful by the time it was finally reauthorized via
the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) in December 2015. Perhaps as a result of the
perceived failures of NCLB, ESSA grants states more flexibility in determining how to
improve schools and how to hold them accountable for student improvement, as Klein
(2016) explains:
State and school district officials who have complained for years that an inflex-
ible, over-prescriptive federal role in public education is at the heart of the No
Child Left Behind Act seem to have finally gotten their wish: a replacement
law that scales back Washington’s K-12 footprint for the first time in more
than a quarter-century (1).
In all, then, during the years in which the president has enjoyed broad waiver author-
ity in K-12 education, the federal government’s role in education has gone from limited
to prescriptive and then been scaled back again. Throughout this evolution, as Chapter
2 discusses in depth, presidents have approved waivers from ESEA in order to provide
states with flexibility from federal law, although across the Clinton, Bush, and Obama ad-
ministrations, each president articulated different goals with respect to these waivers. As
a result, while the president’s statutory waiver authority remained virtually unchanged
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from 1995 through 2012, the policies implemented through the waivers contained in this
dataset vary. Below, I explain the process for collecting this data and discuss differences
across the types of waivers included in the data and analysis.
Education Waivers: Data Collection
ESEA is the primary federal law governing K-12 education; as discussed in Chapter
2, general waiver authority was granted to the Secretary of Education in President Clin-
ton’s 1994 reauthorization of ESEA through IASA. This waiver authority was preserved in
President George W. Bush’s 2001 reauthorization of ESEA via NCLB (Skinner and Feder
2012, 6).
From 1995 through 2012, this general authority has been used to approve the vast
majority of K-12 waivers, although a small number of waivers were approved under the
Goals 2000: Educate America Act and under other provisions of ESEA. Specifically, out
of 1,495 total K-12 waivers approved from 1995 to 2012 in this dataset, 10 waivers were
approved under the Goals 2000: Educate America Act and 18 were approved under dif-
ferent ESEA provisions.18 Figure 3.3 shows the number of waivers granted each year
from 1995 through 2012.
In 1995, the Department of Education began reporting approved K-12 education waivers
from ESEA via the Federal Register. From 1995 to 2010, I relied exclusively on these Fed-
eral Register Notices to record approved K-12 waivers. The waivers granted under the
Obama administration’s "ESEA Flexibility” initiative launched in 2011 were not reported
in the Federal Register, but rather, were reported via letters sent to chief state school of-
ficers and posted on the Department’s website. From 2011 to 2012, I recorded approved
waivers using these letters.
18This total number of waivers excludes those granted to U.S. territories and Washington, D.C., consistent
with the discussion throughout the dissertation of the dataset analyzed.
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Figure 3.3: Approved K-12 Education Waivers, 1995-2012
Variation in Education Waivers
As in the case of welfare and Medicaid waivers, the types of policies implemented
under K-12 waivers and the provisions waived have varied over time. During the Clinton
administration, for example, it was common for local education agencies to be awarded
waivers – as a result, states could have received more than one waiver per year. For ex-
ample, Pennsylvania received 39 waivers in 1995. These waivers were submitted through
the state education agency to the federal government, such that this interaction can still
be categorized as a state-federal relationship rather than local-federal (Flexibility Materi-
als to Governors and Chiefs 1994). Further, the Obama administration’s ESEA Flexibility
program allows states to apply for up to 13 waivers in a year, and in fact, states are re-
quired to apply for at least 10 of these 13 waivers to be eligible for any of them. This
requirement explains the spike in the raw number of approved waivers in 2012 following
the announcement of the ESEA Flexibility program in September 2011.
This variation means that these education waivers could be categorized in any num-
ber of ways. Multiple waivers submitted by local education agencies or districts within
one state could be counted as one waiver. Waivers granted under specific programs, like
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those granted under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) or granted to
states dealing with the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Ike, could be removed from
the analysis.19 One could argue that the education waivers granted during the Obama
administration from 2011 to present are quite different from previous education waivers
because under the ESEA Flexibility program, as discussed in Chapter 1, Secretary of Ed-
ucation Arne Duncan granted waivers that were conditional on states agreeing to imple-
ment policies that were not a part of existing law.20
However, the goal here is not to explain variation in the policy content of waivers
granted by presidents and their administrations. Rather, the task at hand is to identify
the conditions under which presidents are motivated to approve waivers, and relatedly,
to assess the conditions under which governors submit waiver applications. As a result,
in my analysis I do not distinguish between different types of waivers. The broad discre-
tion granted to the Secretary of Education, and by extension to each president’s admin-
istration, governs the waivers granted under both IASA and NCLB. Presidents Clinton,
Bush, and Obama drew on this waiver authority as they developed waiver programs,
designed review requirements, invited applications, reviewed state submissions, and de-
cided whether or not to approve each waiver request. As such, in this dataset and in sub-
sequent analyses I make only two narrow exclusions from the approved waivers listed
in the Federal Register from 1995 through 2010 and in approval letters sent to states in
2011 and 2012.
These exceptions are as follows. First, I exclude waivers of administrative cost limita-
tions to Indian education funds granted from 2002 through 2009 under the Indian Educa-
19Robustness checks of Proposition 2 (the central theoretical implication, introduced in Chapter 4) show
that the results do not change meaningfully when either the waivers granted under ARRA or waivers
granted for relief of Hurricanes Katrina or Ike are omitted from the analysis. Please see Table 3.6 in the
Appendix and Figures 3.4 and 3.5 for specifications that omit ARRA and Hurricane Katrina waivers, re-
spectively.
20In Chapter 6, I include an alternate specification that omits these waivers from analysis. The central
relationship expressed in Proposition 2 is robust to omission of the ESEA Flexibility waivers. In Chapter 7,
I discuss the implications of conditional waivers in more detail.
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tion Formula Grant program.21 I exclude these waivers because eligibility for application
is dependent on the portion of Indian students in a school, or on a school’s proximity to
or location on an Indian reservation, according to the Office of Indian Education (2014).
Because eligibility for these cost limitation waivers is tied specifically to this demographic
requirement, the submission and approval decisions may be categorically different than
the mechanism that otherwise informs the waiver process. Second, in the Federal Regis-
ter Notice on approved waivers from the 2009 calendar year, the Obama administration
reported that nineteen local education agencies in Massachusetts were awarded waivers
from two sections that "preclude the 19 districts from using funds other than Title I, Part
A funds for the 2008-2009 school year to meet the 10 percent professional development
spending requirement." I count these nineteen waivers as one waiver granted to the state
of Massachusetts – unlike the waivers granted to individual districts under the Clinton
administration, this appears to be an exceptional case specific to Massachusetts during
this year.
Other than these two exceptions, in the main analysis in this and subsequent chap-
ters, I include all waivers granted by the Secretary of Education under the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act and the Goals 2000: Educate America Act as listed in the
Federal Register from 1995 through 2010 and all waivers reported by the Department of
Education in approval letters posted online and mailed to states under the ESEA Flexi-
bility program in 2011 and 2012.
3.3.3 Dependent Variable: Strengths and Limitations
Using these data on welfare, Medicaid, and education waivers, the dependent vari-
able for subsequent analyses of approved waivers is the number of waivers approved, per
state-year-policy area.22 Here, I discuss the logic behind this structure and the tradeoffs
21118 such waivers were granted from 2002 through 2009.
22As discussed above, the dependent variable in analyses of submitted waivers equals the number of
waivers submitted per state-year-policy area.
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involved in using approved waivers unconditional on submission as a dependent vari-
able.
Structure of the Dependent Variable
Including an observation for each state-year allows for incorporation of factors that
vary across states and that influence whether a governor receives approval of their waiver
applications. Measuring the total number of approvals by year would obscure the nature
of the waiver process; waivers are not approved in batches each year. Rather, each state’s
application is reviewed individually. This structure of the dependent variable captures
the variation across states that characterizes this process.
Further, including one observation per policy for each state-year allows us to assess
the model using observations from more than one policy area. As discussed above, this
analysis allows for more generalizable results. Pooling the number of approved waivers
into one state-year observation is an option and would perhaps reduce noise and ineffi-
ciency that is introduced through the inclusion of three policy-specific observations per
state-year. But this method would not distinguish between waivers approved in one pol-
icy area or another, and doing so is important, particularly given the large number of
education waivers in the data. Including one observation per state-year-policy makes it
possible to include control variables for each policy. For these reasons, the state-year-
policy structure of the dependent variable is optimal for assessing the questions at hand.
Addressing Potential Selection Bias
In this chapter and in Chapter 6, I primarily focus on a model of approved waivers
unconditional on submission. That is, I include all state-year observations for which
waivers were available in each policy area regardless of whether a waiver was submitted
in each state-year-policy area. Here, I explain this approach and explain my efforts to
minimize bias in the results.
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The primary concern with an unconditional model is that states in the applicant pool
are not generated by a random selection process. Rather, states in the applicant pool
select into the sample when the governor decides to submit a waiver application. Without
accounting for this self-selection process, the estimates may suffer from omitted variable
bias, where the omitted variables are those that drive the self-selection process.
One solution would be to estimate a conditional model that includes only state-years
in which governors submitted a waiver application. By conditioning on this self-selection,
we could directly measure the effects of the relevant explanatory variables on waiver ap-
provals, given selection into the pool of applicants. But this approach narrows the scope
of analysis to Section 1115 welfare and Medicaid waivers only, since data on submitted
education waivers is not currently available, as explained above.
Omitting approved education waivers would reduce the ability to produce generaliz-
able estimates about the president’s use of waivers. Recall that no analysis of approved
waivers includes more than one policy area at a time; this approach has made it difficult
to generalize about the use of waivers as policy tools. Rather, it has led to policy-specific
analysis of waivers.23 However, the goal here is not to explain how presidents use waivers
in one policy area, but to examine how the institutional constraints that shape presiden-
tial policymaking motivate his use of this tool across policy areas. For this reason, omit-
ting education waivers in favor of a conditional model is not necessarily a worthwhile
tradeoff, since this would lead to less variation on key variables and, overall, less gener-
alizable results.
While the potential issue of selection bias remains, two characteristics of this analysis
help to minimize this problem. First, the rate of waiver approvals is in fact quite high.
23For example, based on his analysis of Medicaid and education waivers using separate models and
producing separate estimates for each policy area, Shelly (2013) concludes that "this study offers support for
the findings of authors such as Derthick (2001) that intergovernmental politics varies across policy areas"
(463). He goes on to suggest that "one should allow for the possibility that the federal government may
simply grant more flexibility in education policy than in Medicaid. For most of U.S. history until the fifties,
the federal government was largely uninvolved in public education...the federal government may recognize
it needs states and local cooperation, while state and local officials may understand their relatively strong
bargaining positions" (463-4).
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In the case of Section 1115 waivers, of the submitted waivers in my dataset, 77 percent
of welfare waivers were approved, and 90 percent of Medicaid waivers were approved.
Overall, the approval rate for Section 1115 waivers in my data is 82.8 percent.24 Similarly,
Gormley (2006) describes the high approval rates of education waivers:
In general, the Department of Education has responded favorably to waiver
requests. Both the Clinton administration and the George W. Bush adminis-
tration approved most of the education waiver requests they received. When
considering waivers, the Department of Education has usually said yes unless
the waiver was unnecessary or unauthorized by federal law (Gormley 2006,
53).
To elaborate on this point, Table 3.2 below is a reproduction of Table 3 from Gormley
(2006), which depicts the rate of waiver approvals from 1995 through 2004.25 Refer-
encing these high rates of approval, Shelly (2013) highlights "the likelihood that waivers
that are requested are usually granted" (458). From 1995 through 2004, the average ap-
proval rate by the Department of Education was 72 percent. While slightly lower than
the average approval rate for Section 1115 waivers, this is nonetheless quite a high av-
erage approval rate. Further, Gormley’s data end before the Obama administration took
over the ESEA waiver process in 2009. Anecdotally, it seems that the Obama administra-
tion approved waiver applications at a high rate. For example, 43 of 45 states that have
submitted waiver applications under the ESEA Flexibility program have been awarded
waivers, according to the Department of Education.26
24This calculation only includes waivers for which I could identify the applicant and the year of sub-
mission, approval, or both. U.S. territories and Washington, D.C. were excluded because they do not have
governors, consistent with the analysis throughout this dissertation. When the calculation includes all
reported waivers, including those for which I could not identify a year of submission or approval, the ap-
proval rates are as follows: 71 percent for welfare, 84 percent for Medicaid, and an average of 76.5 percent
across all Section 1115 waivers. This rate is quite similar to the average approval rate for K-12 waivers that
Gormley (2006) finds from 1995 through 2004, which is 72 percent.
25Notes for Table 3 in Gormley (2006): "Source: Susan Winingar, education program specialist, Office of
Elementary and Secondary Education, Department of Education, March 2005. Note: These waivers were
issued under the authority of Goals 2000 (1994), the School-to-Work Opportunities Act (1994), and the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, as reauthorized in 1994. Local education agencies and states
can request a waiver in one year and have it granted in the next year. Thus the ratio of waivers granted to
waivers requested in any calendar year captures the number of waivers requested in that calendar year and
the disposition of those waivers in that calendar year or a subsequent year" (532).
26The high rates of waiver approvals frequently referenced in the literature further reduce concerns that
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Calendar Year Waivers requested Waivers granted % granted
1995 118 105 89.0
1996 71 49 69.0
1997 97 86 88.7
1998 122 113 92.6
1999 174 122 70.0
2000 99 53 53.5
2001 99 85 85.9
2002 51 29 56.9
2003 16 11 68.8
2004 35 16 45.7
Table 3.2: Waivers requested and granted by the Department of Education in response to
states and local education agencies, as seen in Gormley (2006), Table 3, page
532.
These high rates of approval suggest that, as many scholars have noted, most waivers
that are submitted are ultimately approved. The important implications are, first, that
the approval stage of the process is not characterized by an intense weeding out of appli-
cants and, second, that states with approved waivers look similar to states that submitted
waivers.
Next, I explain the second characteristic of the analysis that helps account for poten-
tial selection bias. In subsequent models of waiver approvals I include the state-level
factor that predicts waiver submission: the Squire index of professionalism. Including
this observable characteristic that determines self-selection into the applicant pool helps
reduce the potential for omitted variable bias.27 This solution has a weakness: the anal-
ysis of waiver submissions is based on welfare and Medicaid waivers, but not on educa-
tion waivers. To the extent that states submitted education waiver applications based on
different factors, this analysis will not account for those factors. However, there is not
a compelling reason to expect that different state-level factors explain education waiver
submissions in contrast to Medicaid or welfare waiver submissions, particularly given my
argument that waivers are valuable tools under certain institutional constraints rather
there are dramatic differences between those who submit waiver applications and those whose waivers are
approved (Thompson and Burke 2007; Shelly 2013; Lieberman and Shaw 2000).
27Please see the Appendix for an explanation of this logic.
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than policy-specific conditions. For these reasons, the unconditional model of waiver
approvals allows for reliable analysis of the theoretical propositions. Nonetheless, as a
robustness check below I also include conditional specifications of approved welfare and
Medicaid waivers.
3.3.4 Summary of the Data
I have described a dataset that includes submitted waivers in welfare and Medicaid
from 1984 through 2012, and further, approved waivers in welfare, Medicaid, and edu-
cation over the same years. While this dataset is far from perfect, it improves on the three
primary weaknesses that characterize existing datasets of waivers. First, I incorporate
multiple policy areas. Doing so allows us to test propositions about the president’s use of
waivers without restricting our analysis or interpretation to one policy area. As a result,
we have a better understanding of the president’s use of this tool, which is the central
goal of this dissertation. Second, the data here cover nearly thirty years in total.28 The
data here on submitted and approved waivers covers a longer time period than existing
work, which is critically important to allow for sufficient variation across the variables of
interest, particularly those related to the institutional environment that constrains (and
incentivizes) presidential policymaking behavior. Third, this dataset includes not only
approved waivers, but submitted waivers. Including submitted waivers allows me to as-
sess propositions about the conditions under which governors submit waivers, an inquiry
that is missing from the literature.
This original dataset allows for two types of tests. First, it allows us to explicitly in-
terrogate the common assumption in the existing work on waivers that presidents do not
pursue waivers under certain institutional conditions, but rather, that they simply ap-
prove more waivers for governors in their party. The data here provide for a fair and
generalizable assessment of whether there is any merit to this existing framework. Sec-
28As explained above, waivers in each policy area were available for a subset of the full time period from
1984 through 2012.
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ond, and most importantly, I use this dataset to conduct the tests at the heart of this
dissertation. Specifically, in Chapters 5 and 6 I use these data to assess the theoretical
propositions that I develop in the next chapter about the conditions under which gover-
nors submit and presidents approve waivers.
3.4 Modeling the Common Assumption
The final section in this chapter assesses the common assumption about the presi-
dent’s role in the waiver process at the submission and approval stages. I begin with the
submission stage.
3.4.1 Submitted Waivers
While existing work does not specifically address the submission stage of the process, I
extend the logic of the common assumption that governors in the president’s party receive
more waiver approvals to this stage. Specifically, I assess whether governor-president
alignment is an important factor in explaining which governors submit waiver applica-
tions. Weak evidence in support of this argument would suggest that we need a theory of
presidential policymaking through waivers that incorporates the president’s institutional
environment.
Primary Dependent and Explanatory Variables
The dependent variable here is the number of submitted waivers, per state-year-policy.
The central explanatory variable is Alignment, which equals one if the governor is in the
president’s party and zero if the governor is not. The expectation, based on the common
assumption, is that this variable will be positive, indicating that governors in the presi-
dent’s party submit more waivers in anticipation that the president simply grants more
waiver requests for governors in his party.
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State Factors
Existing models that seek to explain waivers include a number of internal state factors,
and with good reason. Indeed, consistent with the laboratories of democracy narrative,
waivers provide opportunities for experimentation that should at least in part reflect the
politics and priorities specific to individual states (Weissert 2008). I include relevant state
factors to examine how the state environment influences this stage of the waiver process.
First, we might expect that a state’s governmental capacity influences whether a state
has the resources required to create a viable application. This is no small hurdle – for
example, in the case of welfare, the Office of Management and Budget’s commitment to
cost neutrality required states to create programs that would not incur additional costs,
a potentially complex endeavor (Gueron and Rolston 2013). I include the Squire index
of legislative professionalism as a proxy for a state’s capacity to commit the necessary
resources to draft an application (Squire 1992, 2007, 2012). The Squire index accounts
for length of the legislative session, legislator compensation, and legislator staff. While
waiver applications are not created by the legislature, I assume here that lower (higher)
levels of legislative capacity correspond with lower (higher) levels of bureaucratic capac-
ity (Huber and Shipan 2002).29
Second, the political ideology of the state’s citizenry may impact whether or not a
governor decides to submit a waiver. While existing work on waivers has failed to find
evidence that citizen ideology helps explain which waivers are approved (Lieberman and
Shaw 2000; Shelly 2012), no analysis of how this factor impacts submission has been con-
ducted. Furthermore, state citizen ideology has been found to be a relevant predictor
of other policymaking outcomes (Erikson et al. 1993). It is reasonable to predict, there-
fore, that a state’s ideological leaning would influence a governor’s decision to submit
a waiver. I measure citizen ideology using Berry et al.’s measure based on ADA/COPE
29The Squire index has been associated with many types of policymaking activities, "both within and
outside the legislature," and has been found to be valid and reliable over time and in comparison with
alternative measurements (Squire 2007, 211).
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scores (2010).30
Third, we may expect that a state’s financial resources influence whether or not a
governor seeks a waiver, particularly since waivers were frequently used to cut down the
costs of welfare and Medicaid programs. Governors of states with a lower per capita
income, and thus a smaller tax base, may have been more inclined to apply for waivers
that would have allowed them to implement cost-cutting strategies. I include a measure
of state per capita income (in 1000s) to assess whether poorer states submitted more
applications.31
National Factors
There are two important national factors that may also influence how many waivers
governors submit. First, I include a measure of the change in the national Gross Domestic
Product (GDP). If the country’s finances are strained, states may expect less funding from
the federal government. Because the waivers I analyze here are in the areas of welfare and
Medicaid, programs that are partially funded through federal dollars, governors may
also feel the crunch if the national GDP decreases.32 In this case, waivers that allow for
program experimentation (and cost saving) may become even more attractive.
Second, I include James Stimson’s measure of policy mood, measured with Annual
Mood (1999). Waivers are repeatedly discussed by presidents as policymaking tools that
30It may be the case that more conservative states were eager to support waivers that cut down on spend-
ing on social programs. For example, the push for managed care in the 1990s that sought to make Medicaid
more cost effective may have appealed primarily to conservative audiences.
31Further, there are a number of additional state-level variables that one might argue influence how
many waivers governors submit each year. I include a number of these variables in additional specifications
reported in the Appendix. Specifically, I include a dummy variable for state divided government that equals
one if the majority of state legislators are from the opposing party of the governor and zero otherwise, a
dummy variable that equals one if a governor’s state has a term limit rule, a variable that measures how
many years are left in a governor’s term, a variable that equals one if it is an election year for a governor and
zero otherwise, and Berry et al.’s measure of state institutional ideology alternately based on NOMINATE
rather than on ADA/COPE scores (2010). Please see Table 3.5 in the Appendix for these specifications.
Substantively, including these additional variables does not result in a different conclusion: it still appears
that Alignment is significant at the α = 0.10 level in some models but not others, as discussed below.
32Indeed, Shaw and Lieberman (2000) find that the primary predictors of welfare waiver approvals are
related to the national AFDC caseload, suggesting that governors submit more waivers as the national
caseload increases and, thus, as the federal budget grows more strained under this increase.
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allow their administrations to take action and, often, to implement reform where oth-
erwise none might be possible. Recall, for example, Clinton’s rhetoric of implementing
reform by authorizing action at the state level. Further, waivers are explicitly designed
to foster innovation through experimental programs. During years when the public is
more in favor of activist government, I expect that governors and presidents alike may be
more eager (and may find it politically more beneficial) to implement new programs via
waivers.
3.4.2 Submitted Waivers: Assessing the Common Assumption
The model based on the common assumption in existing work is below. In addition to
the variables just described, I include dummy variables for each administration observed
in the data: Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush, with Obama as
the omitted category. These dummy variables help decrease omitted variable bias by ac-
counting for unobserved factors specific to each president that may have influenced this
process, such as a president’s own relationships with governors and more broadly, his
willingness to work with states on important policy questions. The presidential dummy
variables are in ZtPresident. Similarly, this model includes a policy dummy variable
for whether a waiver was submitted in welfare; a value of zero for this variable corre-
sponds with Medicaid observations. The dependent variable is a count of the number
of waiver applications submitted in state i = 1...50, policy j = welfare or Medicaid, year
t = 1984...2012.
Waivers Submittedijt = β0 + β1Alignment + β2Squire + β3Citizen Ideology
+β4Income + β5GDP Change + β6Mood
+β7Welfare +ZtPresident + εijt (3.1)
Table 3.3 shows the results from two different specifications. In the first column,
the Baseline model includes president fixed effects. While the president fixed effects are
jointly significant in the Baseline model, suggesting that including them helps account for
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unobserved variation, it could be the case that including these fixed effects obscures our
estimate of Alignment.33 Consequently the model in the second column omits these fixed
effects. A negative binomial specification is used in both models, given the abundance of
zeros and evidence of overdispersion.34
In both models in Table 3.3, the direction of Alignment is positive. In the Baseline
model, however, Alignment fails to reach standard levels of statistical significance.35 In
contrast, in the No President Fixed Effects model, Alignment is significant at the α =
0.10 level.36 Table 3.5 in the Appendix echoes this pattern; Alignment is inconsistently
significant only at the lenient α = 0.10 level. Overall, these results suggest that there is
only weak and inconsistent evidence that governors submit more waivers when they are
in the president’s party.
If the existing framework correctly models the president’s role in the waiver process,
governors should anticipate that the president will approve more waivers for those in his
party. As a result, governors in the president’s party should submit more waivers in ex-
pectation of receiving approval from the president’s administration. However, we do not
see convincing evidence that governors behave in a manner consistent with this frame-
work. These weak results suggest that we need to move beyond a framework in which
the president’s role in this process is either defined by or limited to partisan alignment
between each governor and the president. I propose such a theory in Chapter 4 and assess
the implications for the submission stage in Chapter 5.
It is worth noting here that the Squire index plays an important role in explaining how
many waivers governors submit. As expected, states with higher legislative professional-
ism scores, and by proxy, higher policymaking capacities, submit more waivers. Perhaps
those governors who can rely on a competent bureaucracy to create the often-complicated
33χ2 test statistic = 80.00, p-value 0.000.
34For example, a likelihood ratio test of α = 0 of the Baseline model in Table 3.3 below gives a test statistic
of 12.10 with a p-value of 0.000, such that we can safely reject the null that α = 0.
35The p-value for Alignment is 0.156.
36P-value = 0.079. Note: the 95% confidence interval includes 0 [-0.03, 0.48].
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Table 3.3: Assessing the Common Assumption, Submitted Waivers




% GDP Change -0.02 -0.12∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.03)





Citizen Ideology 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)















Log Likelihood -730.52 -769.80
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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waiver applications are best situated to submit applications.
3.4.3 Assessing the Common Assumption: Approved Waivers
Finally, I assess the assumption in the existing literature that governors in the presi-
dent’s party receive more waiver approvals than those in the opposing party. The depen-
dent variable here is the number of waivers approved per state-year-policy. As described
above, this dataset allows for more variation across policy areas and over time than ex-
isting work, providing for a more thorough assessment of the common assumption than
existing work. It is important to keep in mind that this existing model does not con-
sider the president’s institutional incentives to approve waivers. Null results regarding
the role of Alignment in predicting waiver approvals would suggest that we need a new
model that specifically considers the president’s incentives to use waivers.
The baseline model of approved waivers, below, echoes the previous model of sub-
mitted waivers.37 The unconditional model includes state fixed effects to account for any
unobserved, state-specific characteristics that influence which states are granted waivers.
I also add a dummy variable for education and welfare waivers.38
Waivers Approvedijt = β0 + β1Alignment + β2Squire + β3Income
+β4GDP Change + β5Mood + β6Welfare + β7Education
+ZtPresident +WiState + εijt (3.2)
In the analysis here, I also specify a conditional model.39 I estimate the unconditional
37As I discuss in the Appendix, I include Squire, given its role in predicting state submissions, to help
account for self-selection into the pool of applicants based on state capacity. I omit Citizen Ideology, since
the results from the submission models suggest that this factor did not play a role in state submissions.
Given the slow pace at which the ideology of a state changes, the state fixed effects should absorb any role
this factor plays, reducing concerns over omitted variable bias. Please see Table 3.7 in the Appendix for
models that include Citizen Ideology; the results are similar to those discussed below.
38Medicaid is the omitted dummy variable for policy area.
39The conditional model omits state fixed effects to preserve degrees of freedom, given the smaller sam-
ple. Please see the Appendix for results that include state fixed effects for the conditional model – Alignment
does not approach conventional levels of statistical significance in this model. I also include the log of sub-
mitted waivers in this model, since I have this information, rather than using Squire as a proxy for the log of
submissions. This decision is based on the logic regarding omitted variable bias discussed in the Appendix.
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model using a zero-inflated negative binomial specification, while the conditional model
is assessed using a Poisson specification.40 Table 3.4 shows the results from both the
unconditional and the conditional model.
Across both models in Table 3.4, Alignment fails to achieve statistical significance at
the α = 0.10 level. Note, for example, the coefficient of 0.04 and the robust standard
error of 0.09 in the unconditional model. Indeed, the p-value for Alignment is 0.62 and
0.35 in the unconditional and conditional models, respectively. While the estimates of
waiver submissions provided weak and inconsistent evidence that Alignment predicted
submissions, these results provide even less evidence that Alignment predicts waiver ap-
provals. In fact, there is essentially no evidence here to support the proposition that
partisan alignment between the president and an individual governor explains waiver
approvals.
The common assumption that Alignment explains waiver approvals is not based on an
argument about the president’s institutional incentives to use waivers as a policymaking
tool. Indeed, the existing framework of waiver approvals in large-n work does not fully
consider why the president would want to grant states flexibility from federal laws. We
need a theory that goes beyond the simple assumption embodied in the Alignment term
to explain when it is in the president’s interest to approve waivers, particularly given
the lack of predictive value this term achieves when assessed here with data that cover
multiple administrations and policy areas.41
40The Vuong test-statistic in the unconditional model is 3.34, with a p-value of 0.0004, indicating that
multiple processes generate the zeros in the data. I include the policy dummy variables in the inflation
model, since the process that might generate zeros are policy-specific. For example, we may observe zeros
if states are invited to apply for waivers in a specific policy area but decline to do so, or on the other hand,
when the administration has explicitly discouraged applications in a specific policy area. Please see the
Appendix for an ordinary least squares estimation of the conditional model. A poisson specification is
used for the conditional model here given the skew in the data towards zero. A likelihood ratio test of
α = 0 produces a test statistic of 0.00 with a p-value of 1.000, indicating that a negative binomial model is
not necessary for the conditional model given the lack of over dispersion.
41It is worth noting that Education, the dummy variable for waivers granted in education, is positive
and significant in the unconditional model. This is not surprising, given the large number of approved
education waivers in the data compared to the number of approved Medicaid and welfare waivers. The
statistical significance of this dummy variable is an argument in favor of the state-year-policy structure
used here to account for differences across policy areas.
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Annual Mood 0.04 0.01
(0.02) (0.04)





















State Fixed Effects Yes No
N 2600 238
Log Likelihood -1937.52 -229.54
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Finally, in the conditional model, Natural Log Submissions is positive and significant
with a coefficient of 0.80 and a robust standard error of 0.12. The significance and magni-
tude of this variable suggests that submitting a waiver is a strong predictor of approval.
This result helps reduce concerns regarding selection bias in the unconditional model
here and in subsequent chapters.42
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter served three purposes. First, I discussed the common assumption in
large-n work on waivers that presidents approve more waivers for governors in their
party, although solid evidence in support of this assumption remains elusive. Next, I
introduced an original dataset of submitted and approved waivers designed to address
limitations in existing data. This dataset contains 1) submitted waivers in welfare and
Medicaid from 1984 through 2012 and 2) approved waivers in welfare, Medicaid, and K-
12 education over the same time period. As discussed at length in this chapter, with these
data we are better equipped to assess theoretical propositions about how the president’s
institutional environment shapes his use of waivers.
Finally, using these data, I tested the common assumption in the large-n literature on
waivers that presidents play a reactive role in the waiver process, simply granting more
waiver requests for governors in their party. Existing work often does not consider the
submission stage of the process, although it is reasonable to extend the logic of existing
work to expect that governors in the president’s party will submit more waiver appli-
cations. But here, the results provide only weak and inconsistent evidence that Align-
ment helps explain waiver submissions. Further, Alignment does not appear to predict
the number of approved waivers. Based on this framework, one might conclude that
the president does not play an important role in the waiver process, nor does he pursue
42However, as discussed above and in the Appendix, it remains important to include the state factor that
predicts submission, Squire, in subsequent unconditional models to help minimize omitted variable bias
due to the potential selection effect.
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waivers to meet his own policy goals.
I argue that this framework, however, does not adequately account for the president’s
strategic use of waivers. Several scholars have suggested that the president uses waivers
in pursuit of specific policy goals (Thompson 2012; Thompson and Burke 2007; Hacker
2004; Teles 1996; Gais and Fossett 2005). The evidence in Chapter 2 strongly suggests
that presidents pursue and grant waivers strategically. Despite these null results in terms
of the common assumption, then, we should not conclude that the president plays a neg-
ligible role in the waiver process. Rather, these null results stem from the omission in the
existing large-n work of the president’s strategic interest in using waivers. The central
implication here is that we need to develop a new theoretical framework that considers
the president’s institutional incentives to use waivers. To this end, the next chapter pro-




Here, I discuss the logic behind including Squire in the model of approved waivers to
help account for self-selection into the sample. First, Squire is the only state-level variable
that predicts log(S), where S is the number of submissions per state-year. One approach
to help account for self-selection is to include log(S) in the model of approved waivers,
log(A). That is:
log(A) = αlog(S) +XB+u.
However, we do not know the number of submitted waivers in the case of education. As a
result, we cannot include log(S) in the model of approved waivers that includes all policy
areas. The solution here is to approximate log(S). Consider that log(S) = ZA∗ +V , where
Z contains the state-level variables that predict log(S). By substitution, we can estimate
log(A) as follows:
log(A) = αlog(S) +XB+u
= (ZA∗ +V )α +XB+u
= ZA+XB+u +Vα (3.3)
Based on the analysis in this chapter, the only state-level variable that predicts sub-
missions is Squire. Thus, including Z = Squire in the model of approved waivers, log(A),
helps account for self-selection into the sample.
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Table 3.5: Alternate Models, Submitted Waivers
All Terms Inst. NOMINATE
Alignment 0.26 0.21
(0.16) (0.14)
% GDP Change -0.13∗ -0.01
(0.06) (0.05)




Citizen Ideology 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Income (1000s) -0.06∗ -0.03
(0.02) (0.02)




Yrs. Left in Term -0.04
(0.09)
Term Limit Exists -0.34∗
(0.17)
State Div Gov -0.24
(0.23)
Inst. Ideology ADA/COPE -0.00
(0.00)















Log Likelihood -615.27 -727.55
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.6: Proposition 2: Omitting Approved ARRA and Hurricane Waivers
No ARRA No Hurricane
Distance -3.41 -3.44
(4.24) (4.33)
Percent Governors -8.46 -8.21
(5.84) (5.96)




Pres. Approval -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Annual Mood 0.09∗∗ 0.10∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)



















Log Likelihood -1855.18 -1870.06
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 3.4: Proposition 2: No ARRA
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Figure 3.5: Proposition 2: No Hurricane
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Table 3.7: Alternate Models, Approved Waivers
Citizen Ideology OLS No President FE State FE
Unconditional Conditional Conditional Conditional
Alignment 0.19 0.08 0.15 -0.14





% GDP Change -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.09∗
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Annual Mood -0.05 0.01 0.06∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
Welfare 1.05∗∗∗ 0.15 0.31∗ 0.36
(0.16) (0.11) (0.16) (0.22)
Reagan -1.47∗∗ 0.54∗ 0.27
(0.52) (0.25) (0.35)
GHWB -0.13 0.18 -0.26
(0.41) (0.22) (0.32)
Clinton 0.75∗ -0.10 -0.32
(0.35) (0.22) (0.33)
GWB -0.26 0.19 0.14
(0.35) (0.22) (0.27)
Natural Log Submissions 0.71∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.13) (0.17)
Constant 0.28 0.10 -4.45∗∗∗ -1.73
(1.99) (1.66) (1.20) (2.65)
N 1700.00 238.00 238.00 238.00
Log-Likelihood -731.52 -240.97 -231.99 -204.99
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
106
CHAPTER IV
A Theory of Presidential Policymaking through Waivers
Presidents have approved hundreds of waivers in welfare, Medicaid, and education,
as Chapter 2 discussed. Yet we lack a theory that explains this kind of presidential pol-
icymaking at the subnational level. Here, I take a step toward addressing this gap by
introducing a theory of presidential policymaking through waivers. In particular, I dis-
cuss waivers as an alternative to revising existing law through legislative changes.
This chapter proceeds in four sections. First, I review the literature on presidential
power and policymaking. In particular, I focus on how the president’s institutional con-
straints shape his policymaking choices. While this work provides the foundation for the
theory that I develop in subsequent sections, I identify a gap in the current understanding
of presidential policymaking: existing work does not generally consider when and how
the president might pursue subnational strategies. Second, I discuss Gais and Fossett’s
(2005) concept of executive federalism as a promising starting point for understanding
the incentives that motivate presidents to pursue subnational policymaking strategies.
Third, building on this work, I develop a theory of presidential policymaking through
waivers. I argue that presidents are motivated to approve waivers when they are ideolog-
ically far from Congress, contingent on the share of governors in their party. Finally, from
this theory, I propose a set of empirical implications that I assess in subsequent chapters.
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4.1 Theoretical Foundations: Presidential Power and Policymaking
Here, I discuss the nature of presidential power, focusing on how the president’s in-
stitutional environment shapes his decisions about which policymaking tools provide the
best avenues for pursuing his goals. To begin, Richard Neustadt’s doctrine defining pres-
idential power as the power to persuade (1960) shaped the study of the presidency for
decades. Yet scholars have begun to challenge this perspective in recent years. The chal-
lenge does not stem from disagreement over whether the president has an incentive to
bargain with Congress given his lack of formal authority. Rather, as Howell notes, a con-
sensus has emerged that the formal powers available to the president are "not enough"
for him to meet the American public’s expectations (2013, 8).
The departure from Neustadt’s thesis is best understood as an argument for an ex-
panded conception of presidential power. In his discussion of unilateral action, Richard
Waterman explains this argument through two fundamental questions that revisit Neustadt’s
thesis: "can presidents lead by persuasion alone? If not, what else can presidents do to
facilitate leadership?" (2009, 477). Waterman highlights a recurrent theme in recent lit-
erature on the presidency. Specifically, despite their lack of formal authority, presidents
have a number of tools at their disposal that allow them to pursue their policy goals
outside of the legislative arena, and in light of this, we should not equate their powers
of persuasion vis-à-vis Congress with presidential power. In pursuing these questions,
Neustadt’s central insight remains instructive: the president must find a way to expand
upon the limited powers delegated to him by the Constitution.
As Howell (2013) explains, the president has both the incentive and the license to
do so. Given the foundational nature of this argument for understanding presidential
policymaking, I expand on both of these points in turn. First, the president’s incentive
to expand his powers stems from a simple imperative – namely, we expect "everything"
from the president (2013, 1). Howell elaborates:
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In every policy domain, presidents must not only demonstrate involvement,
they must act - and they must do so for all to see, visibly, forthrightly, and
expediently. Deliberation must not substitute for action. Presidents are free
to think and talk, but they absolutely must do (6).
The solution to meeting these expectations is for presidents to "guard and expand their
base of power" (12).
Second, Howell traces the president’s license for expanding power not to the formal
authorities granted to him in Article II of the Constitution, but to the profound "silences"
in this Article (65). Howell asks: "What does it mean, for instance, to vest the president
with the ‘executive power’ and then to require the president to ‘take care’ that the laws
of the United States are ‘duly and faithfully executed?’" (63). The vague nature of the
president’s obligations provides the license with which presidents have expanded their
powers.
This understanding of the president’s motivation and means to pursue power char-
acterizes recent scholarship on presidential policymaking. Recognizing that presidential
power does not only operate through bargaining with members of Congress, scholars
have ventured far beyond the formal confines of the Constitution to identify policymak-
ing tools developed over the course of the modern presidency. Generally, scholars place
these strategies in the broad categories of unilateral action (Howell 2005) and adminis-
trative authority (Moe 1985). The former category includes, perhaps most prominently,
executive orders (Howell 2003; Mayer 2001), in addition to a smattering of options that
Howell (2014, 1) succinctly summarizes: “signing statements (Jackman 2014; Kelley et al.
2013), executive agreements (Martin 2000), memoranda (Woolley 2014), procurement
provisions (Gitterman 2013), and distributive outlays (Berry et al. 2010a; Kriner and
Reeves 2015; Hudak 2014).” In terms of administrative authority, Moe (1985) identi-
fies how presidents strategically centralize and politicize the dizzying maze of federal
government institutions; oversight of the rule-making process (Thrower et al. 2014) and
appointment power (Lewis 2003) exemplify these approaches, respectively.
109
Two characteristics define this recent work on presidential policymaking. First, in
a departure from Neustadt’s argument that presidents’ primary policymaking strategy
involves bargaining with Congress, this scholarship begins from the premise that the
president in fact often works around Congress. This approach is certainly justified. In an
era of increasing party polarization in Congress (McCarty et al. 2006), this scholarship in
many ways reflects a new (or at least current) reality as presidents attempt to govern in
the face of congressional obstructionism and divisive partisan bickering.
Second, this work tends to focus on national-level strategies; subnational strategies
are conspicuously absent from the extra-legislative policymaking tools listed above. In-
deed, Hacker (2004) warns that subnational policy revision has flown under the radar
for too long, allowing national policymakers to exploit various strategies of incremental
change that will ultimately lead to retrenchment of the American welfare state.1 Hacker
specifically highlights waivers as vehicles of “subterranean change” used by the exec-
utive branch as an alternative to revising programs through legislation (252). However,
this strategy and others like it remain almost wholly unexplored in the literature on pres-
idential policymaking.
Howell (2014) underscores this point in his exploration of President Obama’s Race
to the Top initiative: "though designed and implemented within the executive branch,
Race to the Top does not fit easily within the broader arsenal of unilateral powers com-
monly attributed to the president” (7). The Race to the Top case is illustrative. While
presidents pursue various state-level strategies, the literature on the president’s extra-
legislative policymaking options does not yet provide a framework for explaining such
tools that circumvent Congress and, in exchange, require state-by-state cooperation and
implementation. In fact, Howell’s investigation of President Obama’s inventive Race to
the Top initiative is, to my knowledge, the only full-scale empirical examination of a pres-
1Thompson and Burke (2007) argue that this fear is misplaced in the context of Medicaid waivers; they
find that Section 1115 waivers have largely been used to expand, rather than circumscribe, access. In this
project, I remain agnostic as to whether changes made through waivers expand or constrict the welfare
state overall.
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ident pursuing state-level policy change. While a large body of scholarship focuses on the
president’s national-level alternatives to legislation, very little systematic exploration of
the president’s subnational, extra-legislative policymaking strategies exists.
4.2 Executive Federalism: A Starting Point
The literature on unilateral action focuses on national-level strategies that allow the
president to act without cooperating with other branches (or levels) of government. Build-
ing on this work, to explain when presidents use a subnational policymaking strategy,
and waivers in particular, we need to reconsider the president’s incentives to cooperate.
In this section, I introduce Gais and Fossett’s concept of executive federalism and dis-
cuss how this concept provides a starting point for a theory of presidential policymaking
through waivers.
Gais and Fossett (2005) explain executive federalism as follows: "In the last two
decades...the executive branch has used a growing range of administrative tools to ne-
gotiate directly with states over specific policies or to alter the context of state policy
making without specific congressional approval (487)." This definition speaks directly to
the two-fold appeal of waivers. First, presidents can approve waivers without congressional
consent. This characteristic is quite valuable. Consider, for example, the limited policy-
making options the president may have if the status quo for a particular policy is located
in the "gridlock interval" (Krehbiel 2010). In this case, alternative policymaking options,
such as waivers, that allow the president to act without relying on the legislative process
may be particularly attractive. As the discussion of waiver authority in Chapter 2 sug-
gested, Congress has delegated broad discretion to presidents and their administrations
over the waiver process. As a result, the president can exercise this authority without
approval or consent from Congress.
Second, rather than ceding control over policy to states through delegation, presidents
negotiate with states over alterations in existing policy via waivers. Presidents and their
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administrations often refer to waivers as opportunities for states to gain "flexibility" from
existing law. Despite this rhetoric, the qualitative evidence in Chapter 2 seems to sug-
gest that administrations do not simply grant states broad flexibility via waivers. Rather,
the administration negotiates with individual governors to identify a policy change that
not only satisfies the governor but, importantly, helps the president advance his own
domestic agenda. Consistent with Gais and Fossett’s definition of executive federalism,
presidents use waivers to pursue their own policy goals at the subnational level.
Further, Gais and Fossett explain the strengths inherent in the office of the presidency
that make executive federalism feasible:
[T]he executive branch can apply its powers to the states in ways that Congress
cannot...It can adapt quickly to state policy developments, act on selected
states, and build on state reactions to federal initiatives - thereby using state
changes and variations to discourage developments it opposes and to facili-
tate those it supports...The executive can also act in a concerted manner across
several programs or even policy areas...by using key federal appointments to
bring new goals to bear on many decisions affecting the states (507).
They also note that exercising authority through waivers and other types of executive
federalism is facilitated by the fact that these tools "do not require legions of federal
staff” (507). In particular, evaluating waiver applications does not require a large team:
"[w]aivers require a few policy and legal experts, as well as some research methodologists
to review evaluation plans" (507).
Gais and Fossett (2005), overall, introduce and make a strong case for the plausibil-
ity of executive federalism. Crucially, they emphasize the possibility that the president,
under certain conditions, finds it in his interest to pursue his goals by working with state
actors rather than going it alone. However, this does not amount to a theory of waivers,
nor is it a theory of executive federalism. Indeed, the latter would be impossibly broad
and ultimately not very useful. For example, we do not have a single theory of unilat-
eral action. Instead, scholars have proposed specific theories that explain the motivations
and constraints that accompany various strategies within this broader category. What
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we need in this case is a similarly focused theory that explains when presidents have an
institutional incentive to pursue a waiver strategy.2
4.3 A Theory of Presidential Policymaking through Waivers
In this section, I propose a theory of presidential policymaking through waivers.
Specifically, I address a question that the existing literature does not adequately answer,
despite the institutional incentives for the president to pursue this strategy: when is it
in the president’s interest to grant states flexibility from federal law via waivers? This
question is substantively and theoretically important as well as empirically tractable.
4.3.1 Defining the "Waiver Strategy"
Chapter 2 suggests that presidents use waivers strategically in service of their domes-
tic agendas; the theory that follows is informed by this central observation. Drawing on
this evidence, I describe the president’s use of waivers as a "waiver strategy." This phrase
does not refer to negotiations between the administration and governors over individual
waiver applications. Rather, the term waiver strategy refers to the president’s decision to
pursue his policy goals by authorizing state-level revisions to existing legislation through
waivers.
The appeal of this strategy is simple yet powerful: the president’s waiver authority in
the policy areas discussed here is not formally constrained by Congress, and as such, a
2Given the president’s incentives to pursue subnational policymaking strategies, as articulated by Gais
and Fossett, what explains the lack of theoretical and empirical work in this area within scholarship on the
presidency? In "The Politicized Presidency,” Moe (1985) articulated and even defended the institutional in-
centives for presidents to centralize their authority: "[w]hatever his particular policy objectives, whatever
his personality and style, the modern president is driven by these formidable expectations to seek control
over the structures and processes of government" (239). Moe grounds an understanding of the president’s
behavior in his institutional structure and concludes from this analysis that presidents face powerful in-
centives to centralize control. He is not alone in reaching this conclusion; this theme is woven throughout
scholarship on the presidency (Neustadt 1960; Skowronek 2008; Howell 2013). This focus may explain the
lack of attention paid to strategies that require cooperation with the nation’s governors, which at first may
appear to involve too much decentralization as to be in the president’s interest. However, as the qualitative
evidence discussed in Chapter 2 suggests and as I discuss below, presidents in fact retain a high degree of
control over the waiver process.
113
waiver strategy does not require congressional consent. However, a waiver strategy is not
unconstrained. Since the president’s ultimate goal is to shift national policy towards his
ideal point through state-by-state changes, a waiver strategy is not viable if only one or
two states are likely to participate. A successful waiver strategy hinges on cooperation
from enough governors such that the president can shift policy in his preferred direction
on a national scale.
I argue that two factors operate in conjunction with one another to explain when the
president uses a waiver strategy. First, the president is motivated to use this strategy
when he is ideologically far from Congress. While this condition is necessary for the
president’s use of a waiver strategy, it is not sufficient. This type of strategy is only viable
if a second condition is met: specifically, if enough governors are willing to cooperate
with this strategy. Ultimately, I argue that the president is motivated to pursue waivers
when he is ideologically far from Congress contingent on the share of governors in his
party.
4.3.2 Waivers as an Alternative to Legislation
I begin with the first condition: the harder it is for the president to move his preferred
legislation through Congress and sign a new law, the stronger the incentive to grant states
flexibility from federal law via waivers. While Article II may grant the president vague
yet potentially expansive authority, his role in the legislative process is carefully detailed
and leaves little room for interpretation (Howell 2013, 63). Indeed, the constraints on
the president’s role in the legislative process are designed to limit his ability to create or
change laws. Krehbiel’s pivotal politics model, for example, illustrates the institutional
hurdles the president faces in shifting the legislative status quo (2010). In his framework
based on a unidimensional ideological space, the president must consider the location of
the filibuster pivot (i.e., the senator required to overcome a filibuster) and the median
member of the House when calculating the feasibility of shifting the policy in his favor
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via legislation.
Indeed, the president’s ability to achieve his policy goals by signing a new law is con-
strained by the ideological composition of Congress. Given the requirement that both
chambers of Congress vote in favor of a bill before it reaches the president’s desk, when
the president is ideologically far from the filibuster pivot in the Senate or the median
member of the House, the chances of a compromise that allows the president to imple-
ment his preferred policies in lieu of existing legislation are low. The greater the distance
between the president and Congress, whether the president is farthest from the Senate
filibuster pivot or the median member of the House, the more difficult it becomes not
only for the president to shift policy toward his ideal point but also for Congress and the
president to reach agreement at all. As the president moves farther from Congress, his
prospects for a legislative victory dim and the appeal of revising existing policies via an
alternative route increases.
In this case, approving waivers that authorize governors to implement changes to the
relevant federal law may become a particularly attractive strategy. Approving waivers
allows presidents to begin implementing their own policy goals without wrestling with
Congress. Particularly when the president has ideological preferences that diverge from
one or both chambers of Congress, this strategy may be attractive as it allows him to make
progress on his domestic agenda without investing heavily in a battle with Congress that
may have high costs but low potential payoffs. Indeed, if the president is able to approve
a substantial number of waivers while simultaneously pushing for legislative reform, he
may increase the pressure on Congress to work with him despite ideological differences.
And even if his legislative strategy ultimately fails, the president can point to waivers as
evidence of progress while simultaneously blaming Congress for obstructing legislative
change.3
3This argument draws on observations from Chapter 2; the cases discussed there, such as Clinton’s
use of welfare waivers and Obama’s use of NCLB waivers, suggest that presidents use a waiver strategy
particularly when they have a difficult relationship with Congress.
115
4.3.3 Potential Objections
There are several potential objections to my argument that presidents are motivated
to pursue waivers when they are far from Congress. The first and perhaps most obvious
potential objection is that as the president moves farther from Congress, members of
Congress will simply prevent the president from using waivers. This logic is similar
to Howell’s discussion of executive orders (2003) – precisely when this tool would be
advantageous for the president, Congress has an incentive to override the president’s use
of this tool. Yet in practice, Congress retains very little control over the waiver process.
Neither of the authorizing statutes described in Chapter 2 specify a formal mechanism of
congressional oversight. Even the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) leaves Congress
without a direct avenue to reign in secretarial waiver authority – under the APA, the only
mechanism for overturning a Secretary’s decision about a waiver is through the judicial
system. And in this case, Skinner and Feder (2012) describe how the courts generally
defer to secretarial discretion in approving waivers.
Members of Congress can hold hearings and request reports from the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) to investigate an administration’s waiver practices, but evi-
dence suggests administrations can choose whether or not to revise their waiver processes
in response to these proceedings (Thompson 2012). For example, GAO published two re-
ports, in 2002 and 2007, admonishing the Bush administration for a lack of transparency
in approving and reporting Section 11115 Medicaid waivers. However, the Bush admin-
istration was not forced to change any of its procedures as a result of these reports (158).
A second potential objection is that while members of Congress themselves cannot
prevent the president from exercising waiver authority, their agents in the bureaucracy
can effectively restrict the president’s use of waivers. However, waiver authority is dele-
gated to Cabinet secretaries, political appointees who are selected based in large part on
shared policy preferences with the president (Lewis 2003). And unlike rules and regu-
lations, the waiver process is exempt from a formal oversight process. As a result, the
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waiver process can be insulated from countervailing forces within the bureaucracy more
easily than traditional tools. Presidents and their administrations can also revise the
structure of the waiver review process to centralize decision-making within the White
House. President Reagan’s creation of the Interagency Low Income Opportunity Advi-
sory Board under the advisement of Charles Hobbs, described in Chapter 2, exemplifies
this advantage.
A third and final potential objection is that a number of other available strategies that
allow the president to take a more direct approach to implementing his agenda may be
preferable to waivers, rendering a waiver strategy moot – after all, committing to a waiver
strategy entails entering into negotiations with as many as fifty individual governors.
While this theory does not attempt to assess when the president will pursue waivers
as a specific alternative to one of these options, it is useful to illustrate why some of
the president’s other extra-legislative policymaking strategies are not always available,
particularly when the president is ideologically distant from Congress.
Foremost among these strategies are those that fall in the category of unilateral action.
However, in the case of executive orders, perhaps the most prominent type of unilateral
powers, if the president is far from Congress, issuing an executive order may in fact
be a risky proposition. As discussed above, Howell (2003) finds that when the majority
party is strong in Congress or when the president faces divided government, the president
cannot enjoy the first mover advantage without fear of retribution from Congress.4
Given this constraint, perhaps the president could pursue his agenda through the
4Further, waivers are valuable to the president in policy areas in which each state is largely responsible
for developing its own policies in order to implement federal law, as in the case of welfare, Medicaid, and
education. The president’s use of an executive order in this type of policy area would likely be perceived as
overstepping the bounds of executive authority, undermining the legitimacy of the president’s attempt at
reform. Further, given the extensive variation that characterizes state-level welfare, Medicaid, and educa-
tion policies, an executive order would impose a "one size fits all" approach on a diverse set of policies. In
addition to political pushback for intruding into states’ policymaking territory, then, issuing an executive
order would in practice be an ineffective approach to policy change. Finally, granting an executive order
to change an existing law would likely be seen as an illegitimate use of power. In the circumstances when
waivers are useful, then, the president may be unable to use executive orders without exceeding the bounds
of executive authority.
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rulemaking process. But the president’s ability to exercise this type of administrative
authority is also limited by Congress. Thrower et al. (2014) find that when the Adminis-
trator position is vacant in the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), OIRA
does not have the capacity to fast-track for approval the president’s prioritized rules. And
since the OIRA Administrator is a Senate-confirmed position, the president needs coop-
eration from Congress to overcome this hurdle. If the president seeks an avenue to revise
existing laws that circumvents congressional constraints, executive orders and oversight
of rule-making might not be viable options for the same reasons that the president needs
an alternative route in the first place.
4.3.4 Costs of a Waiver Strategy
Thus far, this discussion has illustrated why presidents have an incentive to grant
flexibility from federal laws when they are ideologically far from Congress. But how-
ever attractive a waiver strategy may be as an alternative to a showdown with Congress,
several costs accompany this strategy. Specifically, I discuss the policy, opportunity, and
reputation costs of a waiver strategy.
First, a waiver strategy entails policy costs. Since waiver applications are initially de-
signed by states, and approved waivers are ultimately implemented at the state level, the
president grants some control over the nature of policy change to states in exchange for
the ability to circumvent the legislative process. States may submit waiver applications
with a variety of different policy proposals; indeed, waiver authority was originally writ-
ten to facilitate state innovation. While the administration enjoys review authority over
these applications, the policies approved through waivers may not be perfectly consistent
with one another or with the president’s agenda. Although the president may be able to
shift policy towards his ideal point through negotiations with governors, he may need
to make compromises during negotiations with individual governors in order to reach
agreement on individual waivers, and in turn these compromises may result in more
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moderate policy gains compared to a unilateral strategy. Further, by offering states the
opportunity to propose new programs that may deviate from federal law, the president
may receive waiver applications that contradict his own policy goals. In this case, the
president may face a difficult decision between denying waiver applications and facing
political backlash, or on the other hand, approving waivers to avoid this criticism and in
doing so authorizing policy changes that undermine his own agenda.5
Second, the president may incur an opportunity cost while waiting for governors to
participate in his waiver strategy. It is important to keep in mind that a waiver strategy
is not a type of unilateral action. Rather, participation from a large share of governors
is necessary for this strategy to succeed. Compared to other tools like executive orders,
then, the president has less control over the timeline of a waiver strategy. While the
president may invite states to apply for waivers, he must wait for states to submit ap-
plications, negotiate with his administration, and if approved, begin implementing the
relevant reforms. In the meantime, another branch of government may take action before
the president has a chance to review and approve a substantial number of waivers that
align with his goals. If few states respond to a president’s invitation for waivers, or if
states respond slowly, in the meantime Congress may pass a new piece of legislation that
diverges from the president’s own goals. In this case, the president may face a constricted
set of options for policy reform. Or, a court may rule on a contested component of the ex-
isting law, which could also restrict the president’s ability to shift policy in his preferred
direction.6 Ultimately, pursuing waivers as a means of national-scale reform rather than
5Policy drift is also a risk here. Governors may agree to implement certain policies through waivers but
in practice may deviate from the original agreement. However, this problem is not unique to waivers but,
rather, is endemic to public administration. Further, to combat drift, the president’s administration can
include oversight mechanisms such as evaluation and reporting requirements in the terms of a waiver to
increase transparency of policy implementation. For example, the Obama administration makes it clear
in letters of approval to Chief State School Officers that the administration retains the authority to revoke
ESEA Flexibility waivers if states fail to meet the terms of compliance set out by the Department of Educa-
tion.
6While a new rule or regulation may also be promulgated, the chances of a rule or regulation that
contradicts the president’s goals being approved in these three policy areas is low, given that the secretaries
of the relevant agencies are reliable agents of the president, as discussed.
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using another tool at the president’s disposal may pose a high opportunity cost.
Third, the president also risks a reputation cost when using a waiver strategy. On
the one hand, if a waiver strategy is successful, whereby a large share of the nation’s
governors implement the president’s preferred policies through waivers, the president
may indeed be able to claim credit for reform. But at the same time, he must share credit
with governors while recognizing that he was unsuccessful in persuading Congress to
work with him. As Howell (2013) reminds us, presidents are expected to act decisively
on important issues. In granting waivers, the president may become vulnerable to the
critique that he shifted his responsibilities to governors rather than taking direct action
himself. While some presidents may successfully shape the narrative in their favor, as
president Clinton did in his use of welfare waivers, others may not prove so adept.
On the other hand, if a waiver strategy is not successful, the president may face an-
other type of reputation cost. The evidence discussed in Chapter 2 suggests that pres-
idents frequently introduce their waiver strategies publicly and personally invite gov-
ernors to apply. Each waiver strategy considered here is clearly and closely identified
with the president’s administration. If the president publicly invites governors to apply
for waivers as a means of national-scale reform but only a few governors submit applica-
tions, the president runs the risk of looking like a weak leader. Further, an unenthusiastic
response from states may in fact undermine the president’s agenda. Consider, for exam-
ple, President George W. Bush’s request for Section 1115 waivers to turn Medicaid into a
block grant program discussed in Chapter 2. As Thompson (2012) describes, only a few
states appeared interested in taking the President up on his offer. This type of lukewarm
response may undermine a president’s case for adopting the relevant policy change. If a
substantial share of governors appear uninterested in applying for waivers the president
invites, this failure could both call into question the president’s leadership and weaken
the president’s ability to implement the relevant reform.
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4.3.5 The Critical Hurdle: Governor Participation
The president can minimize these potential costs and implement his preferred re-
forms on a national scale if enough governors are willing to cooperate with the president’s
waiver strategy. The evidence in Chapter 2 suggests that presidents approve waivers in
pursuit of their own national policy goals, despite the rhetoric of providing states with
flexibility and opportunities to innovate that presidents often use to describe waivers.
While a waiver strategy requires state-by-state change, the president’s ultimate objective
with this strategy is to reform policy on a national scale. If the president can rely on
a large share of governors to submit waiver applications and subsequently implement
policy changes aligned with the president’s objectives, this strategy can allow the presi-
dent to stimulate national-scale policy shifts toward his ideal point while working around
Congress. But if the administration does not expect cooperation from enough governors,
a waiver strategy will not be a feasible option.7 Consequently, I argue that if the president
is ideologically far from Congress, the viability of a waiver strategy will depend on the
share of governors he expects to cooperate by implementing policy changes via waivers
that align with the president’s goals.
Pursuing a waiver strategy that fails to garner the necessary cooperation from gover-
nors would be costly and would be a blunder from a policymaking standpoint. First, as
examples from Chapter 2 suggest, engaging in the waiver process requires the adminis-
tration to spend scare time, resources, and perhaps even political capital on soliciting,
reviewing, and approving these applications. While approving one or two waivers might
result in isolated victories for the president, it would not result in widespread policy
change. Just as with any other strategy, investing in this course of action only makes
sense if the administration expects a sufficiently large payoff; otherwise, this effort would
7Consider, for example, if only two or three states applied for the ESEA Flexibility waivers that Obama
offered from NCLB. If that was the case, the policies mandated by NCLB would have largely remained
in place. But with 43 states operating under ESEA Flexibility waivers, the Obama administration in fact
replaced central parts of NCLB with policies that were outlined in Obama’s legislative Blueprint for Reform
that Congress failed to act on for nearly five years.
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amount to a waste of resources. If the president only anticipates that a small share of
governors will be interested in applying for waivers, his goals for national reform may be
better served by relying on another of the many policymaking tools at his disposal.
Second, if the president offers states flexibility but hardly any governors are willing to
implement the kind of reforms the president would approve, this lack of enthusiasm may
undermine the president’s own policy goals. This outcome may be particularly damaging
if the president is involved in ongoing negotiations with Congress over related legislative
reforms. On the other hand, if governors respond positively to the president’s waiver
invitation, the president can leverage this support while bargaining with Congress. For
example, as discussed in Chapter 2, Clinton frequently claimed to have granted more
welfare waivers than the previous two administrations combined while simultaneously
criticizing the Republican-led Congress for failing to successfully pass welfare reform
legislation. Similarly, in 2011 President Obama framed his ESEA Flexibility waiver strat-
egy as his administration’s answer to Congress’ inability to reform the roundly unpopular
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB). Obama’s Department of Education ultimately
approved waivers under this program for 43 states and D.C.8 In both of these cases, if
only a few states had cooperated with the administration’s waiver strategy, members of
Congress opposed to the president’s agenda may have highlighted lack of state interest
in the president’s waiver initiative as evidence that the president’s reform agenda should
be abandoned or dramatically altered.
When the president is ideologically far from Congress and is interested in a waiver
strategy as an avenue of extra-legislative policy change, he needs to be able to rely on
many allies at the state level to effectively use this strategy. Consequently the president
needs to consider the subnational political landscape when deciding whether to pursue
a waiver strategy. Simply stated, I argue that a waiver strategy becomes increasingly fea-
8In the fall of 2015, when Congress was finally in the process of revising NCLB, Secretary of Education
Arne Duncan commented that his biggest regret in his tenure as Secretary was not using waivers from
NCLB sooner, implying that the administration’s use of this tool was one of their most powerful reform
strategies in the face of an uncooperative, Republican-dominated Congress (Klein 2015).
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sible as a means of implementing national-scale policy reform as the share of governors
in the president’s party grows. The more governors in the president’s party, the more
allies the president can rely on to comply with his request for waiver applications. In
addition, with a large share of governors in his party, the possibility that a majority of
governors would respond to the president’s invitation for waivers with policy proposals
that undermine or contradict the president’s agenda decreases.
There are two reasons why governors in the president’s party are his most reliable
allies. First, governors in his party are more likely to be ideologically similar to the pres-
ident. As evidence in Chapter 2 suggests, presidents and their administrations exercise
broad discretion over the waiver process, and in many cases they are only willing to ap-
prove waivers that conform to, or at least do not conflict with, their policy preferences.
Governors in the president’s party are more likely to share the president’s policy goals and
thus stand the most to gain from the flexibility his administration offers. Second, gover-
nors in the president’s party will also benefit the most if the president’s waiver strategy
is successful and well-received by the public. If the president can point to his work with
governors as evidence of reform and progress, this may in turn increase the value of the
party brand, helping governors in the president’s party in subsequent elections. Further,
governors in the president’s party may earn direct aid from the party in future campaigns
if they cooperated with the president’s waiver strategy by submitting an application and
then implementing a waiver. These reciprocal benefits reflect the "sympathy" that char-
acterizes the relationship between co-partisans at different levels of government (Bednar
2009, 114).
If governors in his own party are his most likely allies, then when the president is
far from Congress, he is more likely to see waivers as a viable strategy as the share of
governors in his party increases. The more governors in his party, the more likely he
is to receive a positive response from a critical mass of governors – and this is the key
to a successful waiver strategy. This is not to say that governors must coordinate and
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intentionally act together in order for a waiver strategy to work for the president. What
matters here is how many governors the president can count on, regardless of whether the
governors act as individual chief executives or as a group. As a result, the most important
constraint on the president’s ability to use waivers to pursue his goals is not whether an
individual governor is in his party, but how many governors overall are in his party.
This discussion leads to the central implication of my theory. The president’s decision
to approve waivers does not hinge independently on his distance from Congress or on the
number of likely allies at the state level. Rather, the president is motivated to approve
waivers when he is ideologically far from Congress, contingent on the share of governors
in his party. Recall that the goal of a waiver strategy is to shift policy in the president’s
preferred direction through authorizing state-level changes to federal law. This policy
shift does not require one hundred percent participation from governors, but it cannot
be achieved if only a handful of governors decide to participate. Given my assumption
that governors in his party are his most likely allies, the share of governors in the pres-
ident’s party becomes the primary constraint that determines whether a waiver strategy
is viable. In other words, the president is incentivized to pursue a waiver strategy when
he is ideologically far from Congress contingent on the share of governors in his party.9
4.4 Central Propositions
In this section, I offer several propositions that allow me to assess the implications
of this theory. I discuss these propositions in sequence, beginning with the application
phase of the waiver process and then moving to the approval stage.
9It is worth considering the implications for situations when the president is not far from Congress.
The president, in this case, is much less motivated to authorize deviations from federal law. The easier it
becomes to work with Congress, the less incentive the president has to pursue an extra-legislative revision
strategy via waivers. When the president is ideologically close to Congress, even with a large share of
governors in his party, it is most likely in his interest to work directly with Congress rather than to grant
states flexibility via waivers, and the number of waivers may decrease in this scenario.
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4.4.1 Predicting Governors’ Application Behavior
Like the president, governors are strategic actors who invest their time and resources
carefully. Submitting an application when the president has not expressed interest or
willingness to review or approve these applications would waste valuable resources. In-
deed, creating a waiver application is not a costless endeavor. Waiver applications are
not simply rubber stamped upon receipt by the administration.10 As the evidence in
Chapter 2 suggests, sometimes lengthy, even contentious, negotiations between the ad-
ministration and individual governors, particularly governors from the opposing party,
characterize the approval process. Investing in creating a waiver application when the
president’s administration is not in fact open to approving these applications squanders
time and resources, and potentially valuable political capital as well.
Given the finite nature of a governor’s resources, it is in her interest to submit an
application if she expects that the president has an incentive to approve waiver appli-
cations. And as I have argued, the president has an incentive to approve waivers when
he is ideologically far from Congress, contingent on the share of governors in his party.
In turn, governors’ application behavior should be fundamentally shaped by these condi-
tions. Proposition 1 captures this expectation that governors submit waivers strategically,
based on their expectations of the president’s institutional incentives to approve waivers:
Proposition 1: Governors submit more waiver applications as the ideological distance between
Congress and the president increases, contingent on the share of governors in the president’s
party.
From the president’s perspective, this is a crucial stage in the waiver process. If gover-
nors submit applications based on their perception of the president’s behavior, the pres-
ident is likely to find that his invitation for waiver applications is greeted with enough
submissions for this strategy to be viable. Indeed, it is worth reiterating here that waivers
10For example, Gueron and Rolston (2013) detail how Section 1115 welfare waiver applications were
assessed based in large part on the rigor of a state’s evaluation mechanism to assess the efficacy of demon-
stration programs.
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are distinct from other extra-legislative policymaking strategies in the president’s arse-
nal. The president cannot mandate that states adopt policy changes through waivers.
Rather, governors must first submit waiver applications. If it is the case that governors
submit waiver applications when it is in the president’s interest to approve them, we have
important evidence that the waiver process is fundamentally shaped by the president’s
incentives. This analysis, then, takes an important first step towards investigating the
theory of presidential policymaking through waivers discussed above.
4.4.2 Predicting Waiver Approvals
Ultimately, we are interested in when the president grants waivers – only by approv-
ing waiver requests can the president capitalize on a waiver strategy. The proposition
below is based on the core interaction that I have argued motivates the president’s use of
a waiver strategy:
Proposition 2: The number of waivers approved each state-year increases as the ideological dis-
tance between Congress and the president increases, contingent on the share of governors in the
president’s party.
In the empirical analysis in subsequent chapters, we are primarily interested in the
marginal effect of the president’s ideological distance from Congress contingent on the
share of governors in his party. I expect that the number of waivers approved will in-
crease when the president moves further from Congress as the percent of governors in
the president’s party increases. I focus on the marginal effect of distance given my argu-
ment that the president’s inability to move his preferred legislation through Congress is
the necessary condition that initially motivates the president to consider a waiver strat-
egy. The share of governors in the president’s party is primarily relevant as a constraint
on the president’s ability to use this strategy when he seeks a policymaking option that
provides an alternative to the legislative process.
Notably, I do not anticipate that governors in the president’s party are more likely
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to receive waiver approvals. This may seem counterintuitive, but the argument here is
not that presidents are inherently against granting waivers to governors in the opposing
party. Rather, presidents are more motivated to pursue this strategy when they are con-
fident that they will receive a widespread, positive response to their invitation – and I
argue that the more governors in their party, the more confidence they will have in this
strategy. However, this does not mean that presidents will only grant waivers submitted
by governors in their party. On the contrary, if governors from the opposing party are
willing to work with the administration, this can be an advantage for the president. Since
waiver proposals submitted by governors of the opposing party must still be vetted by
the president’s administration, the president can retain control over the policy outcomes
of the waiver process while pointing to a record of bipartisanship reform. Consequently
when the president invites waivers, there might be a "rising tide lifts all boats" effect; that
is, governors from the opposing party may benefit from this opportunity.
4.4.3 Waivers as Legislative Revisions
In the final proposition, I incorporate an additional observation about the conditions
under which presidents use waivers. The evidence reviewed in Chapter 2 suggests that
the president often uses a waiver strategy during his concurrent efforts to revise an exist-
ing law that either contradicts his own goals, has fallen out of the public’s good graces,
or both. For example, both Clinton’s use of welfare waivers during his first term and
Obama’s use of waivers from the No Child Left Behind Act illustrate this tactic. It seems,
then, that waivers are particularly useful to the president when he is dissatisfied with an
existing federal law and in fact hopes to revise it.
Consequently, I suggest that yet another condition informs the president’s decision to
use a waiver strategy. In particular, when the president is far from Congress, he may be
motivated to pursue a waiver strategy not only if there is a sufficient share of governors
in his party, but also if he is dissatisfied with current law. In this case, the president is
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motivated to use waivers to undermine existing legislation while simultaneously autho-
rizing policy changes that promote his goals. With enough cooperation from governors,
granting waivers allows the president to make a persuasive case that the current law is
not working and that governors are no longer content (or willing) to implement it as writ-
ten. This discussion suggests that whether or not the president is satisfied with existing
law may also condition how his relationship with Congress impacts his decision to pur-
sue waivers. The final proposition explores this possibility.
Proposition 3: The president approves more waivers as the ideological distance between Congress
and the president increases, contingent on the president’s satisfaction with existing law and on
the share of governors in his party.
When the president is dissatisfied with a current law, he has few (if any) incentives
to defend or strengthen this existing law, and in turn, he may have strong incentives
to revise this law via waivers. As a result, I expect that when the president is far from
Congress, he approves more waivers as the share of governors in his party increases and
when he is dissatisfied with an existing law in the relevant policy area.
It is worth noting here that my expectations for the president’s use of a waiver strat-
egy when the president is dissatisfied with a law are clearer than my expectations when
the president is satisfied with current law. When the president is satisfied with a law, the
evidence in Chapter 2 is mixed in terms of whether presidents find waivers useful. On
the one hand, we cannot assume that the president will finds waivers unnecessary. Both
Clinton’s and Obama’s uses of Section 1115 Medicaid waivers following passage of the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and of the Affordable Care Act of 2010, respectively, in-
dicate that presidents may want to use waivers to facilitate implementation of laws that
enact important aspects of their domestic agendas. On the other hand, presidents may
want to implement laws that enact their agenda as written rather than authorizing states
to deviate from these laws. For example, after signing the No Child Left Behind Act of
2001, President George W. Bush’s administration made it clear that they were not open to
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offering states flexibility via waivers. In all, while I expect that presidents who are dissat-
isfied with current law may be particularly likely to pursue waivers, whether presidents
who are satisfied with current law will be interested in doing so is less clear.
4.5 Conclusion
My core claim is that the president is incentivized to use a waiver strategy when he
is ideologically far from Congress as the share of governors in his party increases. In ad-
dition, I expect that governors submit more waiver applications under these conditions,
anticipating approval when the president is incentivized to grant states flexibility. Fur-
ther, I suggest that the president’s decision to approve waivers is also influenced by his
dissatisfaction with existing law. Overall, this theory contributes to our understanding
of presidential power by incorporating both the horizontal and vertical relationships that
shape the president’s use of a waiver strategy.
This theory draws heavily from scholarship on unilateral action and presidential power.
By approaching waivers from the president’s perspective, I depart from existing work
on this policy tool that primarily focuses on waivers as instruments of state innovation
(Lieberman and Shaw 2000; Shelly 2013). However, this theory accounts for the central
role that state policymakers, and governors in particular, play in this process. Indeed,
whether or not enough governors are willing to participate in the president’s waiver strat-
egy forms the primary constraint on the president’s use of this strategy. This theory, then,
is consistent with expectations about intergovernmental cooperation in the federalism
literature.
Bednar (2009), for example, explains that national and state actors alike share incen-
tives to cooperate with one another.11 She argues that experimentation both in policy
11Bednar is primarily concerned with explaining how a federal structure allows for system maintenance
rather than explaining the incentives that underlie specific policymaking strategies and choices; nonethe-
less, my theory about the president’s incentives to grant waivers to governors parallels her argument that
"adaptability" is not only possible but is incentivized in a federal system given the institutional constraints
on national actors.
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implementation and in the distribution of authority provides political actors new oppor-
tunities to pursue their goals through compromise: "The federation can be a forum for
linking issues where one group accepts a compromise on one dimension to attain goals
in another dimension, making possible cooperation that was not otherwise feasible" (55).
Here, cooperation should not be mistaken for coercion of state and local governments
by the national government. Bednar points to the party system in the United States as a
political safeguard that helps to incentivize this kind of intergovernmental cooperation.
In her words, "a sympathy develops between the levels of the party system" (114) in which
actors at the state level see it in their own interest to work with actors in their party at
the national level. Paralleling this argument, Manna (2006) explains the incentives for
intergovernmental cooperation; when policy entrepreneurs lack the license or capacity
to act at one level of government, they mobilize this resource at another level in a process
that he describes as "borrowing strength" (19).
In short, then, this theory is broadly consistent with perspectives on policymaking
in the federalism literature, although the theoretical framework here is based primar-
ily in the presidency literature. This choice is deliberate. While my theory incorporates
governors’ motivations, as it must, the primary aim is to explain a type of presidential
policymaking that has important policy consequences but has thus far remained unscru-
tinized. To that end, this theory is fundamentally informed by the president’s goals and
incentives.
The subsequent chapters assess the propositions discussed above and, in doing so,
explore my core argument about the incentives (and constraints) that shape a president’s
waiver strategy. This analysis will contribute to our understanding of the president’s
use of a waiver strategy and, more broadly, will allow us to evaluate how horizontal and
vertical constraints shape presidential policymaking at the subnational level.
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CHAPTER V
The Politics of Waiver Submissions
On February 2, 1993, less than one month into his first term, President Clinton ad-
dressed the National Governors Association (NGA) and laid out his administration’s plan
to reform welfare. As Clinton reminded his audience, "No one likes the welfare system as
it currently exists, least of all the people who are on it.” This issue, of course, had formed
a cornerstone of his presidential campaign; delivering on this high-profile agenda item
was a top priority for the new administration. But in this speech, President Clinton, per-
haps surprisingly, did not lay out a legislative plan to revise Reagan’s Family Support
Act of 1988 or the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. Instead, he in-
vited the nation’s governors to experiment with innovative approaches to welfare reform
via Section 1115 waivers. Appealing to his former colleagues to submit waiver applica-
tions, he reassured them that "[my] view is that we ought to give you more elbow room
to experiment.”
From the earliest days in his presidency through the end of his first term, Clinton ap-
pealed to governors to cooperate with this strategy.1 The implication is paramount: while
administrations may use waivers to their advantage, this process fundamentally relies on
state participation. If states do not cooperate by submitting waiver applications, a waiver
1Of the forty-four times that President Clinton publicly spoke about welfare waivers between 1993
and 1996, half of these speeches were in front of audiences of state or local organizations, or national
organizations of state and local groups, while twelve of these instances (26 percent of the total) occurred
when the President addressed the National Governors Association.
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strategy will be ineffective in helping the president pursue his policy goals through au-
thorizing revisions to existing laws.
Despite the intergovernmental cooperation at the heart of the waiver process, existing
work on waivers does not adequately incorporate the president’s incentives in explain-
ing when states submit waiver applications. While scholars who study waivers suggest
that states may submit waivers in response to pressure from the federal government or
in reaction to national trends (Arsneault 2000; Lieberman and Shaw 2000; Shelly 2012,
2013; Gormley 2006; Thompson and Burke 2007; Weissert 2008), the mechanism remains
unspecified and the president’s role, specifically, is only briefly considered. Thus far, the
president’s institutional incentives to use this tool have not been accounted for. As Chap-
ter 2 suggested, presidents have an active interest in using waivers, and their decision to
exercise their discretionary approval authority dictates whether or not waivers are avail-
able to states. It is troubling, then, that serious consideration of the president’s role in
existing work is conspicuously absent; considerations of the president’s motivations and
incentives, when included, are cursory.2
Assessing a model based on existing work, Chapter 3 provided only weak and incon-
sistent evidence that states submit waiver applications based on shared partisanship with
the president. This analysis illustrated that we lack a model of state waiver submissions
that adequately captures the president’s incentives to use this strategy and governors’ an-
ticipatory responses. In this chapter, I explore a model of waiver submissions informed
by the theory in Chapter 4 that incorporates the president’s role in this process. I then
use an original dataset of submitted waivers, described in Chapter 3, to assess Proposi-
tion 1. Specifically, I assess whether governors submit more waiver applications when the
president has an institutional incentive to approve these waiver requests. In this frame-
work, the principal constraint on whether governors submit waivers is their expectation
of the president’s response. Governors are strategic actors: when they anticipate that the
2Thompson (2012) and Gais and Fossett (2005) are notable exceptions.
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president is motivated to approve waivers, this is precisely when it is worth the time and
resources to compile and submit an application.
It is worth underscoring here why this analysis is central to investigating my core ar-
gument about the conditions under which presidents use a waiver strategy to implement
their preferred policies at the subnational level. If I find no evidence in support of Propo-
sition 1, one could argue that governors submit waivers based on their own political mo-
tivations rather than in anticipation of the president’s desire to approve state flexibility
as a means to implementing his preferred changes. These null results would undermine
the argument at the heart of my theory. That is, it would appear as though governors sub-
mit waiver applications based primarily on their own political needs, and the president
simply approves those applications that happen to align with his policy goals. In this sce-
nario, individual governors, not the president, initiate and shape the direction of policy
change. This process is subtly yet fundamentally different from the one that I propose.
I expect that presidents work to stimulate waiver submissions from governors precisely
when presidents hope to use a waiver strategy to implement national-scale changes that
align with their policy goals via granting waivers to a substantial share of the nation’s
governors. Given this expectation, we should see that governors submit applications un-
der the conditions that motivate the president to implement such a waiver strategy. With
these stakes for the core argument in mind, this chapter explores Proposition 1 in depth.
5.1 Proposition 1
Understanding the president’s use of waivers is at the heart of this dissertation, yet this
enterprise requires careful consideration of governors’ participation. Indeed, if governors
do not submit waiver applications when the president hopes to approve waivers as a
means of policy change, the president’s waiver strategy will fail. My expectations about
when governors submit waiver applications are informed by my theory of the president’s
own motives to approve waivers. As outlined in Chapter 4, Proposition 1 argues that
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governors are strategic actors who should submit waiver applications when the president
wants to approve waivers as part of a strategy to implement national-scale reform. This
proposition reflects a governor’s cost-benefit analysis.
I begin with the potential costs associated with submitting applications. Since waivers
offer states the option to implement program changes, states must design specific alterna-
tive program delivery methods in lieu of existing policies. In other words, states cannot
simply ask for general flexibility. In the case of welfare, for example, states crafted com-
plex proposals that often included multiple, ambitious programs (Gueron and Rolston
2013; Lieberman and Shaw 2000). Doing so required not only fluency in the state’s cur-
rent welfare program, but also devoting sufficient time and expertise to designing new
programs that the Department of Health and Human Services would recognize as po-
tentially valuable methods to incentivize individuals to transition from welfare to work.
Governor Tommy Thompson’s (R-WI) 1987 welfare waiver proposal illustrates the poten-
tial breadth of these applications; his proposal included five separate "planned actions"
that ranged from expanding work requirements to requiring teenage parents and high-
school aged dependents to attend school (Gueron and Rolston 2013, 222).3 In addition,
alternative programs proposed via waivers must often meet the goals of the original legis-
lation without increasing costs, adding further complexity to the task of designing a viable
application.4 In terms of Section 1115 waivers, states were further required to include a
rigorous evaluation component beginning in Reagan’s second term. As a result, craft-
ing a successful waiver application also required sufficient attention to and application
3The full list of proposals in this waiver follows, according to Gueron and Rolston (2013, 223): "1) ex-
pand AFDC work requirements to parents with children under the age of six; 2) expand earnings disregards
so that AFDC phased out with increased earnings more gradually than the fourth months that the thirty
one and one third rule required; 3) extend the length of time former recipients who had left AFDC for work
could receive Medicaid; 4) require teen parents and thirteen- to eighteen-year old dependent children to
attend school as a condition of AFDC eligibility (dubbed Learnfare); 5) pay a lower benefit to new arrivals
to Wisconsin (dubbed Two-Tier)."
4This budget neutrality requirement was first developed by the Office of Management and Budget dur-
ing the Reagan administration and was applied to Section 1115 waiver applications (Gueron and Rolston
2013).
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of research methods such as randomized control trials.5 On top of these administrative
concerns, the governor and his administration must consider the reactions of relevant po-
litical constituencies to the waiver proposal and, if the proposal is approved, to the new
program. In all, designing waiver applications demands ample time, expertise, and re-
sources. Undertaking this task when the president is not interested in approving waiver
applications could in many cases be a costly mistake.
Devoting time, money, and personnel to this endeavor when the president is not will-
ing to grant states flexibility via waivers would not only waste valuable resources, but
could reflect poorly on the governor’s judgment and ability to successfully implement
reforms. Governors who submit applications only to be rejected may suffer a loss in
political capital; just as failure to move their preferred legislation through the state legis-
lature may translate into a defeat, a failed waiver application may similarly reflect poorly
on the governor’s ability to deliver on promises of reform. In all, then, it is not in the gov-
ernor’s interest to submit waiver applications when the administration has no interest in
approving changes to federal law via this avenue.
On the other hand, when presidents want to grant states the opportunity to imple-
ment new programs via waivers, governors have an opportunity to advance their own
careers. Waivers provide valuable opportunities for reform, not only for presidents, but
for governors. During the 1990s, for example, waivers gave governors the opportunity
to take action on welfare reform as Aid to Families with Dependent Children became
increasingly unpopular. And while governors need approval from the president’s ad-
ministration to implement reforms via waivers, the statutory requirements governing the
relevant waiver authorities do not require governors to submit waiver proposals to the
state legislature. Much as the president may have an interest in avoiding a conflict with
Congress, governors may perceive the chance to change policy without going through
the state legislative process as particularly valuable. Further, governors are the state ac-
5For a thorough description of the evaluation of welfare waivers and the evolution of evaluation require-
ments, see Gueron and Rolston (2013).
135
tors publicly associated with waivers; a victory here offers governors an opportunity to
claim credit for reforming social programs. When the president is motivated to approve
waivers, governors have an opportunity not only to advance their agendas but to build
their own image.
Ultimately, I expect that governors submit more waiver applications when the pres-
ident is motivated to approve them. As discussed in Chapter 4, the president has an
incentive to pursue this extra-legislative policymaking strategy when he is ideologically
far from Congress, provided that he can count on cooperation from enough governors.6
Proposition 1 expresses this argument:
Proposition 1: Governors submit more waiver applications as the distance between Congress
and the president increases, contingent on the share of governors in the president’s party.
5.1.1 Data
To investigate these propositions, I use the original dataset of submitted Section 1115
waivers in welfare and Medicaid from 1984 to 2012, as described in Chapter 3. The
dependent variable is a count of the number of waivers submitted in state i = 1...50,
policy j = welfare or Medicaid, and year t = 1984...2012. Table 5.1 reviews the spread of
this dependent variable in all policy areas and includes a breakdown of this variable by
policy.
Policy Years Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Welfare and Medicaid 1984-2012 0.174 0.509 0 8 1700
Welfare 1984-1996 0.265 0.667 0 8 650
Medicaid 1992-2012 0.118 0.370 0 4 1050
Table 5.1: Submitted Waivers, Dependent Variable Summary Statistics
6Under these conditions, governors (of both parties) can be confident that the resources spent on waiver
applications are not wasted. Rather, if the president is motivated to approve waivers to shift policy closer
to his own ideal point given his institutional constraints, submitting a waiver application under these
conditions is a reasonable strategy for governors who want to achieve some measure of policy change.
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5.1.2 Model
Here, I propose a model of waiver submissions based on Proposition 1.7 To assess
Proposition 1, I include three variables. First, I include the term Distance to measure
the president’s ideological distance from Congress. I construct this measure using Poole
and Rosenthal’s Common Space DW-NOMINATE scores, which are comparable across
chambers and over time. For each year, this variable equals either the absolute value
of the distance between the president and the House median or the president and the
filibuster pivot in the Senate, whichever of these distances is larger.8 So for example, if
the distance between the president and the House median is 0.3 and the distance between
the president and the 60th senator is 0.6, then Distance is equal to 0.6. Second, I include
the term Percent Governors, which equals the percentage of governors who are in the
president’s party each year.9 This variable is primarily important to the extent that it
modifies Distance.
In terms of the theory, we are primarily interested in the marginal effect of Distance,
assessed at different values of Percent Governors, on the outcome (the number of waivers
submitted per state-year-policy). To calculate this marginal effect, I include Distance x
Governors, which interacts Distance and Percent Governors. The goal here is to explore
whether governors submit more waivers when they anticipate the president is motivated
to approve them, which I expect occurs when the president is far from Congress as the
share of governors in his party increases.
Based on the results in Chapter 3, I include the Squire index of legislative profes-
7There was little evidence in Chapter 3 that Citizen Ideology or State Per Capita Income influenced waiver
submissions. For the sake of parsimony, I omit those two variables from this model. The results are sub-
stantively very similar when they are included; please see Appendix Table 5.6 for a model that includes
both these terms.
8I use the larger distance because this represents the most consequential constraint on the president’s
ability to move a law through Congress. If the president is closer to the House median than the Senate
filibuster pivot, the Senate filibuster pivot is the primary constraint, and vice versa. I construct the filibuster
pivot based on Krehbiel’s model in Pivotal Politics; see pages 24 and 106.
9For example, if in a given year thirty out of the fifty total governors are Democrats and the president is
also a Democrat, Percent Governors equals 30/50 = .60 for that year. Governors from minor parties are not
included in the percentage of governors in the president’s party; there are very few cases of this.
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sionalism to measure state capacity. My expectation is that states with higher scores on
this index will submit more waiver applications. And in addition to the national control
variables explained in Chapter 3, I add a variable that measures the president’s average
annual approval rating. This term is substantively important; governors may perceive
presidents as more willing to grant states flexibility as the president’s approval ratings
decline. With lower approval, the president may have less political capital to pursue his
goals via Congress.10 Granting waivers may in this case be an attractive option, as it al-
lows the president to pursue his goals but does not require the political capital that may
be necessary to spur legislative action. In this case, governors may see a window of op-
portunity to submit waiver applications if they anticipate the president is more likely to
approve them as his approval ratings (and political capital) decline.11
Finally, as in Chapter 3, I include dummy variables for each administration observed
in the data: Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush, with Obama as the
omitted category. I include these president fixed effects to account for unobserved factors
specific to each president that may have influenced this process, including a president’s
relationships with individual governors and his willingness to work with governors to
implement his policy agenda. The presidential dummy variables are in ZtPresident. The
model also includes a policy dummy variable for whether a waiver was submitted in
welfare; a value of zero for this variable corresponds with Medicaid observations. The
full model is below.
Waivers Submittedijt = β0 + β1Distance + β2Percent Governors + β3Distance x Governors
+β4GDP Change + β5Mood + β6Approval + β7Squire
+β8Welfare +ZtPresident + εijt (5.1)
10Unilateral action may also be an unappealing strategy, as exercising these types of tools may be per-
ceived as abuse of authority, as mentioned in Chapter 4.
11Indeed, evidence suggests that public opinion, including presidential approval, can be an important
factor in presidents’ decisions about policy strategies (Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004).
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5.2 Analysis of Proposition 1
I use a negative binomial specification based on the abundance of zeros in the data and
evidence of over-dispersion.12 Table 5.2 below reports the results for two specifications:
the first omits Alignment, providing a straightforward test of Proposition 1. Given the
weak results in Chapter 3 that Alignment may influence submissions, the second model
includes Alignment to assess whether we find any evidence in support of the assump-
tion in existing work that governor-president partisan alignment plays an important role
here.13
5.2.1 Distance from Congress
In column 1 of Table 5.2, the No Alignment specification includes the Distance, Percent
Governors, and Distance x Governors terms.14 Each of these terms is statistically signifi-
cant at the 0.05 level.15 The regression results in the Alignment specification in column
2 are very similar, while Alignment does not reach conventional levels of statistical signif-
icance.16 It appears that the terms related to Proposition 1 offer more explanatory power
12For example, a test of α = 0 gives a test statistic of 10.13 with a p-value of 0.001 in the No Alignment
model in Table 5.2 below.
13Please see Table 5.5 in the Appendix for the president fixed effects. None of the president dummies are
significant across models.
14Please see Table 5.6 in the Appendix for a specification that uses Divided Government rather than Dis-
tance to measure the president’s ability to move his legislation through Congress, where Divided Government
equals one if at least one chamber of Congress is not in the president’s party. The expectation is that the
marginal effect of Divided Government should increase contingent on the share of governors in the presi-
dent’s party. That is, governors should anticipate that a president will be motivated to use a waiver strategy
when the president faces divided government, provided that the president has enough state allies. Under
these conditions, governors should submit more waivers. The marginal effect of Divided Government in-
creases as Percent Governors increases, as expected, but this relationship does not achieve conventional lev-
els of statistical significance; please see Figure 5.5 in the Appendix. The terms Divided Government, Percent
Governors, and Divided Government x Percent are jointly significant, however (χ2 statistic = 7.78, p-value =
0.05). Substantively, we should not conclude from this specification that the president’s relationship with
Congress does not influence waiver submissions. Indeed, the drawback of using Divided Government is the
limited variation this measure allows for and the lack of nuance compared to Distance. Below, I rely on
Distance to assess Proposition 1.
15At first glance, the coefficients on Distance and Percent Governors are in the opposite direction as ex-
pected, since each coefficient is negative. However, interpretation of these results must account for the
interaction term, Distance x Governors.
16P-value = 0.33.
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Percent Governors -20.44∗ -20.57∗
(9.36) (9.34)





% GDP Change -0.14∗ -0.14∗
(0.06) (0.06)
Annual Mood -0.06 -0.06
(0.04) (0.04)









President Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 1700 1700
Log Likelihood -712.11 -711.62
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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than Alignment. To interpret the substantive implications of Proposition 1, I focus on the
No Alignment model.
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Thick dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
Thin dashed line is a kernel density estimate of Percent Governors.
Figure 5.1: Marginal Effect of Distance on Submissions, "No Alignment" Specification
Figure 5.1 shows the marginal effect plot of Distance on the number of waivers submit-
ted per state-year-policy, where the marginal effect of Distance is assessed across the range
of Percent Governors.17 The positive slope on the line plotting the marginal effect of Dis-
tance shows that, consistent with expectations, the marginal effect of Distance increases
as the share of governors in the president’s party increases. In other words, governors
submit more waiver applications under the conditions when the president is motivated
to approve these waivers: as he moves further from Congress contingent on an increasing
share of allies at the state level who the president expects will implement his preferred
changes through waivers.
Consider, for example, that the marginal effect of Distance when only 30 percent of
governors are in the president’s party is -6.92.18 Given the discussion in Chapter 4 of
the potential costs the president weighs when considering a waiver strategy, he may not
be interested in pursuing this type of strategy even when he is far from Congress if few
17I relied on the "Grinter" package in Stata (Boehmke 2008) to create this marginal effect plot. In this
chapter, Chapter 6, and the related Appendices, subsequent marginal effects plots that appear in this for-
mat were also created using the Grinter package.
18Standard error = 3.83, p-value 0.071.
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governors are in his party. In turn, it appears that governors submit fewer waivers when
the president is far from Congress but a low percentage of governors are in his party. This
outcome may reflect strategic behavior on the part of governors. If a governor anticipates
that the president is not interested in pursuing a waiver strategy as an alternative to
legislation, devoting the resources necessary to create and submit a waiver application
would not be in a governor’s interest.
In contrast, when the president has 57.5 percent or more of governors in his party, the
marginal effect of Distance is positive and significant at the α = 0.05 level.19 When the
president is far from Congress and can rely on a large share of governors to implement
his preferred policy changes, we see that governors submit more waiver applications. In
this situation, governors may anticipate that the president will pursue a waiver strategy
in lieu of legislative change; here, submitting an application may be well worth the time
19Across the range of Percent Governors from 57.5 to the maximum observed value of 62 percent, we can
be most confident that the marginal effect of Distance is significantly different from zero and is positive and
increasing, since this marginal effect is significant at the α = 0.05 level in this range. There may be some
concern that the marginal effect of Distance is not substantively meaningful, given the small range in which
the marginal effect of Distance is positive, increasing with Percent Governors, and statistically significant
at the α = 0.05 level. However, the kernel density plot that overlays the marginal effects plot in Figure
5.1 suggests that a non-trivial share of observations in the data occur at or above Percent Governors = 57.5
percent. To provide another sense of the distribution of the data, the share of governors in the president’s
party is equal to or greater than 56 percent for 26.5 percent of observations in this sample. For 14.7 percent
of observations in this sample, Percent Governors is greater than or equal to 58 percent. Further, a one-
tail test of the null hypothesis that the marginal effect of Distance is greater than zero may be appropriate
here, since we expect this marginal effect to be positive. This one-tail test suggests the marginal effect of
Distance is positive and significant at the α = 0.10 level when the share of governors in the president’s party
is just above 55 percent (55.1 percent, p-value 0.0945). This level is slightly lower than that suggested by
the two-tail test, and from the kernel density plot overlaying Figure 5.1, we see that a substantial share
of observations in the data occur at or above this level. Alternatively, calculating a 90 percent confidence
interval for a two-tail test, the marginal effect of Distance is positive and significant when 56.2 percent
of governors are in the president’s party – recall that the share of governors in the president’s party is 56
percent or higher for over a quarter of observations in this sample. Across these different tests, the marginal
effect of Distance is significant, positive and increasing with the share of governors in the president’s party
over a small but substantively meaningful range of Percent Governors, given the distribution of the data.
Further, for a summary of the frequency at which we observe values of Percent Governors, please see
Table 5.9 in the Appendix. In addition, please see Table 5.10 in the Appendix for a list of the values of
Percent Governors by year. As this table shows, higher values of Percent Governors are not confined to one
administration or to presidents of one party, although President George W. Bush enjoyed the highest share
of governors in his party most consistently throughout his two administrations compared to the other
presidents in the data. In all, the distribution of Percent Governors in the data suggests that observing a
positive, increasing, and statistically significant marginal effect of Distance when Percent Governors is equal
to or greater than 57.5 percent is substantively meaningful for the data at hand, even though the maximum
value of this variable observed in the data is 62 percent.
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and resources if a governor expects that the president will approve their proposed policy
change.
The increase in the marginal effect of Distance as Percent Governors increases to the
maximum observed value is clear. When 57.5 percent of governors are in the president’s
party, the marginal effect of Distance equals 2.5.20 When Percent Governors increases to 62
percent, the marginal effect of Distance increases to 4.02.21 These results suggest that gov-
ernors perceive the president is increasingly willing (and eager) to approve waivers when
he anticipates difficulty working with Congress to implement his preferred reforms as he
can rely on cooperation from an increasing percentage of allies. Overall, this evidence
provides initial support for Proposition 1: governors submit more waivers to the presi-
dent when he is far from Congress, contingent on the share of governors in his party.22
Importantly, these results do in fact indicate that governors submit waiver applica-
tions in response to the particular set of conditions under which I expect the president
to approve waivers: when he is far from Congress, contingent on an increasing share of
Percent Governors. These results are what we would expect to find given the theory de-
veloped in Chapter 4. Specifically, governors should submit more applications precisely
when the president invites and encourages them to do so as part of his waiver strategy.
Indeed, this analysis suggests that governors devote the time and resources to submit-
ting applications based on their expectations about when the president is motivated to
approve waivers.
Revisiting Alignment, Briefly
In Chapter 3, we saw weak and inconsistent evidence that Alignment predicted waiver
submissions; this term met weak levels of statistical significance in some but not all mod-
els assessed there. However, this weak result is not robust to inclusion of the variables
20Standard error 1.19, p-value 0.036.
21Standard error 1.24, p-value 0.001.
22Although we may expect that internal state conditions influence the waiver submission behavior of
governors, this is not the case. Please see Appendix Table 5.6.
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that assess Proposition 1. In the Alignment specification in Table 5.2, Alignment has a
coefficient of 0.13 but does not approach standard levels of statistical significance.23
It seems that governors do not simply submit waivers based on the perceived benefits
of being in the president’s party. Rather, these results suggest that governors are more so-
phisticated strategic actors. They devote the resources to submitting waiver applications
when their chances of approval are high, based on an understanding of the president’s
own desire to approve waivers given his institutional environment.24
Assessing the Role of Percent Governors in the President’s Party
According to the theory developed in Chapter 4, the initial factor that motivates pres-
idents to consider a waiver strategy is their inability to move their preferred legislation
through Congress. Absent this condition, we might expect presidents to pursue tradi-
tional policymaking routes, like the legislative process, that allow them to shift national
policy via one action rather than through piecemeal change at the state level. The share
of governors in the president’s party, then, is primarily relevant to the extent that it
constrains the president from using waivers when he seeks an alternative to legislation.
However, including the interaction term Distance x Governors in the model of submitted
waivers also implies that the marginal effect of Governors, moderated by Distance, influ-
ences the number of waivers submitted (Kam and Franzese 2007).
While this relationship is not central to my theory, I explore several interesting pos-
sibilities here. We might expect that as the share of governors in the president’s party
increases, governors submit more waivers as the president moves farther from Congress.
23Standard error = 0.13, p-value = 0.33. Further, a likelihood ratio test comparing the specifications in
columns 1 and 2 does not indicate that including Alignment improves the fit of the model (test statistic =
0.99, p-value = 0.32).
24It is important to note that this strategy does not preclude the president from approving waivers sub-
mitted by governors in the opposing party. Indeed, there are many examples of presidents working with
governors in the opposing party – Governor Tommy Thompson (R-WI) and his enthusiastic use of welfare
waivers under Clinton is a prominent case of this cooperation (Teles 1996). If the president’s goal is to shift
national policy in his preferred direction, the more negotiating partners at the state level, the better. Given
this incentive, the president’s willingness to work with governors in the opposing party is not surprising.
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Similar to the argument above, this expectation is based on an assumption that governors
submit applications when they expect that the president is motivated to approve waivers.
On the other hand, we may expect that the marginal effect of Percent Governors will be
zero when the president is close to Congress. In this scenario, the president may prefer
to implement his policy goals through legislation rather than through waivers, rendering
the impact of Percent Governors moot. Exploring the marginal effect of Percent Governors
across the range of Distance provides an opportunity to assess these implications and to
better understand how the interaction between the national and state-level policymaking
environments impacts the waiver process.
As with Distance, we are interested in the marginal effect of Percent Governors rather
than the coefficient on this term. Figure 5.2 below illustrates the marginal effect of Percent
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Thick dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
Thin dashed line is a kernel density estimate of Distance.
Figure 5.2: Marginal Effect of Percent Governors, "No Alignment" Specification
From Figure 5.2, we can make two important observations. First, the marginal effect
of Percent Governors on the number of waivers submitted is positive and increasing with
Distance. For example, at the lowest observed value of Distance, 0.195, the marginal effect
of Percent Governors is -13.78.25 When Distance increases to 0.685, the marginal effect of
25Standard error 6.92, p-value 0.047.
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Percent Governors increases to 2.97.26 This increase suggests that governors submit more
waivers when the share of governors in the president’s party increases as the president
moves away, ideologically, from Congress. One interpretation, consistent with my theory,
is that under these conditions, governors submit more waivers in anticipation of an easy
path to approval, given the president’s numerous allies at the state level and his expected
difficulty in achieving his goals through legislation.27
Second, when the president is closer to Congress, it appears that the marginal effect of
Percent Governors is not in fact zero, as we might expect. When Distance is small, it may
be more feasible for the president to achieve his goals by working with Congress; further,
implementing his preferred changes via legislation may offer a more direct and poten-
tially more durable policy shift compared to a waiver strategy. In this case, we would
not necessarily expect Percent Governors to influence governors’ waiver strategies, since
the president may not be interested in granting waivers. But this is not quite what we
observe here. Across the small range of Distance from 0.195, the observed minimum, to
0.205, the marginal effect of Percent Governors is increasing but is negative and significant
at the α = 0.05 level.28
Rather than playing a neutral role, it appears that when the president is very close
to Congress, there is an inverse relationship between the share of governors in his party
and the number of waivers submitted. That is, the more governors in his party, the fewer
waivers submitted when the president is ideologically close to Congress. It may be the
case that when the president enjoys substantial support from the nation’s governors and
is close to Congress, he prefers a legislative strategy. With a large share of governors in his
party, the president can expect that if he signs a new law, the majority of governors will
26Standard error 1.36, p-value 0.03.
27Estimates of the marginal effect of Percent Governors become less precise closer to Distance = 1. For
example, the 95 percent confidence interval when Distance = .979 is [6.46, 19.58]. However, this marginal
effect is nonetheless positive and significant at the α = 0.05 level.
28The marginal effect of Percent Governors is significant at the α = 0.10 level through the point when
Distance equals 0.365. However, the estimates across this range are quite imprecise, as Figure 5.2 illus-
trates, and the 95 percent confidence intervals across this range include zero. For example, the 95 percent
confidence interval when Distance equals 0.345 is [-18.57, 1.27], with a p-value of 0.088.
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be willing to implement it without substantial pushback or criticism. In turn, governors
in the president’s party themselves may prefer that the president signs legislation that
moves the status quo in their favor, rather than relying on waivers which are less durable
and may be revoked by subsequent administrations.
5.3 A Simpler Explanation?
At this point, it is worth asking whether a simpler explanation accounts for patterns
of waiver submissions. That is, could it be the case that governors simply submit waiver
applications when the president is trying to work with Congress to revise a law? This
alternative explanation suggests that governors sense an opportunity to win approval of
policy changes when national actors are in the process of revising an existing law, and as
a result, governors submit more waiver applications during legislative negotiations.
According to this argument, governors still behave strategically, submitting applica-
tions when they expect that the president will approve them. But, their expectations for
approval are simply based on whether revisions to existing laws are being debated, which
governors may interpret as a sign that the president is unhappy with current law and is
willing to approve state requests for flexibility. The implication here is important – if this
is the case, it may be that governors pursue waivers as policymaking opportunities with
little consideration for the president’s own institutional incentives to use a waiver strat-
egy, casting doubt on the degree to which presidents use waivers in pursuit of their own
policy goals. Indeed, if the marginal effect of Distance is no longer relevant once we con-
sider whether the president is working to revise an existing law, this may suggest that the
waiver process is driven more by opportunistic governors than by strategic presidents.
To assess this possibility, I include the variable Pre Law, which equals one if a waiver
was submitted before or during a year in which a new law was signed and zero if it
was submitted in a year after the president signed a new law.29 The assumption here
29It is possible that the appropriate specification includes an additional interaction term between Pre
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is that during negotiations with Congress over revising a law (when Pre Law = 1), the
president was dissatisfied with current law. Based on the qualitative evidence discussed
in Chapter 2, this assumption is reasonable; in these data, presidents were unsatisfied
with the existing laws in welfare and Medicaid that they inherited, and this dissatisfaction
was no secret during debates over legislative reform.30
I estimate two models in Table 5.3 below. Both models add the variable Pre Law to
the model of Proposition 1.31 As before, the first specification does not include Alignment
while the second specification adds this term. The goal here is to estimate whether the
theoretical prediction expressed in Proposition 1 is borne out empirically or, on the other
hand, whether a simpler explanation based on Pre Law suffices to explain when governors
submit waiver applications.
5.3.1 Marginal Effect of Distance from Congress
First, in Table 5.3 we see that in both models, Pre Law is positive and significant, with
a coefficient of 1.23 and a robust standard error of 0.34. A likelihood ratio test comparing
the No Alignment specifications with and without Pre Law indicates that this variable
significantly improves the fit of the model.32 At this point, it seems reasonable to reject
the null hypothesis that the effect of Pre Law on waiver submissions equals zero.
In the No Alignment model, we see that Distance, Percent Governors, and Distance
x Governors are no longer individually significant when Pre Law is included, although
Law and Distance, as suggested by Proposition 3 in Chapter 4. This chained interaction model would imply
that the marginal effect of Distance is moderated by the share of governors in the president’s party and, in
addition, by whether or not the president has signed a law. Conceptually, this would imply that whether a
president has signed a law modifies Distance. However, a likelihood ratio test of a model with this pairwise
interaction is not significantly different from the model in Table 5.2, Column 1, indicating that including
this interaction term does not improve the fit of the model of waiver submissions (χ2 test statistic = 0.01,
p-value = 0.93). Indeed, given the lack of variation in Pre Law in these data, this model may not provide
the best test of this possibility.
30This is not to say that presidents were completely satisfied with new laws they signed in these policy
areas – only that governors sense a clearer window of opportunity for using waivers prior to the president
signing new legislation.
31Please see the Appendix, Table 5.7, for a full report of the president fixed effects. The only consistently
significant president dummy variable is for George W. Bush.
32χ2 test statistic = 13.00, p-value = 0.0003.
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Percent Governors -7.84 -7.99
(10.03) (9.99)
Distance x Governors 15.80 15.85
(13.67) (13.63)





Pres. Approval -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Annual Mood -0.02 -0.02
(0.05) (0.05)









President Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 1700 1700
Log Likelihood -705.62 -705.14
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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these terms are jointly significant.33 Since our primary interest is in the marginal effect
of Distance, I turn to the marginal effects plot in Figure 5.3 to assess the relevant results.
Figure 5.3 indicates that, as before, the marginal effect of Distance increases as the share
of governors in the president’s party increases. When fewer than 51 percent of governors
are in the president’s party, the marginal effect of Distance is not significantly different
from zero at the α = 0.05 level. This null finding suggests that when a small share of
governors are in the president’s party, regardless of his distance from Congress, governors
may anticipate that the president is not interested in a waiver strategy given the lack of a
sufficient share of state allies. However, when 51 percent of governors or more are in the
president’s party, the marginal effect of Distance is positive and significant at the α = 0.05
level. In the range when the marginal effect of Distance is significantly different from zero,
this marginal effect increases as Percent Governors increases. Consider, for example, that
when 51 percent of governors are in the president’s party, the marginal effect of Distance
is 3.46.34 When 60 percent of governors are in the president’s party, the marginal effect
of Distance increases to 4.9.35
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Thick dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
Thin dashed line is a kernel density estimate of Percent Governors.
Figure 5.3: Marginal Effect of Distance with Pre Law, "No Alignment" Specification
These results suggest that governors do not simply submit waiver applications when
33χ2 test statistic = 15.95, p-value = 0.001.
34Standard error 1.75, p-value 0.047.
35Standard error 1.28, p-value 0.000.
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they sense that the president is dissatisfied with existing law and may be open to state-
level revisions. Rather, even when Pre Law is included, we see that governors submit
waiver applications precisely when the president has a strategic incentive to authorize
changes to federal law – when he is far from Congress provided that he can rely on enough
governors in his party to cooperate with his strategy.36 These results bolster the initial
analysis of Proposition 1 that suggests governors’ waiver submission behavior reflects the
president’s strategic use of this policy tool. At the same time, this evidence casts doubt
on the argument that presidents play a passive role in approving waiver applications that
opportunistic governors submit during the president’s negotiations with Congress over
legislative reform.
Consistent with the results in Table 5.2, Alignment fails to reach conventional levels of
statistical significance when Pre Law is included. Indeed, in Table 5.3 the robust standard
error and coefficient both equal 0.13. In comparison, whether Pre Law is included or
not, and whether Alignment is included or not, the marginal effect of Distance plays an
important role in explaining the number of waivers submitted. Specifically, as long as a
critical mass of governors are in the president’s party, governors submit more waivers as
the president moves ideologically farther from Congress.
5.3.2 Marginal Effect of Percent Governors
As before, while the central theoretical expectation is that Percent Governors matters to
the extent that it modifies Distance, these Pre Law specifications provide another opportu-
nity to explore whether the marginal effect of Percent Governors is relevant in explaining
patterns of waiver submission. Figure 5.4 indicates a slightly attenuated role of Percent
Governors compared to the prior specification that omitted Pre Law. Nonetheless, similar
to the original model of Proposition 1 that omits Pre Law, as the president moves farther
36In fact, the magnitude of the marginal effect of Distance appears larger in the upper range of Percent
Governors when Pre Law is included compared to the original model of Proposition 1 that does not include
Pre Law. When 60 percent of governors are in the president’s party, the marginal effect of Distance is 4.9
here compared to a marginal effect of 3.3 in the comparable specification that omits Pre Law.
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from Congress, we see a positive and increasing marginal effect of Percent Governors.37
Again, these results are consistent with the broader theory that governors submit waivers
when they expect that the president has a strategic incentive to approve them. Here,
we see governors submit more waivers when there is a larger share of governors in the
president’s party and as the president moves further from Congress.
However, in contrast to the previous model, the marginal effect of Percent Governors
when the president is close to Congress is neither significant nor precise.38 This suggests
that as the president moves closer to Congress, the marginal effect of Percent Governors
plays less of a role in predicting waiver submissions. Given the improved fit of these
specifications compared to those that excluded Pre Law in Table 5.2, when the president
is close to Congress, the share of governors in his party may be moot in predicting sub-
missions. A simple explanation is available here: presidents may prefer legislation in this
case, making waivers a less attractive strategy to the president regardless of the share of
governors he could rely on to cooperate. In turn, governors might consider submitting an
application a waste of valuable resources.
37We can be most confident that the marginal effect of Percent Governors is significantly different from
zero when Distance is above 0.68. Above this point, the marginal effect of Percent Governors is significant at
the α = 0.05 level.
38The marginal effect of Percent Governors is not significant at the α = 0.10 level when Distance is between
0.20 and 0.67.
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Thick dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
Thin dashed line is a kernel density estimate of Distance.
Figure 5.4: Marginal Effect of Percent Governors with Pre Law, "No Alignment" Specifica-
tion
5.4 Additional Implications
There are two additional results worth emphasizing. First, consistent with results in
Chapter 3, states with more professional legislatures (higher scores on the Squire index
of professionalism) submit more waivers than those with less professional legislatures.
For example, in the No Alignment specification in Table 5.3, this coefficient is 2.55 with a
robust standard error of 0.41. It appears that states with more professional legislatures,
which are also likely to have more professional bureaucracies, are better equipped to
submit waiver applications.
Finally, Presidential Approval consistently has a negative and statistically significant
effect in the specifications in Table 5.2 and 5.3, as expected. This suggests that gover-
nors submit more waiver applications when the president’s approval ratings decline. A
plausible interpretation is that when the president has low political capital and thus less
capability of pursuing his goals through Congress, he is more likely to invite governors
to apply for waivers as a means of extra-legislative policymaking. These results suggest
that governors respond positively to such an invitation.
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5.5 Conclusion
This chapter takes a crucial first step towards investigating my core claim developed
in Chapter 4 that presidents seek (and ultimately, approve) waivers when they are far
from Congress, contingent on the share of governors in their party. Given that governors
themselves are strategic actors who should only spend the scarce time and resources on
submitting applications when the president is motivated to approve them, we should
observe governors submitting applications precisely when presidents seek them. In this
chapter, then, I assessed whether governors submit waiver applications when I expect
that presidents have an incentive to stimulate submissions. As such, the analysis here is
a critical component of assessing the theoretical framework.
Consistent with Proposition 1, this analysis suggests that governors do in fact submit
waiver applications when we might expect that presidents are motivated to use a waiver
strategy. That is, governors submit more waiver applications when the president is ideo-
logically far from Congress as the share of governors in the president’s party increases.
Chapter 2 suggests that presidents implement waiver strategies when they seek national-
scale policy change but are unable to achieve this goal through legislation. The theory
discussed in Chapter 4 subsequently argues that presidents should rely on this strategy
and should seek to stimulate waiver submissions when they anticipate that enough gover-
nors will participate in this strategy. By examining governors’ behavior in this chapter, we
find evidence in support of this theory. These results suggest that governors see waiver
applications as a worthwhile investment of time and resources, and as a viable oppor-
tunity for policy change, when they anticipate that presidents are motivated to use this
strategy given their distance from Congress contingent on the share of governors the pres-
ident can rely on to implement his preferred changes via waivers. At the very least, this
analysis suggests that the conditions we expect to inform a president’s waiver strategy
are, as anticipated, the conditions that governors weigh when deciding whether to devote
the resources to submitting waiver applications.
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In contrast, the results in Chapter 3 provided only weak evidence that Alignment plays
a role in predicting the number of waiver submissions. After accounting for the pres-
ident’s institutional incentives to approve waivers, the results in this chapter provide
no support that Alignment explains waiver submissions.39 The model of Proposition 1,
which accounts for the president’s institutional environment, seems to provide a more
convincing framework of the waiver submission process than the model suggested in ex-
isting work.
In addition, the results from analysis of Proposition 1 are robust to the inclusion of Pre
Law. This suggests that the waiver process is not simply a reflection of governors acting
opportunistically and presidents, in turn, acquiescing to these requests amid efforts to
revise existing laws. If this was the case, we might expect that governors submit more
waivers when they notice that presidents are dissatisfied with existing law, regardless
of whether the president is incentivized to pursue a waiver strategy. However, while
we observe that governors submit more waivers when presidents are actively working to
revise their predecessor’s laws, we also find that even when Pre Law is included, governors
submit more waiver applications when the president is far from Congress as the share of
governors in his party increases. These results suggest that governors submit applications
based on a careful consideration of the president’s own motivation to use this strategy.
Indeed, the analysis here helps to resolve, or perhaps encourages us to move past,
debates over whether these tools are best understood as "bottom-up" or "top-down" mea-
sures. Depending on who you ask, the answer varies as to which category is most ap-
propriate. For example, an independent evaluator who assessed welfare waiver demon-
stration projects emphasizes that states often pushed for the opportunity to innovate via
39It is possible that this null result for Alignment is specific to the time periods and policy areas included
here. While this is worth exploring in future work that includes additional policy areas, there are two
reasons to be confident in the results here. First, as discussed, this dataset includes more policy areas and
years than existing work, allowing for more variation on important variables (Lieberman and Shaw 2000;
Shelly 2013). Second, I include dummy variables that control for each presidential administration and
policy area; these control variables should help account for the politics specific to these administrations
and policy areas.
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waivers.40 This perspective underscores the bottom-up approach and highlights the im-
portant role that states played in the waiver process. But on the other hand, scholars
such as Hacker (2004) point to waivers as "subterranean" tools used by administrations to
change the nature of the social welfare state, urging us to take a top-down perspective.
In comparison, the analysis in this chapter suggests that definitively describing waivers
as top-down or bottom-up perhaps oversimplifies this process. Indeed, evidence here
suggests that governors submit waiver applications precisely when they expect that the
president is motivated to pursue national-scale policy change through authorizing re-
forms at the state level. Ultimately, governors apply for waivers when doing so is in their
interest, but the conditions under which this is the case are shaped by the president’s own
incentives. This strategic behavior on the part of governors and presidents alike blurs the
distinction between a bottom-up or top-down process.
This chapter assessed a central implication of my theory. If presidents do indeed use a
waiver strategy based on the likelihood of achieving a legislative victory contingent on the
share of governors presidents expect to cooperate with this strategy, presidents should
work to stimulate waiver submissions from governors under precisely these conditions.
In turn, governors should submit waiver applications when the president is far from
Congress, contingent on the share of governors in his party. The results in this chapter
suggest that these are in fact the conditions that motivate governors to submit applica-
tions. While this analysis of waiver submissions is crucial to investigating my theory,
the question that assesses the core of the theory remains: when do presidents approve
waivers? The next chapter takes up this inquiry.
40Interview with the author, December 14, 2015.
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5.6 Appendix
Table 5.4: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
DV: Submitted waivers 0.174 0.509 0 8
Pre Law 0.618 0.486 0 1
Distance41 0.757 0.201 0.195 0.979
Percent Governors 0.451 0.098 0.3 0.62
Distance x Percent Governors 0.337 0.116 0.105 0.568
Alignment42 0.451 0.498 0 1
Squire 43 0.191 0.125 0.027 0.659
Citizen Ideology44 49.723 15.009 8.449 95.972
Institutional Ideology, ADA/COPE45 50.552 26.056 0 99.167
State Per Capita Income (1000s)46 26.273 9.512 9.460 60.223
State Pop. 100047 5430.806 5995.803 13.804 37999.879
Governor Party48 0.503 0.496 0 1
Mood49 62.06 3.371 56.342 66.727
% GDP Change50 5.359 2.088 -2 11.1
Presidential Approval51 53.177 10.325 30.03 72.89
Reagan 0.147 0.354 0 1
George H.W. Bush 0.147 0.354 0 1
Clinton 0.353 0.478 0 1
George W. Bush 0.235 0.424 0 1
Obama 0.118 0.322 0 1
Welfare 0.382 0.486 0 1
Medicaid 0.618 0.486 0 1
N 1700
41Poole and Rosenthal (2015)
42Klarner (2014); Council of State Governments (2013)
43Squire (2012)
44Berry et al. (2010b)
45Berry et al. (2010b)
46Klarner 2014; Bureau of Economic Analysis
47Klarner 2014; Bureau of Economic Analysis
48Klarner (2014); Council of State Governments (2013)
49Stimson (1999)
50Bureau of Economic Analysis
51Gallup (2015)
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Percent Governors -20.44∗ -20.57∗
(9.36) (9.34)





% GDP Change -0.14∗ -0.14∗
(0.06) (0.06)
Annual Mood -0.06 -0.06
(0.04) (0.04)


















Log Likelihood -712.11 -711.62
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5.6: Alternative Specifications: Proposition 1
Ideology and Income Divided Government
Distance -17.04∗ –
(7.53)
Percent Governors -20.44∗ -2.96
(9.38) (7.03)
Distance x Governors 34.00∗∗ –
(12.67)
Divided Government – -3.15
(4.56)
Divided Government x Distance – 5.65
(8.47)
National Controls
Pres. Approval -0.04∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
% GDP Change -0.14∗ -0.08
(0.06) (0.06)





Citizen Ideology 0.00 –
(0.00)















Log Likelihood -712.04 -718.09
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Thick dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
Thin dashed line is a kernel density estimate of Percent Governors.
Figure 5.5: Proposition 1 Alternative Specification, Marginal Effect of Divided Govern-
ment
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Percent Governors -7.84 -7.99
(10.03) (9.99)
Distance x Governors 15.80 15.85
(13.67) (13.63)




Pres. Approval -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Annual Mood -0.02 -0.02
(0.05) (0.05)

















Log Likelihood -705.62 -705.14
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Policy Years Governing law Year passed
Welfare 1984-1988 Social Security Act Amendments 1962
1989-1996 Family Support Act 1988
1996-present Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act 1996
Medicaid 1998-2005 Balanced Budget Act 1997
2006-2010 Deficit Reduction Act 2005
2011-2012 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 2010
Table 5.8: Year of Law Passage
Table 5.9: Frequency of Percent Governors
Percent Frequency Percent Cumulative
Governors
30 50 2.94 2.94
32 100 5.88 8.82
34 250 14.71 23.53
36 50 2.94 26.47
38 100 5.88 32.35
40 200 11.76 44.12
42 50 2.94 47.06
44 200 11.76 58.82
46 50 2.94 61.76
48 50 2.94 64.71
54 150 8.82 73.53
56 200 11.76 85.29
58 150 8.82 94.12
62 100 5.88 100.00
Total 1700 100.00
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Table 5.10: Percent Governors, by Year






1989 44 George H.W. Bush
1990 42 George H.W. Bush
1991 40 George H.W. Bush









2001 58 George W. Bush
2002 54 George W. Bush
2003 54 George W. Bush
2004 56 George W. Bush
2005 56 George W. Bush
2006 56 George W. Bush
2007 44 George W. Bush







The Politics of Waiver Approvals
In the fall of 2011, President Obama’s legislative proposal to revise the No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) was languishing in Congress. The administration initially
introduced its Blueprint for Reform in March 2010, and after failing to make progress
in Congress for a year and a half, the Obama administration adopted a new tactic. On
September 23, 2011, President Obama invited states to apply for waivers from the un-
popular NCLB through its ESEA Flexibility initiative. As discussed in Chapter 1, in his
remarks introducing the initiative President Obama stated plainly his decision to pursue
waivers in the absence of congressional action to "fix" what many viewed as a broken law:
"Congress hasn’t been able to do it. So I will."
While Obama emphasized his duty to act given congressional inaction, some ob-
servers charged the President with abusing executive authority. Writing for the New
York Times, Sam Dillon warned that the administration’s use of waivers represented the
"most sweeping use of executive authority to rewrite federal education law since Wash-
ington expanded its involvement in education in the 1960s" (2011). Nearly a year later,
Motoko Rich echoed Dillon’s warning, suggesting in the Times that "the Obama adminis-
tration has maneuvered around Congress, using the waivers to advance its own education
agenda" (2012).
The Obama administration has articulated its use of waivers in lieu of congressional
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action, and journalists have identified this strategy as a sly use of executive authority,
perhaps even abuse. Yet the literature on the presidency has yet to seriously examine the
possibility that presidents use waivers strategically. The time is ripe to investigate this
strategy in earnest. In this chapter, I take up the question at the heart of this dissertation:
when do presidents approve waivers?
Chapter 4 laid out a theory of presidential policymaking through waivers and a set
of propositions that move beyond existing work and account for the president’s insti-
tutional incentives to grant states flexibility from federal law. The results in Chapter 5
provide initial support for this theory, indicating that governors submit waivers precisely
when it is in the president’s interest to approve state-level policy change. In this chapter,
I examine whether the president approves more waivers when his hopes of a legislative
victory are dim, provided that he has enough allies at the state level to rely on this strat-
egy. First, I briefly review the data on approved waivers introduced in Chapter 3. Next,
I use this dataset to assess Propositions 2 and 3. I then extend the analysis to investi-
gate whether waivers are predicted by conditions that explain law durability. Finally, I
summarize these results and discuss the implications.
6.1 Data
As described in Chapter 3, the data on approved waivers includes observations in wel-
fare, Medicaid, and K-12 education from 1984 through 2012. The main benefit of the data
on approved waivers is the variation over time and across policy areas, which allows for
substantial variation on the dependent and explanatory variables and for generalizable
tests of Propositions 2 and 3. The majority of models assessed in this chapter examine
approved waivers, unconditional on submission.
As discussed in Chapter 3, three characteristics of this analysis help reduce concerns
about potential selection bias in these unconditional models. First, the high rate of waiver
approvals across policy areas suggests that states who submit applications are similar to
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those who win approval of their applications. Second, I include the state-level variable
that predicts state submissions, Squire, to help reduce potential selection bias. Third,
I include a conditional specification using a sub-sample of the dataset as a robustness
check on the unconditional models analyzed here.1
6.2 Assessing Proposition 2
Here, I briefly revisit the logic underlying Proposition 2 outlined in Chapter 4. This
proposition captures my central argument that presidents see waivers as an alternative
to a legislative revision strategy. One of the president’s primary goals is implementing
his policy preferences on a national scale. When the president anticipates that working
with Congress will be an uphill battle, he may begin searching for alternative ways to
revise existing policy. If the president is interested in pursuing a waiver strategy as such
an alternative, he must also consider the state-level policymaking environment.
Specifically, he must consider how many governors are likely to submit waiver ap-
plications and ultimately to implement revisions in line with the president’s agenda via
waivers approved by the administration. Recall from Chapter 4 the potential costs the
president faces when he opts for a waiver strategy. First, by offering states flexibility,
the president risks incurring a policy cost, particularly if many governors have divergent
policy preferences from the president. Second, if enough states do not submit waiver
applications or if states are slow to respond to the president’s request, the president may
have wasted a narrow window of opportunity to act and may indeed be pre-empted by
another branch of government. Third, by soliciting waiver applications, the president
risks a reputation cost especially if governors do not respond positively. Consequently
it is in the president’s interest to pursue a waiver strategy as an alternative to legislation
depending on how many governors he can rely on to cooperate. As discussed in Chapter 4,
with a large share of governors in his party, the president can confidently minimize these
1Please see Chapter 3 for a thorough discussion of the data.
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potential costs. Proposition 2 expresses this core theoretical claim:
Proposition 2: The number of waivers approved each state-year increases as the ideological
distance between Congress and the president increases, contingent on the share of governors in
the president’s party.
6.2.1 Model
The dependent variable is a count of the number of waivers approved in state i =
1...50, policy j =welfare, Medicaid, or education, and year t = 1984...2012. Table 6.1
shows the spread and summary statistics for this dependent variable.2
Table 6.1: Approved Waivers, Dependent Variable Summary Statistics
Policy Years Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Welfare, Medicaid, and Education 1984-2012 0.67 2.16 0 39 2600
Welfare 1984-1996 0.20 0.49 0 3 650
Medicaid 1992-2012 0.11 0.37 0 4 1050
Education 1995-2012 1.66 3.42 0 39 900
The model of Proposition 2 parallels the model of Proposition 1 introduced in the
previous chapter, although here of course the dependent variable is a count of approved
rather than submitted waivers per state-year-policy. The variables central to assessing
Proposition 2 are as follows: Distance, Percent Governors, and Distance x Governors. For
a discussion of how these terms are measured, please see Chapter 5. The substantive
analysis will primarily focus on the marginal effect of Distance, assessed across the range
of values of Percent Governors.3
2I should note that the maximum value, 39, is a result of many districts within the state of Pennsylvania
applying for and receiving waivers from the Improving America’s Schools Act in 1995. Results are not
sensitive to this observation.
3As in the previous chapter, I also examine whether the president grants waivers when the share of
governors in his party increases, contingent on his distance from Congress. From a theoretical standpoint,
one might argue that the share of governors in the president’s party will not exert an effect on the number
of waivers approved when the president’s distance from Congress equals zero. In this case, there would
be an argument for omitting Percent Governors from the model below (Kam and Franzese 2007). However,
as is illustrated below, it is not the case that Percent Governors equals zero when Distance equals zero.
Omitting Percent Governors from the model, then, would introduce bias into our model and specifically to
our estimation of Distance x Governors. For this reason, I keep Percent Governors in the model.
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As in the model of Proposition 1, I include three national-level control variables: Ap-
proval, GDP Change, and Annual Mood.4 I review the logic for including each here. First,
as the president’s approval ratings decrease (and thus as his political capital declines),
he may rely increasingly on extra-legislative policymaking strategies rather than work-
ing with Congress. In this atmosphere, he may be more eager to approve waivers. I
include a measure of presidential approval that is an average of the president’s annual
approval ratings, and I expect this coefficient to be negative. Second, as the national GDP
shrinks, the administration may be more inclined to cut spending. Since waivers are
often used to experiment with cost-saving program designs, the administration may be
motivated to approve more waivers when the GDP declines; GDP Change measures the
annual percent change in GDP, and I expect this coefficient to be negative. Finally, as in
the previous chapter, I include Stimson’s measure of policy mood for the following two
reasons (1999). Presidents often publicly discuss waivers as tools that allow them to take
action when Congress cannot (or will not) act, as the opening anecdote of this chapter
illustrates. Waivers, then, may be a more popular type of tool when the public mood
favors a more activist government. In addition, waivers explicitly authorize experimen-
tation. The president and his administration may be more willing to use this tool when
the national mood is more liberal, suggesting that the public is more open to innovation.
As a result, I expect Annual Mood to be positive.
As discussed in Chapter 3, including any state-level variables that predict waiver sub-
missions helps to reduce potential selection bias. As we saw in Chapter 5, Squire was the
state-level variable that played an important role in predicting state waiver submissions.
I include this variable here in the Unconditional models; the Conditional model includes
4In addition to the variables described here, one may suspect that several additional national and state
factors may influence the number of waivers approved, including whether it’s a presidential election year,
state population, state per capita income, and state citizen ideology. I include these variables and report the
results in Table 6.10 in the Appendix. The results are substantively similar in all three specifications. The
primary difference, discussed below, is that the marginal effect of Distance reaches statistical significance
in the Conditional model when several of these additional control variables are included.
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the log of submissions instead.5 I also include president fixed effects to account for unob-
servable variation attributable to each specific president and his administration.6 Finally,
in the Unconditional models below I include state fixed effects to account for unobserv-
able factors specific to each state that may be related to waiver approvals.7
Waivers Approvedijt = β0 + β1Distance + β2Percent Governors + β3Distance x Governors
+β4Approval + β5GDP Change + β6Mood + β7Squire
+ZtPresident +WiState +UjPolicy + εijt (6.1)
6.2.2 Estimating Proposition 2
Table 6.2 includes three specifications.8 Column 1 includes approved waivers in all
three policy areas and is unconditional on submission, column 2 includes only observa-
tions on Section 1115 welfare and Medicaid waivers and is unconditional on submission,
and finally, column 3 includes only observations on Section 1115 welfare and Medicaid
waivers and is conditional on submission. The All Policies – Unconditional model in Col-
umn 1 allows for the most variation on the relevant variables and is more generalizable
5The logic here is that including the log of submissions on the right-hand side helps account for selec-
tion bias. But in the Unconditional models, which include observations on all policy areas, this information
is not available for education observations. In these models, I use Squire instead, which is the state-level
predictor of the log of submissions. In the Conditional model, which only includes observations in welfare
and Medicaid, I can simply include the log of submissions, since this information is available for all obser-
vations. Please see the Appendix to Chapter 3 for a more thorough discussion of how including state-level
variables that predict waiver submissions helps to account for selection bias.
6Doing so is relevant here because each president comes to office with a different interpretation of the
role of states in policymaking. Further, each president enters office with his own set of relationships with
members of Congress, governors, and the national governors’ associations. As a result, each president may
have a different approach to working with governors and may have different levels of success in executing
strategies that require participation from governors. In addition, each president’s personal style may im-
pact not only his eagerness to use waivers but his approach to doing so; while this factor may be important
in predicting the outcome of interest, it is difficult to measure.
7In the models discussed here, I omit Alignment based on the null results in Chapter 3 that suggest it
does not predict approvals. Further, the null results in Chapter 5 suggest that it does not predict waiver
submissions. Including Alignment does not substantively impact the results with regard to any of the
models or specifications discussed in this chapter. Please see the Appendix for specifications that include
Alignment for each model discussed below.
8Please see Table 6.9 in the Appendix for all policy and president fixed effects results.
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over time and across policy areas. As such, I discuss these results first; below, I refer to
this All Policies – Unconditional model simply as the All Policies model.
I estimate the All Policies model with a zero inflated negative binomial specification
for two reasons.9 First, the data are characterized by overdispersion due to an abundance
of zeros. Second, two different processes generate the zeros: the dependent variable might
equal zero if waivers are made available by the administration but a state is not awarded a
waiver, or if an administration chooses not to solicit or approve waivers in that particular
policy area even when the administration has the option to exercise waiver authority.
Because the probability of being in one of these regimes depends on the policy area, the
inflation model includes the policy dummy variables.
To assess Proposition 2, we are primarily interested in the marginal effect of Distance
on the number of approved waivers, assessed at different values of Percent Governors.10
According to my theory, the president initially considers a waiver strategy if he needs an
extra-legislative policymaking option; his distance from Congress, then, is the primary
motivation to pursue such a strategy, although he must simultaneously consider whether
he can use this strategy effectively given the share of governors in his party.
The results in Table 6.2 suggest that Distance, Percent Governors, and the relevant in-
teraction term, Percent x Distance, are all statistically significant at least at the α = 0.10
level in the All Policies model, but this information tells us little about the marginal effect
9A Vuong test indicates that a zero-inflated model is appropriate, with a test-statistic of 3.91, p-value
0.0000.
10Please see Table 6.8 in the Appendix for a model that uses Divided Government rather than Distance
to measure the president’s ability to move his preferred legislation through Congress. In this model, the
coefficient on the interaction term, Distance x Governors, is negative. Nonetheless, the results are broadly
consistent with the results discussed below. In particular, the marginal effect of Divided Government is only
statistically significant at the α = 0.10 level or lower when the share of governors in the president’s party
is between 51 and 55 percent, illustrated in Figure 6.12 in the Appendix. In this interval, the marginal
effect of Divided Government is positive. While this marginal effect decreases very slightly across this range,
the estimates of this marginal effect are not significantly different from one another. Despite the negative
slope on the interaction term, then, the slope is effectively flat in the interval when the marginal effect
of Distance is significant. The substantive implications are that under divided government, with roughly
half the nation’s governors in his party, the president approves more waivers. Moving forward, I rely on
Distance rather than Divided Government throughout the discussion below, since Distance allows for a more
fine-grained assessment of the president’s ideological relationship with Congress and, consequently, on his
ability to achieve passage of his preferred legislative revisions.
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Table 6.2: Assessing Proposition 2
All Policies Section 1115 Section 1115
Unconditional Unconditional Conditional
Distance -7.27 -31.22∗∗∗ -13.69∗
(4.27) (7.30) (6.24)
Percent Governors -13.11∗ -40.32∗∗∗ -18.10∗
(5.87) (9.03) (7.88)
Distance x Governors 16.85∗ 58.10∗∗∗ 22.75∗
(7.65) (12.30) (10.63)
National Controls
Pres. Approval -0.03∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Annual Mood 0.13∗∗∗ 0.07 0.10
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
% GDP Change -0.08∗∗ -0.19∗∗ -0.09
(0.02) (0.06) (0.05)
State Control
Squire -1.53 0.66 –
(1.57) (2.67)
Submissions (Natural Log) – – 0.75∗∗∗
(0.11)
Constant 0.86 15.13∗∗∗ 3.68
(2.66) (4.55) (4.90)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes No
President Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Policy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 2600 1700 238
Log Likelihood -1903.15 -622.72 -228.15
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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of Distance. I turn to Figure 6.1 below, which illustrates this marginal effect. The solid
black line in this figure indicates the marginal effect of Distance, while the dashed lines
indicate the upper and lower bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval for the point
estimates.
Marginal Effect of Distance
Figure 6.1 suggests that the marginal effect of Distance is contingent on the share of
governors in the president’s party. Consistent with expectations, as the share of governors
in the president’s party increases, the marginal effect of Distance increases, illustrated by
the positive slope on the line plotting the marginal effect of Distance across the range of
Percent Governors. Specifically, consider the increase in the marginal effect of Distance
when 30 percent of governors are in the president’s party compared to 50 percent. The
marginal effect of Distance is -2.21 when 30 percent of governors are in the president’s
party, the lowest observed value of Percent Governors in this sample.11 However, because
the marginal effect of Distance falls below conventional levels of statistical significance
at this point, we cannot with confidence infer that the marginal effect is significantly
different from zero when 30 percent of governors are in the president’s party.
In contrast, when 50 percent of governors are in the president’s party, the marginal
effect of Distance is 1.16 and is significant at the α = 0.05 level.12 The marginal effect of
Distance on the number of waivers approved increases from a value statistically indistin-
guishable from zero to 1.16 as the share of governors in the president’s party increases
from 30 to 50 percent. Indeed, when 50 percent of governors or more are in the presi-
dent’s party, the marginal effect of Distance is significant at the α = 0.05 level and contin-
ues to increase as the share of governors in the president’s party increases.13 For example,
11Standard error 1.99, p-value 0.267.
12Standard error 0.57, p-value 0.044.
13We can be most confident in the estimates of the marginal effect of Distance when 50 percent of gover-
nors or more are in the president’s party because, as mentioned in the text, across this range the marginal
effect of Distance is significant at the α = 0.05 level.
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when the share of governors in the president’s party increases from 50 to 60 percent, the
marginal effect of Distance more than doubles, increasing from 1.16 to 2.84.
These results support the core theoretical claim expressed in Proposition 2: as the
president moves further from Congress, he grants more waivers as the share of governors
in his party increases. When the president seeks an alternative to legislation, it appears
that a waiver strategy may be an increasingly attractive option as the president can rely on
a greater share of governors in his own party to implement his preferred policy changes
via waivers.14
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Thick dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
Thin dashed line is a kernel density estimate of Percent Governors.
Figure 6.1: Marginal Effect of Distance, All Policies – Unconditional
I now turn to the two specifications that include only observations for Section 1115
welfare and Medicaid waivers. First, given the large number of education waivers in the
All Policies model, it is useful to investigate whether we observe a similar marginal effect
of Distance when we omit the education observations. To do so, I examine the marginal
effect of Distance in the Medicaid and Welfare – Unconditional model, estimated with a
14Please see Table 6.8 for a model that omits waivers granted under the Obama administration’s ESEA
Flexibility program. Since the Obama administration required states to meet requirements not included
in ESEA as a condition for receiving a waiver, as described in Chapter 3, we might expect that the factors
motivating this kind of waiver strategy differ from the conditions discussed thus far. I discuss the impli-
cations of this possibility further in Chapter 7. At this point, as a robustness check I omit from the model
of Proposition 2 the years in which waivers were granted under the ESEA Flexibility program, 2011 and
2012. As Figure 6.11 in the Appendix shows, we still see that the marginal effect of Distance increases as the
share of governors in the president’s party increases. This value is statistically significant when the share
of governors in the president’s party meets or exceeds 45 percent.
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Poisson specification (column 2 in Table 6.2).15 The regression results reported in column
2 suggest that Distance, Percent Governors, and Distance x Governors are significant, but
again, these coefficients contain limited information. Figure 6.2 plots the marginal effect
of Distance assessed across the range of Percent Governors.
Similar to what we observe in Figure 6.1, in Figure 6.2 we see that the marginal effect
of Distance increases as the share of governors in the president’s party increases. When
only 30 percent of governors are in the president’s party, the marginal effect of Distance
is -13.79 and is significant at the α = 0.05 level.16 These results suggest that when the
president is far from Congress and as such needs an alternative policymaking strategy,
he approves fewer waivers when only a small share of governors is in his party. This
result is consistent with expectations, given the discussion in Chapter 4 of the poten-
tial policy, opportunity, and reputation costs of a waiver strategy that the president must
consider. With few governors in the president’s party, the president cannot count on suffi-
cient state-level cooperation with this strategy and, in turn, cannot confidently minimize
the potential costs of a waiver strategy. In this circumstance, although the president may
be ideologically far from Congress, we should not expect him to pursue a waiver strategy.
On the other hand, as the share of governors in the president’s party increases, the
marginal effect of Distance should also increase. As before, these results suggest that this
is the case. The marginal effect of Distance indeed increases as the share of governors in
the president’s party grows. As discussed above, the marginal effect of Distance is -13.79
when only 30 percent of governors are in the president’s party. When 58 percent of gov-
ernors or more are in the president’s party, however, the marginal effect of Distance is
positive and significant at the α = 0.05 level. Further, the marginal effect of Distance in-
creases from 2.48 when 58 percent of governors are in the president’s party to 4.81 when
62 percent of governors are in the president’s party.17 Even across this small increase
15I do not use a negative binomial specification, since we cannot reject the null hypothesis that α = 0 (a
likelihood ratio test gives a χ2 test statistic = 0.02, p-value 0.451).
16Standard error 3.72, p-value 0.000.
17When Percent Governors = 58, the marginal effect of Distance has a standard error of 1.26 and a p-value
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in Percent Governors, the marginal effect of Distance nearly doubles. These results echo
those discussed above from the All Policies model, suggesting that the marginal effect of
Distance is not simply driven by the education observations included in the All Policies
model.
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Thick dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
Thin dashed line is a kernel density estimate of Percent Governors.
Figure 6.2: Marginal Effect of Distance, Unconditional – Section 1115
Next, I turn to the the Medicaid and Welfare – Conditional model (column 3, Table
6.2).18 This specification only includes observations of approved waivers from state-years
in which waivers were submitted. These results, then, are conditional on submission and
as such reduce concerns about selection bias. Figure 6.3 illustrates the marginal effect
of Distance for this specification. Consistent with expectations and with the previous
results, the positive slope on the line plotting the marginal effect of Distance indicates
that as the president moves further from Congress, he approves more waivers as the
share of governors in his party increases. While this marginal effect is only statistically
significant at the α = 0.05 level across the lower range of Percent Governors, we see the
familiar pattern that the marginal effect of Distance increases as the share of governors in
the president’s party grows.19
of 0.048. When Percent Governors = 62, the marginal effect of Distance has a standard error of 1.33 and a
p-value of 0.000.
18Please see Table 6.12 in the Appendix for alternative specifications that include state fixed effects, omit
Alignment, and use an OLS specification. The results are very similar to those discussed here.
19When additional variables are included to control for presidential election years, state citizen ideology,
and state per capita income, the marginal effect of Distance is positive and significant at the α = 0.10 level
when at least 61 percent of governors are in the president’s party. Please see column 3 in Table 6.12 in the
Appendix.
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Thick dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
Thin dashed line is a kernel density estimate of Percent Governors.
Figure 6.3: Marginal Effect of Distance, Conditional – Section 1115
For example, when 30 percent of governors are in the president’s party, the marginal
effect of Distance is -6.87.20 When the share of governors in the president’s party in-
creases to 48 percent, the marginal effect of Distance increases to -2.77.21 Overall, in this
conditional specification we see additional evidence that the marginal effect of Distance
is contingent on the share of governors in the president’s party, and in particular, that the
marginal effect of Distance on the number of waivers approved increases as the share of
governors in the president’s party grows.
Marginal Effect of Percent Governors
According to the theory developed in Chapter 4, the president initially contemplates a
waiver strategy if moving his preferred policies through Congress is difficult. As a result,
the central substantive analysis focuses on the marginal effect of Distance, and we are pri-
marily interested in how Percent Governors modifies Distance rather than in the marginal
effect of Percent Governors. In fact, we might expect the coefficient on Percent Governors,
β2, to be zero when Distance = 0. That is, in the hypothetical situation when the presi-
dent is perfectly aligned with Congress, we might expect him to pursue legislative reform
rather than waivers regardless of the share of governors in his party. If so, there would
20Standard error 3.12, p-value 0.028.
21Standard error 1.41, p-value 0.049.
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be an argument for omitting Percent Governors from the model (Kam and Franzese 2007,
100). However, this is not the case.22
Although not central to the theory here, it is worth asking whether the marginal effect
of Percent Governors is broadly consistent with the theory developed in Chapter 4. Below,
I assess the marginal effect of Percent Governors across the range of Distance for the All
Policies – Unconditional and the Welfare and Medicaid – Conditional models in Figures
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Thick dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
Thin dashed line is a kernel density estimate of Distance.
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Thick dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
Thin dashed line is a kernel density estimate of Distance.
Figure 6.5: Marginal Effect of Percent Governors, Conditional – Section 1115
The wide confidence intervals for the marginal effect of Percent Governors over most
of the range of Distance indicate a substantial degree of imprecision in these estimates.
22Based on the All Policies – Unconditional model above, if the distance between the president and
Congress was zero, the marginal effect of Percent Governors would be -13.11 with a robust standard error of
5.87 and a p-value of 0.026. Since we cannot accept the null that β2 = 0, omitting this term from the model
would introduce omitted variable bias into the estimate of Distance x Percent.
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Nonetheless, Figure 6.4 illustrates that in the All Policies model the marginal effect of Per-
cent Governors is non-zero and statistically significant at the α = 0.05 level when Distance
is between 0.2 through 0.6. In this range, the positive slope on the marginal effect of Per-
cent Governors suggests that the president approves more waivers when there is a larger
share of governors in his party as the president moves further from Congress. This result
makes sense, given that the further the president is from Congress, the more interest he
has in pursuing his policy goals via an alternative route.
It is also interesting to note the negative marginal effect of Percent Governors given
small values of Distance. This result implies that even when a large share of governors
is in his party, if working with Congress is not particularly difficult, the president grants
fewer waivers. It may be the case that when the president enjoys extensive support at
the state level and he is ideologically close to Congress, he discourages states from revis-
ing the law via waivers and instead opts for a legislative revision strategy. With many
governors in his party, the president may anticipate little backlash from such a strategy.
Indeed, in this scenario governors in the president’s party may prefer that the president
implements reforms via legislation. Once the president is out of office, for example, gov-
ernors may not be able to rely on receipt of waivers to implement changes, since this tool
is only available at the president’s discretion. But if the president signs a new law that
advances the governors’ own goals, they can be more confident in the longevity of this
policy shift instituted through legislation. While additional qualitative analysis will be
important to help identify the precise mechanism here, it seems consistent with the over-
all theory that presidents grant fewer waivers when they find it relatively easy to achieve
their goals via legislative reform and when they anticipate support in doing so from the
majority of governors.
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6.2.3 Discussion of Proposition 2
Howell explains that "[n]o matter their ideological commitments or partisan affilia-
tions, regardless of their personal backgrounds or philosophies of governing, all presi-
dents nearly all of the time seek to guard and expand their base of power" (2013, 12).
While the president’s reliance on governors to implement a waiver strategy evident in
the analysis of Proposition 2 may initially strike one as a dilution of presidential power,
the evidence overall suggests that the president’s use of waivers fits into this framework
of presidential power.
The qualitative evidence in Chapter 2 suggests that presidents pursue waivers with
specific goals in mind and that their administration retains substantial control over this
process. Further, analysis of Proposition 1 in the previous chapter suggests that gov-
ernors submit applications based on their anticipation of the president’s incentives to
approve waivers; rather than trying to wrest power from the president, governors appear
to act as willing participants in the president’s waiver strategy. Finally, this analysis of
Proposition 2 suggests that presidents exercise waiver authority to create a policymaking
opportunity where otherwise one might not exist – that is, when they are ideologically
far from Congress – contingent on the extent of cooperation they expect from the nation’s
governors. Thus far, it appears that presidents’ shrewd exercise of waiver authority cap-
italizes on the division of power across levels of government and provides them with an
additional avenue through which to implement their policy goals.
6.3 Assessing Proposition 3
The evidence in Chapter 2 suggests that waivers are particularly valuable to the presi-
dent when he is not satisfied with existing law. Indeed, in the cases discussed in Chapter 2
it often seemed that presidents approved waivers in concert with a legislative strategy to
revise laws they inherited (and disliked). By approving revisions to existing law through
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authorizing waivers, the president can undermine the legislative status quo as he wrestles
with Congress over legislative changes. Drawing on this qualitative evidence, Proposition
3, introduced in Chapter 4, states that the marginal effect of Distance on waiver approvals
is conditional not only on the share of governors in the president’s party, but also on his
satisfaction with existing law:
Proposition 3: The president approves more waivers as the ideological distance between Congress
and the president increases, contingent on the president’s satisfaction with existing law and on
the share of governors in his party.
Specifically, I expect that a waiver strategy is most attractive to the president when he
is far from Congress, contingent on the share of governors in his party and on whether
he is dissatisfied with existing law. To assess Proposition 3, I use the variable Pre Law,
introduced in Chapter 5, as a proxy for the president’s satisfaction with the current law.
Recall that Pre Law equals one if a waiver was approved before (or during) a year in
which the president signs a new law in the relevant policy area. The assumption is that
before signing a new law, the president is dissatisfied with existing law, based on evi-
dence in Chapter 2 which suggests that in welfare, Medicaid, and education, presidents
were deeply unhappy with the legislative status quo that they inherited. Before signing
new laws, then, it is reasonable to argue that these presidents were dissatisfied with the
existing law. As such, in the analysis below, Pre Law = 1 indicates that the president is
dissatisfied with current law.
On the other hand, Pre Law equals zero if a waiver was approved during a year sub-
sequent to the president signing a new law in the relevant policy area. When Pre Law
equals zero, the assumption is that the president at the very least weakly prefers the new
law he signed to the old law he inherited. Admittedly, this assumption is stronger than
the assumption that presidents would prefer to revise their predecessor’s law, and the
implications for the president’s use of waivers are less clear, since the degree to which
presidents are satisfied with laws they sign varies. The president may be extremely satis-
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fied with a law he signs and, as a result, may want to implement that law as written rather
than granting waivers, as the Bush administration did following passage of the No Child
Left Behind Act of 2001. However, a president may sign a law that includes important
parts of his agenda but omits others, leaving him looking for additional opportunities to
revise the law. Or, the Supreme Court may interpret a law in a way that strikes down key
components of the law as originally written – the Supreme Court’s response to President
Obama’s Affordable Care Act readily comes to mind here. In this case, the president may
be less satisfied with a law and may want to offer waivers to incentivize implementation
of the law, as the Obama administration is currently doing.
With this in mind, below I primarily focus on the results in the condition when the
president is dissatisfied with existing law (Pre Law = 1). We have the clearest theoretical
expectations here: specifically, the marginal effect of Distance should be positive and in-
creasing as the share of governors is in the president’s party increases when the president
is dissatisfied with existing law. In Chapter 7, I discuss alternative measurement strate-
gies that may allow for a more fine-grained analysis of how the president’s satisfaction
with a law impacts his waiver strategy.23
23Please see Table 6.14 in the Appendix for a specification in which I measure the president’s satisfaction
with a law using a different variable, Unsatisfied, which equals one if the president has not yet signed a
new law, similar to the Pre Law coding, but also equals one if there is evidence that the president is not
completely satisfied with a new law he signs. For this dataset, this means Unsatisfied equals one for two
additional cases compared to the original Pre Law coding. First, Unsatisf ied = 1 for education observa-
tions from 1995 through 2000, given the Clinton administration’s inability to achieve several central goals
through their 1994 reauthorization of IASA (Lawmakers Renew and Revamp 1965 Education Act). Sec-
ond, Unsatisf ied = 1 for Medicaid observations from 2006 through 2008, given President Bush’s failure to
transition Medicaid to a block grant program through the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 which he signed.
As Figure 6.14 shows, the results are very similar to those discussed below in the Pre Law = 1 condition.
For example, when Unsatisfied = 1, we see that the marginal effect of Distance is positive and increasing
as the share of governors in the president’s party increases. This marginal effect is statistically significant
at the α = 0.05 level when at least 51 percent of governors are in the president’s party; we can be most
confident that the marginal effect of Distance is significantly different from zero across this range of Percent
Governors. These results imply that when the president is unsatisfied with a law, he grants more waivers
when he is far from Congress, contingent on the share of governors in his party. In the case when the
president is satisfied with existing law (Unsatisfied = 0), we see a similar relationship. The marginal effect
of Distance is positive and significant at the α = 0.05 level when Percent Governors is at or above 38 percent.
As in the case when the president is unsatisfied with existing law, the marginal effect increases as the share
of governors in the president’s party increases. This result is different from the results discussed in the text
in the analysis of Proposition 3. In that analysis, when the president is satisfied with existing law (when
Pre Law equals zero), the marginal effect of Distance is not significant across the range of Percent Governors,
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6.3.1 Measuring Pre Law
Here, I explain in more depth the measure of Pre Law. As discussed, this variable
equals one if a waiver was approved before or during a year in which Congress passed
and the president signed a new law in the relevant policy area. I code the year in which
the president signed a law as one because the president may very well want to approve
waivers during the year in which the relevant legislative battle occurs. Pre Law equals
zero if a waiver was approved in subsequent years. Table 6.3 below lists the relevant laws
passed by Congress and signed by the president in these data.
Policy Governing law Year enacted
Welfare Family Support Act24 1988
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act 1996
Medicaid Balanced Budget Act 1997
Deficit Reduction Act 2005
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 2010
Education Improving America’s Schools Act (IASA)25 1994
No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB)26 2001
Table 6.3: Year of Law Passage
6.3.2 Modeling Proposition 3
Proposition 3 calls for what Kam and Franzese (2007) refer to as a chained interaction
model. Here, I include an interaction term between Distance and Pre Law. The implication
such that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the marginal effect of Distance is zero.
In all, these results from the Unsatisfied coding do not provide convincing evidence that the president
uses waivers differently whether he is dissatisfied or satisfied with existing law. The core consideration still
appears to be his distance from Congress, contingent on the share of governors in his party. However, it
may be the case that neither this alternative coding of Dissatisfied nor the coding of Pre Law discussed in
the text adequately captures the president’s dissatisfaction with the relevant existing law in each year. It
would be hasty to conclude from this analysis that the president’s dissatisfaction with existing law does not
play an important role in his waiver strategy. As a next step, Chapter 7 discusses alternative approaches to
measuring the president’s dissatisfaction with current law.
24President George H.W. Bush did not pursue welfare reform during his administration. I code Pre Law
Passage as 0 for the duration of his presidency for welfare waivers, since his welfare agenda continued that
of his predecessor, President Reagan, who signed the Family Support Act in 1988.
25Clinton also signed the Goals 2000 Act in 1994. Since IASA was the centerpiece of his legislation
agenda, as it reauthorized ESEA, I base the coding on passage of IASA.
26Technically, President George W. Bush did not sign this law until January 8, 2002. However, I code
2002 as a year after passage and signing, since this is the case for all intents and purposes.
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is that the marginal effect of Distance depends simultaneously on the share of governors
in the president’s party and on whether the president is dissatisfied with existing law. I
assess this model in Table 6.4 below.27
Waivers Approvedijt = β0 + β1Distance + β2Percent Governors + β3Distance x Governors
+β4PreLaw + β5Distance x Pre Law + β6Approval
+β7GDP Change + β8Mood + β9Squire
+ZtPresident +WiState +UjPolicy + εijt (6.2)
6.3.3 Analysis of Proposition 3
I assess Proposition 3 using approved waivers in Medicaid, welfare, and education,
unconditional on submission; this is the same sample used in the All Policies – Uncondi-
tional model of Proposition 2 above. As before, I specify zero-inflated negative binomial
models to accommodate the over-dispersion of zeros in the data and the evidence that
more than one process generates these zeros.28
Simple Extension: Comparison to Chapter 5
As in Chapter 5, it is useful to begin with a robustness check that tests whether an
alternative explanation for the president’s use of waivers prevails: do presidents sim-
27It could be the case that the most appropriate specification is what Kam and Franzese refer to as a
"fully interactive" model (2007, 41). In this case, we would not only expect Pre Law to modify Distance,
but also Percent Governors. The full model specification and the related estimate are in the Appendix;
please see Equation 4 and Table 6.16, respectively. Substantively, this specification implies that the share
of governors in the president’s party would differently impact the number of waivers approved before and
after the president has signed a law, and vice versa. From a theoretical standpoint, there is not a clear
rationale that motivates this specification. Further, in the three-way interaction specification, which allows
Percent Governors to vary based on the value of Pre Law and adds a triple interaction term, Distance x Prelaw
x Percent, the model appears over-fit. As the results in Table 6.16 in the Appendix show, the coefficients
associated with the relevant terms are alarmingly large. Further, Figures 6.16 and 6.17 in the Appendix
reveal very wide 95 percent confidence intervals associated with point estimates for the marginal effect of
Distance. These results suggest that this model, fit with these data, produces estimates that are imprecise
and are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. Given the lack of theoretical motivation behind this
model and the imprecision of the estimated results, I focus on the two models in Table 6.4 to assess how
the president’s legislative success influences his waiver strategy.
28In Proposition 3, the Vuong test statistic equals 4.79, p-value 0.000.
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ply approve more waivers before they sign a new law, perhaps in response to governors
seeking an opportunity to implement their preferred policy changes when they sense the
status quo has fallen out of favor? Or, do we still see evidence consistent with my the-
ory that presidents approach waivers strategically and in concert with their legislative
agenda, approving them when they are far from Congress, contingent on the share of
governors in their party?
To compare these two explanations of this process, I begin with a simple extension
that adds Pre Law to the Proposition 2 model – the results are reported in the "Simple
Extension" column in Table 6.4 below. As before, including Pre Law does not dramatically
change the central results for Distance, Percent Governors and Distance x Governors, which
remain significant well below the α = 0.05 level. Figure 6.6 shows that the marginal
effect of Distance is very similar compared to the All Policies – Unconditional model of
Proposition 2 above, and in particular, that the marginal effect of Distance increases as
the share of governors in the president’s party increases. For example, when only 30
percent of governors are in the president’s party, the marginal effect of Distance is -3.93.29
However, when the share of governors in the president’s party increases to 52 percent, the
marginal effect of Distance increases to 1.05.30 Above this value of Percent Governors, the
marginal effect of Distance continues to increase and is significant at the α = 0.05 level.31
It appears that the results from Proposition 2 are robust to inclusion of Pre Law in the
Simple Extension model.
29Standard error 1.93, p-value 0.042.
30Standard error 0.43, p-value 0.014.
31The magnitude of these results are similar to the results from the All Policies – Unconditional model
of Proposition 2. For example, the marginal effect of Distance when 55 percent of governors are in the
president’s party is 1.73 here compared to 2.00 in the comparable model of Proposition 2.
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Thick dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
Thin dashed line is a kernel density estimate of Percent Governors.
Figure 6.6: Simple Extension of Proposition 2 with Pre Law
Marginal Effect of Distance in Proposition 3
I now assess Proposition 3 to explore whether the president’s dissatisfaction with ex-
isting law influences the marginal effect of Distance; results are reported in column 2,
Table 6.4.32 Recall that this model includes an additional interaction term, Prelaw x Dis-
tance, such that the marginal effect of Distance varies with Percent Governors and with Pre
Law. From the coefficients reported in Table 6.4, it is difficult to discern the marginal
effect of Distance. Instead, I discuss this marginal effect in terms of Figures 6.7 and 6.8.
To begin, Figure 6.7 illustrates the marginal effect of Distance on the number of ap-
proved waivers across the range of Percent Governors when Pre Law equals one – that is,
when the president is dissatisfied with current law. From Figure 6.7, it appears that the
marginal effect of Distance under this condition increases as the share of governors in the
president’s party increases. Consistent with expectations, when the president is dissat-
isfied with existing law, we see that he approves more waivers when he is further from
Congress as the share of governors in his party increases. This now-familiar pattern is
worth discussing in detail, given its centrality to the theory developed in Chapter 4.
At the lowest observed value of Percent Governors, 30 percent, the marginal effect of
32Please see Table 6.13 in the Appendix for the reported results of the president and policy fixed effects.
In addition, please see Table 6.15 for models that include Alignment. The results discussed here are robust
to these specifications.
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Table 6.4: Assessing Proposition 3
Simple Extension Proposition 3
Single Interaction Chained Interaction
Distance -10.71∗ -10.76∗
(4.17) (4.19)
Percent Governors -19.83∗∗∗ -19.27∗∗∗
(5.64) (5.64)
Distance x Governors 22.62∗∗ 21.75∗∗
(7.51) (7.59)
Pre Law Passage 1.59∗∗∗ 1.20
(0.16) (1.06)
Distance x Prelaw 0.52
(1.45)
National Controls
Pres. Approval -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Annual Mood 0.22∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)







President Fixed Effects Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Policy Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 2600 2600
Log Likelihood -1869.14 -1869.06
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Distance on approved waivers is -3.72.33 When the share of governors in the president’s
party increases to 52 percent, however, the marginal effect of Distance increases to 1.06.34
Indeed, when 52 percent or more of governors are in the president’s party, the marginal
effect of Distance is positive and significant at the α = 0.05 level. When the share of gov-
ernors in the president’s party increases from 52 to 62 percent, the maximum observed
value in this sample, the marginal effect of Distance increases from 1.06 to 3.24.35 When
the president is dissatisfied with existing law, then, he approves more waivers as his abil-
ity to achieve his goals through legislation weakens provided that he can rely on enough
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Figure 6.8: Proposition 3, Pre Law=0
33Standard error 1.94, p-value 0.055.
34Standard error 0.42, p-value 0.012.
35Standard error 0.63, p-value 0.000.
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As Figure 6.8 shows, when Pre Law equals zero we still see the positive slope of the
marginal effect of Distance. However, the marginal effect of Distance is not statistically
significant across the range of Percent Governors. From these results, we cannot confi-
dently infer that the marginal effect of Distance is significantly different from zero when
the president is satisfied with current law. It may be the case that after the president has
signed a law (indicating that he is at least weakly satisfied with the new law compared to
the previous law), he may not have a strong interest in authorizing flexibility via waivers,
regardless of his distance from Congress and the share of governors in his party.
However, given the discussion above, this assumption that presidents are satisfied
with new laws they sign may be too strong. Indeed, using whether or not a president
has signed a new law may be too blunt a measure to assess whether the president is
satisfied with the law, or whether he remains satisfied with that law in subsequent years.36
A more sensitive measure of presidential satisfaction with the current law will be an
important step towards investigating how presidents use waivers when they are satisfied
with existing law. I discuss such possibilities in Chapter 7.
6.3.4 Discussion of Proposition 3
This analysis suggests that the president’s incentive to authorize departures from ex-
isting law may be influenced by his legislative agenda and, in particular, by a desire to
revise existing law. Specifically, we see that the president approves more waivers when
he is far from Congress, contingent on the president’s share of allies at the state level
and when he is dissatisfied with current law. While granting waivers may at first glance
seem to undermine the president’s efforts to exercise and consolidate power, they are per-
haps best understood as a supplement to the president’s legislative strategy. When the
36For example, the results under the condition when the president is satisfied with existing law are
inconsistent across the measure of Pre Law used in the text and the alternative measure of Unsatisfied,
discussed in a footnote above, used in Table 6.14 and illustrated in Figure 6.15 in the Appendix. The
marginal effect of Distance is not significantly different from zero in the specification using Pre Law, but
this marginal effect is significant at the α = 0.05 level when 38 percent or more of the nation’s governors
are in the president’s party using the measure Unsatisfied.
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president is dissatisfied with current law, a waiver strategy that is contingent on suffi-
cient governor participation can provide the president with a subnational opportunity
to pursue his preferred outcomes despite the horizontal institutional constraints that, by
design, frustrate this very goal.
6.4 Extension: Waivers in the Context of Legislative Durability
From this analysis, we have gained insight into why presidents value waivers as pol-
icymaking tools. By approving state-level changes via waivers, however incrementally,
presidents can authorize revisions to existing laws. We might expect, then, that condi-
tions that predict other types of revisions to laws also predict waiver approvals. Here,
I draw on the law durability literature to assess whether this is the case. If the condi-
tions associated with more traditional types of revisions also predict waiver approvals,
this evidence will corroborate the argument that presidents approve waivers as part of a
broader strategy of legislative change.
6.4.1 Predicting Law Durability
Maltzman and Shipan (2008) argue that conditions in years subsequent to law en-
actment may influence how vulnerable laws are to revision via amendments. Specifi-
cally, they expect (and find) that fewer amendments are passed as bicameral agreement
between the House and Senate decreases. Following the same logic, I expect that this
situation is precisely when waivers might be useful. Large inter-chamber differences
may make legislative revision via amendments improbable or difficult, as Maltzman and
Shipan find. In this case, waivers may provide the president with an opportunity to revise
a law if the House and Senate are unlikely to agree on amendments. To assess this propo-
sition, I add the variable Chamber Differences to the model of Proposition 3.37 I expect the
37Following Maltzman and Shipan (2008), I use Binder’s (2003) measure of bicameral differences to mea-
sure this variable. Larger values indicate more disagreement between chambers.
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coefficient to be positive.
Further, Berry et al. (2010a) find that as a law’s enacting majority in Congress weakens
(loses seats), "programs are particularly imperiled," measured by reductions in funding
(15). Specifically, they make the case that "partisan turnover increases the odds of spend-
ing cuts, program mutation, and program death" (14). Extending this logic to waivers is
straightforward. When the enacting coalition weakens in subsequent Congresses, a law
may become more vulnerable to revision via waivers, just as it becomes more vulnerable
to funding cuts and other changes. With fewer proponents of the law in Congress, the
president may be able to authorize changes via waivers without risking pushback from
members of Congress. While the president may also see an opening to revise a law via
the legislative process, waivers can be a useful supplement to such a strategy. Following
Berry et al. (2010a), I measure changes in coalition strength over time by calculating the
percent change in seat share held by the majority party from the enacting Congress to the
current Congress, averaging across chambers. I expect the coefficient on Coalition Change
to be negative.38
6.4.2 Assessing Waivers in the Context of Law Durability
To assess whether these conditions predict waivers in the expected manner, I add
Chamber Differences and Coalition Change to the model of Proposition 3. As before, I
include observations for all three policy areas, unconditional on submission. Table 6.5
below shows the regression results for two models. The first, labeled "Basic Durability,"
38I do not include an evaluation of how enacting conditions might influence whether more waivers are
granted from a particular law. From a theoretical standpoint, there is a logical case to be made that,
just as laws are more likely to be amended if they are passed under divided government or with large
inter-chamber differences, laws passed under these conditions are more susceptible to revision via waivers
Maltzman and Shipan (2008). However, in these data, we only observe a total of 8 enacting laws. That is,
each of the waivers approved in this dataset revises one of eight laws in the three policy areas considered
here. In comparison, in their analysis, Maltzman and Shipan include 262 laws. While it is worth asking
whether laws enacted in more divisive environments may be more vulnerable to revision via waivers, the
data here do not allow for sufficient variation to test these propositions. In contrast, the propositions dis-
cussed here about current conditions focus on conditions that change over time. Even though we are still
limited by the small number of laws in the sample, by investigating conditions that change each year, we
gain a bit more variation that makes it more feasible to assess these propositions.
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simply adds Chamber Differences and Coalition Change to the model of Proposition 3. Sec-
ond, following Berry et al. (2010a), the model "Coalition Gains and Losses" includes a
spline knot at zero in Coalition Change to separately assess the impact of seat share gains
for the original coalition and, on the other hand, seat share losses.39
First, I revisit the marginal effect of Distance. The regression results for Distance, Per-
cent Governors, and Distance x Governors are quite similar across these two models. I focus
here on the Basic Durability model. As the results in Table 6.5 suggest, the marginal ef-
fect of Distance is similar to that observed in the prior model of Proposition 3. When the
president is dissatisfied with existing law (Pre Law equals one), illustrated in Figure 6.9,
the marginal effect of Distance increases as the share of governors in the president’s party
increases. When only 30 percent of governors are in the president’s party, the marginal
effect of Distance is -7.77.40 However, as the share of governors in the president’s party in-
creases to 57 percent, the marginal effect of Distance increases to 1.02.41 Indeed, when 57
percent of governors or more are in the president’s party, the marginal effect of Distance
is positive and significant at the α = 0.05 level and continues to increase as Percent Gover-
nors grows to its maximum observed value (62 percent). The core relationship observed
in the analysis of Proposition 3 is also seen here: when he is dissatisfied with current law,
the president grants more waivers as he moves further from Congress contingent on the
share of governors in his party.
When Pre Law equals zero in the Basic Durability model, we observe a positive slope
on the marginal effect of Distance, as Figure 6.10 shows. In contrast to the results under
this condition in the model of Proposition 3, the marginal effect of Distance is significant
39Please see Table 6.17 in the Appendix for reported policy and president fixed effects. In addition,
please see Table 6.18 and Figure 6.18 in the Appendix for the regression results and marginal effects plot
of Distance from a specification of the Simple Extension model that includes these law durability terms.
As in the Basic Durability model here, the results are robust to inclusion of the law durability terms. Also
please see Table 6.18 in the Appendix for a model that includes a variable that measures the age of the law.
It is possible that "older" laws are more resistant to revision, as coalitions and stakeholders have coalesced
around them. Berry et al. (2010a), for example, include this measure in their model of program durability.
The results are very similar to those discussed here.
40Standard error 2.17, p-value 0.000.
41Standard error 0.47, p-value 0.028.
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Table 6.5: Assessing Durability
Basic Durability Coalition Gains and Losses
Distance -19.63∗∗∗ -18.73∗∗∗
(4.61) (4.75)
Percent Governors -31.11∗∗∗ -30.66∗∗∗
(6.34) (6.43)
Pre Law Passage 0.05 0.15
(1.01) (1.03)
Distance x Governors 32.56∗∗∗ 32.10∗∗∗
(8.06) (8.10)
Distance x Prelaw 2.10 2.11
(1.35) (1.35)
Durability Measures
Chamber Diff Current Yr 16.31∗∗∗ 16.61∗∗∗
(4.12) (3.86)
Coalition Change -4.11∗∗ –
(1.47)
Coalition Losses – 6.35
(15.57)
Coalition Gains – -4.78∗
(2.10)
National Controls
Pres. Approval -0.05∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Annual Mood 0.19∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.03)







Policy Fixed Effects Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes
President Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 2600 2600
Log Likelihood -1857.78 -1857.55
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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at the α = 0.05 level from the minimum observed value of Percent Governors through
the point when 50 percent of governors are in the president’s party. These results from
the Basic Durability model suggest that perhaps the president’s distance from Congress,
contingent on the share of governors in his party, does in fact influence the number of
waivers approved when the president is satisfied with current law. However, I hesitate to
draw conclusions from these results, which are inconsistent with what we observe in the
analysis of Proposition 3.42 Given the additional three variables compared to the model
of Proposition 3, the Basic Durability model may be over-fit. As a result, we cannot be
confident that the marginal effect of Distance is significantly different from zero when
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Figure 6.10: Basic Durability, Pre Law=0
42Recall that in the analysis of Proposition 3, the marginal effect of Distance is not significant across the
range of Percent Governors when Pre Law equals zero.
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I now assess the results in terms of the law durability variables. Consistent with ex-
pectations, in both models we see a positive, statistically significant coefficient on Cham-
ber Differences. Specifically, this coefficient is 16.31 in the Chained Interaction model
and 16.61 in the Coalition Gains and Losses model.43 Maltzman and Shipan (2008) find
that major laws are less likely to be amended in Congress as disagreements between the
House and Senate increase (262); here, we see that that as Chamber Differences increases,
the president approves more waivers. These results imply that with large chamber dif-
ferences, when Congress is less likely to approve amendments to existing legislation, the
president approves more waivers. Of course, this does not constitute definitive evidence
about the mechanism underlying the president’s waiver strategy. But these results sug-
gest, yet again, that the president’s waiver strategy is related to his ability (or lack thereof)
to shift existing policy via legislative revisions.
In addition, and as expected, in the Chained Interaction model the coefficient on Coali-
tion Change is negative and significant, indicating that when the congressional coalition
that originally enacted a law loses seat share in Congress, the president approves more
waivers. These results are consistent with what Berry et al. (2010a) find in their analysis
of program durability: as a congressional coalition weakens, laws become more vulner-
able to revision. Here, we see a parallel phenomenon, where waivers are the method of
revision rather than the reductions in program funding that Berry et al. (2010a) examine.
The Coalition Gains and Losses model also suggests that revision through waivers
is related to the strength of the original enacting coalition in subsequent years. Here,
Coalition Gains is negative (−4.78) and significant. This result indicates that when the
enacting coalition gains seats in Congress, the president approves fewer waivers from that
43Following Maltzman and Shipan (2008), I add an interaction between Chamber Differences and ln(time)
to the Simple Extension model, where time equals the number of years since law passage, to account for a
non-proportional effect. Please see Table 6.18 for these regression results and Figure 6.19 in the Appendix
for the marginal effects plot of Chamber Differences. Similar to the results reported here, the marginal
effect of Chamber Differences is positive across the range of values of ln(time). However, this marginal
effect decreases and drops below conventional levels of significance as ln(time) increases. I use the Simple
Extension model as the baseline for the alternative specifications in the Appendix to avoid straining the
available variation in the data as I incorporate this series of additional variables.
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law. It may be the case that laws with strong coalitions in Congress are less vulnerable to
revision via waivers, as the president may anticipate pushback from coalition members
in authorizing subnational changes without congressional consent.
These results for Chamber Differences and Coalition Change indicate that the presi-
dent approves more waivers when bicameral differences make amendments unlikely and
when laws become vulnerable as enacting coalitions weaken, respectively. While not
definitive, these results are consistent with the argument that presidents use waivers as
tools of legislative revision.
6.5 Additional Implications
Here, I reflect briefly on several additional implications from the analysis in this chap-
ter. First, across every unconditional model specified here, Presidential Approval is neg-
ative and statistically significant, consistent with expectations. Presidents with lower
average annual approval ratings appear to grant more waivers. It may be the case that
presidents with lower approval ratings have low political capital, weakening their ability
to bargain with (and extract compromises from) Congress. Waivers may provide the pres-
ident with a viable alternative for revising policy in this case. Indeed, Manna’s framework
suggests that we are more likely to see intergovernmental policymaking precisely when
one actor has low "license" to act, such as a president with low approval ratings, and as
a result attempts to "borrow strength" from actors at other levels of government, such as
governors (2006).
Second, the coefficient on Annual Mood is positive and significant across all models
specified here that include all policy areas. As expected, when the national policy mood
is more in favor of government activism, the president approves more waivers. This re-
lationship is not surprising, given that presidents often describe waivers as tools that al-
low them to enact reforms when other policymaking options appear foreclosed. Further,
and consistent with expectations, it seems that when the policy mood is more liberal,
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presidents are more willing to approve waivers that, by design, instigate innovation and
experimentation.
Finally, as reported in the Appendix, across the models of Propositions 2 and 3 esti-
mated here, Alignment fails to achieve statistical significance at conventional levels.44 It
appears that the common assumption in existing large-n work that presidents grant more
waivers to governors in their party cannot adequately explain the president’s role in this
process. Further, results specific to Propositions 2 and 3 are robust to inclusion of this
term. In all, this analysis suggests that the president’s waiver strategy is fundamentally
informed by the institutional constraints he faces.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter opened with reactions from journalists who expressed alarm at the Obama
administration’s use of waivers to revise the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB).
The attention paid to these waivers was perhaps justified – by the end of 2015, 43 states
and D.C. were implementing substantial changes to NCLB via waivers encouraged and
authorized under the administration’s ESEA Flexibility initiative. While policymakers
and members of the media alike recognize the president’s ability to use waivers strategi-
cally, to this point we lack a theory and systematic investigation of the conditions under
which presidents approve waivers.
There are a number of reasons that may explain why waivers have thus far not been
examined as a valuable type of presidential policymaking tool. Policy gains through
waivers are, by their nature, piecemeal. While an administration may authorize state-
level changes through waivers, cooperation from a large share of governors is required to
achieve anything approaching a national policy shift. Waivers are also not necessarily as
permanent as legislation. For example, it appears that the passage of the Every Student
Succeeds Act in December 2015 may release states from the conditions of their ESEA
44Please see Tables 6.10, 6.12, and 6.15 in the Appendix.
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Flexibility waivers.45
Nonetheless, waivers offer presidents a viable policymaking alternative to the legisla-
tive process. The evidence in Chapter 2 suggested that presidents do in fact take advan-
tage of the broad discretion granted to them under the waiver authorities discussed in
this project. Further, the results in this chapter offer a systematic analysis of my core
argument that presidents approve more waivers when they are far from Congress, con-
tingent on the share of governors in their party. The analysis in this chapter primarily
focuses on the marginal effect of Distance because, from the president’s perspective, a
waiver strategy is initially attractive when he is ideologically far from Congress. As we
have seen, this condition is not sufficient to justify a waiver strategy. Rather, when the
president seeks an extra-legislative policymaking avenue, he pursues a waiver strategy
if he can count on cooperation from enough governors in his party. That is, when the
president’s reform efforts are frustrated by Congress, as the share of governors willing to
implement state-level changes authorized by the president’s administration increases, a
waiver strategy becomes a viable option for the president to shift policy in his preferred
direction on a national scale and, in doing so, to claim credit for reform. To illustrate this
conclusion, Table 6.6 summarizes the central results from this chapter.
Distance M.E. Distance M.E.




Simple Extension -3.93∗ 3.31∗∗∗
Chained Interaction, Pre Law=1 -3.72 3.24∗∗∗
Basic Durability
Chained Interaction, Pre Law=1 -7.77∗∗∗ 2.33∗∗∗
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 6.6: Summary of Findings, Marginal Effect of Distance
45See, for example, the American Federation of Teachers’ discussion of the new law (2016).
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For the unconditional models estimated using all three policy areas, Table 6.6 lists
the marginal effect of Distance across the minimum and maximum observed values of
Percent Governors. An important pattern is evident here. As the share of governors in the
president’s party increases from 30 to 62 percent, the marginal effect of Distance increases
in each model. The marginal effect of Distance is negative (or, in the case or Proposition
2, not significantly different from zero) when only 30 percent of governors are in the
president’s party, but when 62 percent of governors are in the president’s party, across all
models in Table 6.6 the marginal effect of Distance on the number of approved waivers is
positive and significant.46
These results imply that the president’s ability to successfully use a waiver strategy is
dependent on the share of governors in his party. Even when the president is far from
Congress, he approves fewer waivers when a small share of governors is in his party.
Given the potential policy, opportunity, and reputation costs of a waiver strategy dis-
cussed in Chapter 4, these results are consistent with expectations. Without enough
state-level allies, this strategy is not a wise alternative to legislation. On the other hand,
when the president is far from Congress, he approves more waivers when a large share
of governors is in his party. Again, this result is consistent with the theory developed
in Chapter 4. When the president is ideologically distant from Congress and has little
hope of achieving his policy goals through legislation, a waiver strategy appears to be a
viable alternative when the president can rely on a large share of allies at the state level
to implement reforms that, as a whole, advance his agenda on a national scale. This
core relationship is not identical across each specification discussed in this chapter, but
fundamentally, we see a similar story unfolding across each set of results.
While understanding the politics of waivers is important in its own right, this work
makes a broader contribution. Grounded in a theory of presidential policymaking, this
46Although the marginal effect of Distance is not significant at the α = 0.05 level when 30 percent of gov-
ernors are in the president’s party under the condition Pre Law = 1 in the Proposition 3 Chained Reaction
specification, this marginal effect is significant at the lenient α = 0.10 level.
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analysis provides an initial picture of when it is in the president’s interest to authorize
state-level deviations from federal law. This work takes a crucial step towards investigat-
ing how horizontal and vertical constraints shape presidential policymaking. In doing so,
the analysis here contributes to the endeavor of identifying when and how presidents use
subnational policymaking tools in pursuit of their own goals. As Hacker (2004) warned
over a decade ago, this evidence suggests that the broad contours of presidential power
outlined in the existing literature may be unduly narrow if we fail to recognize the presi-
dent’s ability to shift policy in his favor through subnational strategies.
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Appendix
Table 6.7: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
DV: Approved waivers 0.669 2.162 0 39
Pre Law Passage 0.5 0.5 0 1
Distance47 0.757 0.212 0.195 0.979
Percent Governors 0.453 0.096 0.3 0.62
Distance x Perent Governors 0.341 0.128 0.105 0.568
Distance x Pre Law 0.344 0.39 0 0.979
Alignment48 0.453 0.498 0 1
Squire49 0.189 0.123 0.027 0.659
Citizen Ideology50 49.948 15.207 8.449 95.972
Institutional Ideology, ADA/COPE51 49.665 26.965 0 99.167
Governor Party52 0.48 0.495 0 1
Mood53 62.168 3.379 56.342 66.727
% GDP Change54 5.077 2.124 -2 11.1
Presidential Approval55 52.896 10.632 30.03 72.89
President Election Year 0.269 0.444 0 1
State Per Capita Income (1000s)56 28.561 9.522 9.460 60.223
State Population (1000s)57 5555.883 6139.318 13.804 37999.879
Average Coalition Change58 0.043 0.049 -0.03 0.133
Chamber Differences Current Year59 0.084 0.021 0.038 0.113
Reagan 0.096 0.295 0 1
George HW Bush 0.096 0.295 0 1
Clinton 0.346 0.476 0 1
George W. Bush 0.308 0.462 0 1
Obama 0.154 0.361 0 1
Education 0.346 0.476 0 1
Welfare 0.25 0.433 0 1
Medicaid 0.404 0.491 0 1
N 2600
47Poole and Rosenthal (2015)
48Klarner (2014); Council of State Governments (2013)
49Squire (2012)
50Berry et al. (2010b)
51Berry et al. (2010b)
52Klarner (2014); Council of State Governments (2013)
53Stimson (1999)
54Bureau of Economic Analysis
55Gallup (2015)
56Klarner 2014; Bureau of Economic Analysis




Table 6.8: Alternate Proposition 2 Specifications: No ESEA Flexibility and Divided Gov.
No Flex Divided Government
Distance -1.07
(5.54)
Percent Governors -8.30 1.17
(6.50) (6.22)




Divided Government x Percent -2.70
(7.42)
Pres. Approval -0.04∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Annual Mood 0.11∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)



















Log Likelihood -1620.63 -1915.67
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
201




















































.3 .4 .5 .6
Percent Governors
Thick dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
Thin dashed line is a kernel density estimate of Percent Governors.
Figure 6.11: Proposition 2: No ESEA Flexibiilty
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Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
Figure 6.12: Proposition 2: Divided Government
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Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
Figure 6.13: Proposition 2: Alternative Conditional Model
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Table 6.9: Assessing Proposition 2: All Policy and President Fixed Effects Reported
All Policies Medicaid and Welfare Medicaid and Welfare
Unconditional Unconditional Conditional
Distance -7.27 -31.22∗∗∗ -13.69∗
(4.27) (7.30) (6.24)
Percent Governors -13.11∗ -40.32∗∗∗ -18.10∗
(5.87) (9.03) (7.88)
Distance x Governors 16.85∗ 58.10∗∗∗ 22.75∗
(7.65) (12.30) (10.63)
Pres. Approval -0.03∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Annual Mood 0.13∗∗∗ 0.07 0.10
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
% GDP Change -0.08∗∗ -0.19∗∗ -0.09
(0.02) (0.06) (0.05)
Squire -1.53 0.66 –
(1.57) (2.67)




Welfare -0.01 0.88∗∗∗ 0.29
(0.35) (0.19) (0.22)
Reagan -3.04∗∗∗ 1.81 1.62∗
(0.47) (0.96) (0.74)
GHWB -3.08∗∗∗ 1.47∗ 0.78
(0.36) (0.73) (0.63)
Clinton -1.09∗∗∗ 1.95∗∗∗ 0.43
(0.19) (0.53) (0.47)
GWB -3.84∗∗∗ 0.48 0.94
(0.28) (0.80) (0.65)
Constant 0.86 15.13∗∗∗ 3.68
(2.66) (4.55) (4.90)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes No
N 2600.00 1700.00 238.00
Log Likelihood -1903.15 -622.72 -228.15
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 6.10: Alternate Proposition 2 Specifications: Alignment and Additional Controls
Alignment Additional Controls Additional Controls
All Policies All Policies Medicaid and Welfare
Distance -7.30 -8.09 -29.48∗∗∗
(4.29) (4.26) (7.46)
Percent Governors -13.25∗ -16.61∗∗ -40.29∗∗∗
(5.90) (6.02) (9.36)
Distance x Governors 16.94∗ 19.44∗ 55.79∗∗∗
(7.67) (7.71) (12.42)
Pres. Approval -0.03∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Alignment 0.10 0.10 0.28
(0.08) (0.08) (0.14)
Annual Mood 0.13∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.11∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05)




Squire -1.50 -1.95 1.04
(1.61) (1.64) (2.63)
Citizen Ideology – 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.02)
Income (1000s) – -0.05∗∗ -0.11∗
(0.02) (0.05)
State Pop. (1000s) – -0.00∗∗ -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Education 1.32∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ –
(0.27) (0.26)
Welfare -0.01 -0.02 0.81∗∗∗
(0.35) (0.34) (0.18)
Reagan -3.04∗∗∗ -5.12∗∗∗ -1.51
(0.47) (0.74) (1.31)
GHWB -3.08∗∗∗ -4.95∗∗∗ -1.50
(0.36) (0.66) (1.14)
Clinton -1.09∗∗∗ -2.35∗∗∗ 0.04
(0.19) (0.42) (0.75)
GWB -3.85∗∗∗ -4.72∗∗∗ -0.51
(0.28) (0.37) (0.80)
Constant 0.93 2.88 16.45∗∗∗
(2.69) (2.82) (4.85)
N 2600.00 2600.00 1700.00
Log Likelihood -1902.39 -1893.33 -615.81
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 6.11: Alternate Proposition 2 Specifications, Unconditional Model
GW Bush Alternate Pres. No State FE No PA
Dummies 1995 ED
Distance -22.86∗∗∗ -8.02 -8.71 -6.23
(3.99) (4.59) (5.02) (4.14)
Percent Governors -31.12∗∗∗ -13.83∗ -14.51∗ -12.03∗
(5.79) (6.23) (6.75) (5.69)
Distance x Governors 43.57∗∗∗ 18.34∗ 19.48∗ 14.72∗
(7.46) (8.28) (9.15) (7.42)
Pres. Approval -0.05∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Annual Mood 0.08∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
% GDP Change -0.18∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗ -0.10∗∗ -0.06∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Squire -0.77 -1.53 2.24∗∗∗ -1.27
(1.44) (1.57) (0.36) (1.40)
Education 1.69∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗ 1.65∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.27) (0.37) (0.27)
Welfare -0.52 -0.00 0.01 -0.02
(0.29) (0.34) (0.28) (0.25)
Reagan – -2.96∗∗∗ -2.59∗∗∗ -3.26∗∗∗
(0.49) (0.63) (0.44)
GHWB – -2.98∗∗∗ -2.54∗∗∗ -3.27∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.54) (0.32)
Clinton – – -0.70∗ -1.17∗∗∗
(0.28) (0.19)
GWB -2.60∗∗∗ – -3.60∗∗∗ -3.84∗∗∗
GWB1 – -3.84∗∗∗ – –
(0.32)
GWB2 – -3.78∗∗∗ – –
(0.33)
Clinton1 – -1.13∗∗∗ – –
(0.21)
Clinton2 – -1.01∗∗∗ – –
(0.25)
Constant 14.22∗∗∗ 2.16 1.67 -0.73
(2.33) (3.41) (3.59) (2.30)
N 2600.00 2600.00 2600.00 2599.00
Log Likelihood -1943.12 -1902.99 -1972.21 -1892.05
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 6.12: Proposition 2, Conditional Model Alternative Specifications
With Align State FE Additional Controls OLS
Distance -14.81∗ -13.69∗ -13.28∗ -9.85∗
(6.37) (6.24) (6.12) (4.40)
Percent Governors -19.65∗ -18.10∗ -20.16∗∗ -12.71∗
(8.05) (7.88) (7.76) (5.54)
Distance x Governors 24.83∗ 22.75∗ 24.32∗ 16.45∗
(10.86) (10.63) (9.96) (7.55)
Submissions (Natural Log) 0.76∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.17)
Alignment 0.17 – – –
(0.14)
Pres. Approval -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Annual Mood 0.11∗ 0.10 0.14∗∗ 0.07∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
% GDP Change -0.09 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Welfare 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.14
(0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.11)
Reagan 1.64∗ 1.62∗ -0.37 0.00
(0.74) (0.74) (1.13) (.)
GHWB 0.78 0.78 -1.07 -0.68∗∗∗
(0.63) (0.63) (0.97) (0.20)
Clinton 0.47 0.43 -0.65 -0.97∗∗
(0.46) (0.47) (0.65) (0.30)
GWB 0.91 0.94 -0.19 -0.71∗
(0.65) (0.65) (0.80) (0.34)
Obama – – – -1.32∗∗
(0.45)
Election – – -0.30 –
(0.16)
Squire – – 1.41∗∗∗ –
(0.41)
Citizen Ideology – – 0.00 –
(0.01)
Income (1000s) – – -0.05∗ –
(0.02)
Constant 4.17 3.68 4.16 5.09
(5.03) (4.90) (4.79) (3.18)
N 238.00 238.00 238.00 238.00
Log Likelihood -227.63 -228.15 -223.46 -238.98
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 6.13: Assessing Proposition 3: Fixed Effects Reported
Simple Extension Proposition 3
Distance -10.71∗ -10.76∗
(4.17) (4.19)
Percent Governors -19.83∗∗∗ -19.27∗∗∗
(5.64) (5.64)
Distance x Governors 22.62∗∗ 21.75∗∗
(7.51) (7.59)
Pre Law Passage 1.59∗∗∗ 1.20
(0.16) (1.06)
Distance x Prelaw – 0.52
(1.45)
Pres. Approval -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Annual Mood 0.22∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)


















State Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 2600 2600
Log Likelihood -1869.14 -1869.06
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 6.14: Assessing Proposition 3: Alternative Pre Law Measurement
Simple Extension Proposition 3
Distance -8.13 -4.20
(4.20) (4.29)
Percent Governors -14.93∗∗ -18.28∗∗
(5.73) (5.58)




Distance x Unsatisfied – -6.25∗∗∗
(1.41)
Pres. Approval -0.04∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Annual Mood 0.18∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)



















Log Likelihood -1880.00 -1873.85
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Figure 6.15: Unsatisfied = 0, Proposition 3, Alternative Pre Law Coding
Waivers Approvedijt = β0 + β1Distance + β2Percent Governors + β3Distance x Governors
+β4Approval + β5GDP Change + β6Mood
+β7PreLaw + β8Distance x Pre Law
+β9Governors x Pre Law + β10Distance x Pre Law x Percent
+β11Squire +ZtPresident +WiState +UjPolicy + εijt (6.3)
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Table 6.15: Proposition 3, With Alignment
Simple Extension Proposition 3
Distance -10.75∗∗ -10.80∗∗
(4.17) (4.19)
Percent Governors -20.01∗∗∗ -19.50∗∗∗
(5.64) (5.63)
Distance x Governors 22.73∗∗ 21.93∗∗
(7.51) (7.58)
Pre Law Passage 1.59∗∗∗ 1.24
(0.16) (1.05)
Distance x Prelaw – 0.47
(1.44)




Annual Mood 0.22∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)



















Log Likelihood -1868.19 -1868.12
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 6.16: Alternative Specification: Proposition 3
Fully Interactive Model
Prelaw x Distance x Percent -2.38
(26.32)






Pre Law Passage 0.66
(9.56)
Distance x Percent 37.56
(22.83)
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Figure 6.17: Triple Interaction, Prelaw=0
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Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
Figure 6.18: Simple Extension with Durability Measures
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Table 6.17: Durability Models with Fixed Effects Reported
Chained Interaction Coalition Gains and Losses
Distance -19.63∗∗∗ -18.73∗∗∗
(4.61) (4.75)
Percent Governors -31.11∗∗∗ -30.66∗∗∗
(6.34) (6.43)
Pre Law Passage 0.05 0.15
(1.01) (1.03)
Distance x Governors 32.56∗∗∗ 32.10∗∗∗
(8.06) (8.10)
Distance x Prelaw 2.10 2.11
(1.35) (1.35)
Chamber Diff Current Yr 16.31∗∗∗ 16.61∗∗∗
(4.12) (3.86)
Coalition Change -4.11∗∗ –
(1.47)
Coalition Losses – 6.35
(15.57)
Coalition Gains – -4.78∗
(2.10)
Pres. Approval -0.05∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Annual Mood 0.19∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.03)


















State Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 2600 2600
Log Likelihood -1857.78 -1857.55
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 6.18: Alternative Durability Specifications, Proposition 3
Simple Extension ln(t) Interaction Law Age
Distance -18.74∗∗∗ -17.91∗∗∗ -18.87∗∗∗
(4.53) (4.57) (4.53)
Percent Governors -32.33∗∗∗ -32.98∗∗∗ -34.06∗∗∗
(6.33) (6.41) (6.52)
Pre Law Passage 1.62∗∗∗ 2.34∗∗∗ 2.14∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.37) (0.44)
Distance x Governors 35.03∗∗∗ 33.38∗∗∗ 35.40∗∗∗
(7.97) (8.01) (7.92)
Chamber Differences 15.07∗∗∗ 23.25∗∗ 14.46∗∗∗
(4.06) (7.42) (3.73)
Coalition Change -3.71∗∗ -3.39 -4.00∗
(1.40) (1.85) (1.83)
Natural Log of Law Age – 0.06 –
(0.38)
ln(time) x Chamber Diff – -5.38 –
(4.71)
Law Age – – -0.07
(0.06)
Pres. Approval -0.04∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Annual Mood 0.18∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
% GDP Change -0.14∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗ -0.12∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Squire -1.35 -1.39 -1.35
(1.66) (1.25) (1.25)
Education 2.37∗∗∗ 2.73∗∗∗ 2.63∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.30) (0.32)
Welfare -0.17 0.01 -0.01
(0.29) (0.29) (0.30)
Reagan -0.27 -0.21 0.70
(0.61) (0.61) (0.94)
GHWB 0.06 -0.06 -0.15
(0.41) (0.47) (0.49)
Clinton 0.95∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗ 0.89∗∗
(0.29) (0.32) (0.32)
GWB -1.07∗ -1.04∗ -1.18∗
(0.44) (0.46) (0.47)
Constant 5.01 0.68 3.17
(3.34) (3.68) (3.46)
N 2600.00 2600.00 2600.00
Log Likelihood -1858.99 -1856.21 -1858.09
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.




When asked what his "biggest mistake" was in his nearly seven-year tenure as Secre-
tary of Education from 2009 through 2016, Secretary Arne Duncan answered:
One huge mistake was we spent a year and a half[,] two years trying to fin-
ish No Child Left Behind in 2009 and ’10 and ’11. We spent hundreds and
hundreds of hours. And we knew the law was hurting children and hurting
teachers. And we would have been crucified by Congress, saying we bypassed
them if we hadn’t spent that time, and so we thought we were doing the right
thing. So at the end of the day, that was a big mistake. We failed....We let
schools, we let kids suffer for another year. So, in hindsight, we should have
done waivers earlier (Klein 2015).
Here, Duncan describes the Obama administration’s failed attempt to work with Congress
(hundreds and hundreds of hours) to reform K-12 education, in contrast to the adminis-
tration’s successful waiver strategy that dramatically revised implementation of the No
Child Left Behind Act. Indeed, it is remarkable that of all the decisions Duncan made
as one of the longest-serving Secretaries of Education, he identifies the decision not to
pursue a waiver strategy "earlier" as his biggest mistake. This observation underscores
the powerful policymaking opportunities available to presidents through a waiver strat-
egy. Despite presidents’ uses of waivers in welfare, Medicaid, and K-12 education, to this
point we lack a thorough understanding of when and how presidents pursue this strategy.
This dissertation has addressed these questions.
Specifically, I have argued that presidents use waivers strategically based on con-
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straints imposed both by Congress and by the nation’s governors. In this chapter, I begin
by summarizing the central argument and findings about the conditions under which
presidents exercise waiver authority. I then discuss the contributions this analysis makes
and, further, discuss the implications for our understanding of presidential power. Fi-
nally, I propose several extensions of this work that continue to investigate how and when
presidents use waivers.
7.1 Summary
In Chapter 1, I argue that the president pursues a waiver strategy under specific con-
ditions structured by his institutional environment. To ground the subsequent analysis in
a concrete understanding of waivers as policy tools, I offer a simple definition of waivers:
exemptions from federal law granted by the relevant secretary. I then explain the types
of waivers that I focus on in this project: welfare, Medicaid, and K-12 education waivers
submitted and approved from 1984 through 2012. In addition, I summarize the types of
policies implemented through these waivers.
With this groundwork in place, I preview the central argument that this project de-
velops: presidents are motivated to use a waiver strategy when they are ideologically far
from Congress, contingent on the share of governors in their party. This argument has
the potential to make an important contribution to our understanding of presidential
power. In particular, to explain the conditions under which presidents are motivated to
use a waiver strategy, I consider vertical constraints imposed by the nation’s governors
in addition to the horizontal constraint imposed by Congress that the literature typically
focuses on.
Next, Chapters 2 and 3 set the stage for the theory that I subsequently develop. In
Chapter 2, I explore the nature of waiver authority across the policy areas considered
here. I begin by identifying a critical similarity across the two statutes that govern wel-
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fare, Medicaid, and K-12 education waivers.1 Specifically, both statutes grant the relevant
secretary broad discretion in inviting, reviewing, and approving waivers. The nature of
waiver authority, then, is consequential in two ways. First, as the evidence discussed
throughout the reminder of the chapter suggests, presidents can and have used waivers to
effectively revise existing federal law at the subnational level without consent or binding
oversight from Congress. Second, while presidents retain a surprising degree of authority
over this strategy, including when and how to use it, waivers do not constitute unilateral
action. Rather, governors must initially submit waiver applications. From here, they must
be willing and able to engage in the review process and, if approved by the secretary, im-
plement program changes via waivers. For presidents to use waiver authority to pursue
national-scale shifts in existing federal policy, they must be able to rely on a critical mass
of governors to cooperate with this strategy.
The remainder of Chapter 2 is devoted to assessing relevant qualitative evidence about
how and when presidents use waivers. The evidence in Chapter 2 overwhelmingly sug-
gests that presidents and their administrations approach waivers as valuable policymak-
ing tools. Further, this qualitative analysis provides important insight into the conditions
under which presidents grant waivers, laying the groundwork for subsequent develop-
ment of a theory of presidential policymaking through waivers.
In Chapter 3, I introduce an original dataset of submitted and approved waivers in
welfare, Medicaid, and K-12 education from 1984 through 2012. The data introduced
here improve on existing large-n analyses of waivers in three important ways. First, the
data include observations from three comparable yet different policy areas, allowing for
more generalizable results than previous work that focuses on one policy area at a time.
Second, the observations here cover a longer time span than existing work, providing for
valuable variation on factors relevant to the president’s institutional environment. Third,
1As discussed, Section 1115(a) of the Social Security Act Amendments of 1962 governs welfare and
Medicaid waivers. Section 9401 in the ESEA (initially Section 14401 in the 1994 reauthorization of EASA)
governs K-12 waivers.
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existing work on waivers does not consider the submission stage of this process.
Existing models of waivers consign the president to a reactive role and assume that he
simply approves more waivers for governors in his party. In the latter half of Chapter 3,
I directly address this potential counter-narrative to my argument. Specifically, I assess
the validity of the existing framework using the dataset described above, which provides
a fair test of the common assumption about the president’s role. I find weak and incon-
sistent evidence that governors in the president’s party submit more waivers, and I find
no evidence that presidents approve more waivers for governors in their party. At this
point, we have sufficient reason to suspect that existing models of waivers fail to capture
the dynamic that motivates presidents to implement a waiver strategy.
Chapter 4 then develops a theory of presidential policymaking through waivers. I
argue that presidents are initially motivated to pursue a waiver strategy when they an-
ticipate difficulty moving their preferred legislation through Congress. However, this
condition is not sufficient to spur the president to pursue a waiver strategy. Given that
cooperation from governors is necessary for the president to implement widespread pol-
icy changes through a waiver strategy, the president must be able to rely on enough gov-
ernors who are willing to participate in the waiver process. In particular, I argue that
governors in the president’s party are the president’s most reliable allies. Ultimately, I ar-
gue that presidents use a waiver strategy when they are ideologically far from Congress,
contingent on the share of governors in their party. Based on this theory, I suggest three
propositions that I examine in Chapters 5 and 6.
In Chapter 5, I examine Proposition 1, which states that governors submit more waiver
applications when they anticipate that presidents are motivated to approve these appli-
cations. The logic behind Proposition 1 is as follows: according to my theory, the pres-
ident is motivated to pursue a waiver strategy when he is far from Congress provided
that he can rely on enough state allies to implement his preferred policy reforms. Under
these conditions, he should invite and encourage governors to submit waiver applica-
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tions, and in turn, governors should respond by submitting applications. When the pres-
ident is motivated to approve waivers, developing and submitting a waiver application is
a worthwhile investment for governors. In my analysis of Proposition 1, I find evidence
that, indeed, governors submit more waiver applications when the president is far from
Congress as the share of governors in the president’s party increases.
While this evidence is consistent with theoretical expectations, it leaves open the ques-
tion of when presidents approve waivers. Chapter 6 investigates this question through
empirical tests of Propositions 2 and 3. Proposition 2 offers the central test of my theory of
presidential policymaking through waivers. Here, I find compelling evidence, consistent
with expectations, that the president approves more waivers when he is ideologically far
from Congress contingent on the share of governors in his party. Further, in the analysis
of Proposition 3, I find that the marginal effect of Distance is also contingent on whether
the president is dissatisfied with existing law. This analysis is consistent with qualita-
tive evidence in Chapter 2 which suggests that presidents implement a waiver strategy
when they inherit laws with which they disagree. Here, we find further evidence consis-
tent with the central argument: when presidents are dissatisfied with current law, they
approve more waivers when they are far from Congress when enough governors are in
their party, making it feasible for the president to authorize national-scale reform via
waivers. In all, this analysis provides support for the central argument that the presi-
dent implements a waiver strategy in response to horizontal and vertical constraints in
his institutional environment.
7.2 Contributions
This dissertation makes three contributions; I describe each in turn here. First, the
theory of presidential policymaking through waivers that I develop provides a frame-
work for more theoretical and empirical work on the president’s use of subnational poli-
cymaking strategies. The concept of executive federalism, introduced by Gais and Fossett
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(2005), has for too long substituted for theory about this type of presidential authority.
By identifying the incentives that motivate the president to pursue a waiver strategy, as
well as the constraints that shape his use of this strategy, I create a starting point for sub-
sequent work that examines how the president uses different types of waivers, as well as
other types of subnational policymaking tools.
Second, this theory (and the evidence in support of it) is more broadly relevant for
our understanding of presidential power. As discussed in Chapter 1, scholarship typi-
cally focuses on national-level strategies that presidents use to implement their goals. As
a result, existing work primarily considers the horizontal constraints placed on the pres-
ident through the system of checks and balances. One relationship in particular plays a
prominent role in these analyses – that is, of course, the constraint that Congress places
on the president’s ability to act. In this dissertation, I adapt this approach and add a
vertical dimension that is often not considered consequential in explaining presidential
policymaking. Here, I am referring to the constraint that the nation’s governors place
on the president’s ability to pursue his policy goals at the subnational level. In other
words, this analysis provides a framework for understanding how presidents exercise
power given the constraints imposed by the separation of powers and, simultaneously,
the federal system’s division of authority across different levels of government. While
generally omitted from discussions of presidential power, the theory and evidence here
suggest that intergovernmental relationships may indeed shape the contours of executive
authority, particularly when the president seeks subnational alternatives from a legisla-
tive strategy.
The other side of the coin is equally interesting to examine. That is, this theory sug-
gests that presidents do, under certain conditions, see governors as valuable allies as
presidents seek to implement their policy preferences. And when enough governors are
willing to cooperate, it may in fact be the case that these intergovernmental relationships
open up new avenues through which the president exercises authority. It appears from
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this analysis that this is indeed the case with waivers. As I discuss below, many questions
remain about when and how the president uses this strategy, but at this point, the the-
ory and the empirical evidence suggest that we may be missing important ways in which
presidents exercise their authority if we fail to recognize the possibilities that subnational
policymaking opens up for the president.
Third, the original dataset introduced in this dissertation will be potentially useful
beyond this project as we continue to explore presidents’ policymaking alternatives, and
in particular, how the president’s use of waivers fits in with other strategies. For example,
we may want to examine whether presidents use waivers instead of (or in tandem with)
other extra-legislative strategies, such as executive orders and memos. This dataset of
submitted and approved waivers will at the least be a helpful starting point for this type
of analysis. The variation in this dataset over time and across policy areas will allow us
to continue to develop and test generalizable theories of presidential policymaking.
In addition, given the initial evidence in Chapter 6 that some conditions that predict
law durability also predict waiver approvals, we should perhaps think further about how
the president’s use of waivers impacts law durability. This type of analysis may require
us to consider waivers in relation to different legislative revisions, such as amendments
and funding reductions. For example, perhaps under certain conditions presidents use
waivers rather than trying to pursue amendments to existing law. Or, perhaps presidents
reduce funding by encouraging states to adopt particular types of program changes via
waivers; this potential use of waivers echoes Hacker’s narrative of retrenchment via sub-
terranean policy change (2004). Whether we observe these potential substitution effects




This work has three additional implications for our understanding of legislative revi-
sion, state-level policy diffusion, and the evolution of presidential power. I address each
in turn.
7.3.1 Legislative Revision
First, we have seen that waivers are particularly valuable tools that presidents use
to revise existing laws. If it is the case that presidents can implement their preferred
policy changes without revising legislation, as the qualitative and quantitative work here
suggests, then presidents may in fact delay legislative revision of a law. Consider the case
of welfare reform under Clinton: by inviting states to apply for waivers and claiming
credit for welfare reform, President Clinton was able to, at least in part, deliver on his
campaign promise of reforming welfare without actually signing a new law.
Indeed, presidents may prefer to use waivers, at least temporarily, rather than sign
a law that only marginally satisfies their preferences. This may provide something of a
safety valve, allowing them to defer the difficult business of re-negotiating a law until
they anticipate an easier or more friendly policymaking environment. In the case of
Obama’s ESEA Flexibility initiative, for example, waivers allowed states to avoid falling
out of compliance with NCLB’s unattainable requirement that all students be proficient
in math and reading by 2014. At the same time, this strategy perhaps allowed the Obama
administration to delay committing substantial resources to ESEA reauthorization until
a more opportune moment presented itself.
However, this tactic is not without costs. If a law is unpopular and, more importantly,
has failed to deliver on its policy promises, should the president address it whether or not
doing so is politically convenient for him? From a normative standpoint, it is important
to ask whether waiver authority allows presidents to sidestep the responsibility to work
with Congress when a law is clearly not working, as was the case with NCLB.
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As mentioned above, from an empirical standpoint, we should also consider whether a
president’s use of waivers interacts with (or perhaps substitutes for) other types of legisla-
tive revision. If an administration is pursuing a waiver strategy, for example, we might
ask whether the likelihood of congressional amendments or program funding changes.
On the one hand, the president’s use of waivers might weaken an existing law and make
imminent large-scale revision more likely. At the same time, however, use of waivers may
signal the president has opted for this strategy as a temporary solution in lieu of a leg-
islative re-write and may allow members of Congress to similarly shift their attention to
other issues.
7.3.2 State-Level Policy Diffusion
Next, the president’s use of waivers may have an important implication for the nature
of state-level policy diffusion. Some have observed that state-level policies implemented
via waivers can reflect the priorities of the federal government (Arsneault 2000; Thomp-
son 2012). The analysis here suggests the specific conditions under which this might be
the case and, further, suggests that in the case of waivers at least, we should be particu-
larly attentive to how the president’s priorities shape state innovation and policymaking.
The analysis in Chapter 5 suggests that governors submit waivers under the conditions
when presidents are willing to approve waivers. An implication here (and supported in
Chapter 6) is that the waivers approved by the administration, in turn, facilitate imple-
mentation of the president’s agenda.
Not only the timing but also the nature of policy innovations implemented through
waivers, then, seem highly influenced by the administration’s agenda and priorities. The
analysis here suggests that in the case of waivers, we should ask how the president’s
priorities shape innovation across the subnational environment. In particular, we may
expect more uniformity in policy innovation than we would otherwise anticipate.
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7.3.3 Executive Authority
Here, I reflect on a broader question about executive authority. Specifically, should
the president’s use of waivers add to our fears about runaway presidential power, un-
constrained by the institutions meant to check the president’s authority? Although the
president can grant waivers without congressional consent, and the courts have, on the
whole, granted the administration broad latitude in exercising this authority, I argue that
two factors ultimately prevent the president’s use of waivers from dramatically expand-
ing executive authority.
First, despite the inability of Congress to prevent the president from exercising waiver
authority, the statutes discussed here that grant secretaries the ability to approve waivers
are not, in fact, blank checks. As has been discussed at length, the nation’s governors place
a meaningful constraint on the president’s use of this policymaking strategy. The case of
President George W. Bush’s failed attempt to incentivize states to transform Medicaid into
a block grant program through waivers illustrates that presidents cannot simply mandate
policy changes through waivers (Thompson 2012). Rather, enough states must be willing
to engage in this process for presidents to implement widespread policy change using
this strategy.
More often than not, it appears that presidents use this strategy when governors are
eager and willing to adopt the changes that presidents are willing to approve. In the case
of welfare reform under the Clinton administration, for example, governors were not
simply passive recipients of the president’s overtures to submit applications for waiver
approvals. Rather, many governors were eager to reform their state welfare delivery pro-
grams under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children entitlement program.2 The
Clinton administration’s use of waivers built on a mutual interest at the state and national
level in experimenting with alternative programs that incentivized welfare recipients to
transition from welfare to work. While some may criticize waivers as undemocratic tools
2Interview with the author, December 14, 2015.
225
that are not vetted and approved by Congress, each one is in fact negotiated over and
implemented by elected leaders at the state level.3
Second, although Congress does not enjoy formal oversight over the waiver process,
just as in any other area of presidential policymaking, the threat that Congress may re-
vise a law to restrict the president’s authority remains. Of course, one may argue that
this constraint is not meaningful, given the potential for presidents to approve waivers
in short order compared to the length of time it could potentially take Congress to pass
new legislation that limits the president’s waiver authority. However, there are in fact
examples of Congress revising the president’s waiver authority to directly address com-
plaints about the manner in which presidents exercised this authority. I discuss two of
these cases here.
The first example focuses on the backlash that President George W. Bush faced from
his use of Section 1115 Medicaid waivers, as described at length by Thompson (2012).
During his first term, the Bush administration approved waivers to "redirect CHIP (Chil-
dren’s Health Insurance Program) funds to insure childless adults" (155). A report from
the Government Accountability Office "advised Congress that these waivers violated the
CHIP statute," yet Bush’s Secretary of Health and Human Services, former governor Tommy
Thompson, refused to stop this practice when pressured to do so by senators Charles
Grassley (R-IA) and Max Baucus (D-MT) (155). However, the senators ultimately pre-
vailed: "In the face of executive branch recalcitrance, Grassley and Baucus inserted pro-
visions in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 that prohibited the Bush administration from
approving any new demonstrations that reallocated CHIP funds to childless adults" (155).
This example illustrates that, although members of Congress have had little success in-
tervening in the president’s decisions about when to use waivers and which to approve,
3A potential objection here is that, in the case of Obama’s NCLB waivers, states were facing the potential
of falling out of compliance with the law if they were not excused from its provisions. In this case, one
could argue that waivers were mandatory. However, if enough states balked at the administration’s ESEA
Flexibility program, it is doubtful that the Department of Education would have held all states responsible
for meeting the impossible requirement that all children be proficient in math and reading by 2014.
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Congress may revise or restrict waiver authority in subsequent legislation.
The next example illustrates a similar case when Congress addressed perceived exec-
utive over-reach in the case of education. In December 2015, Congress finally revised the
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, which was due for reauthorization in 2007. Specif-
ically, Congress passed and President Obama signed the Every Student Succeeds Act
(ESSA), a reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. After push-
back that the Obama administration abused waiver authority by requiring states to meet
conditions not mandated by current law in order to receive waivers, the new law, ESSA,
prohibits the Secretary of Education from attaching such conditions to waivers in the fu-
ture (Ujifusa 2015). While Congress did not eliminate the Secretary of Education’s waiver
authority, they did define this authority narrowly such that future Secretaries will not be
able to so transparently include the administration’s preferred policy changes as a condi-
tion of approval. In all, both of these cases suggest that although the president and his
administration enjoy broad discretion over waivers, and in particular in deciding when
and how to use waivers and which to approve, Congress is not left without avenues for
constraining this authority.
It seems, overall, that the argument that waivers provide presidents with unfettered
vehicles of policy reform is overstated. While it is the case that secretaries enjoy a great
deal of discretion over how to use waiver authority, and that consequently the president
and his administration enjoy substantial control over this process, the role that governors
play places a meaningful constraint on executive authority in the exercise of this tool.
Further, while Congress may not be able to directly exercise oversight of a president’s
waiver process or act quickly to curb a president’s use of waivers, Congress ultimately
has the ability to constrict this authority.
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7.4 Future Research
In this final section, I identify three promising areas of future work that extend the
analysis in this dissertation. First, I propose ways to develop more precise measures of
how satisfied a president is with a law, which would allow us to better assess how this
condition impacts a president’s waiver strategy through quantitative analysis. Second, I
recommend extending the theory to assess the conditions under which presidents offer
waivers that require states to adopt new policies not mandated by existing law. Third,
I discuss the value of extending the theory developed here to incorporate the impact of
public opinion on the president’s use of waivers.
7.4.1 Measuring "Satisfaction"
In Proposition 3, I suggest that whether a president is satisfied with the current law
impacts his incentives to authorize revisions to this law via waivers. The expectation here
is that the president approves more waivers when he is far from Congress, provided that
a sufficient share of governors is in his party and the president is dissatisfied with existing
law. In Chapter 6, I find evidence that when the president is dissatisfied with a law, he
grants more waivers conditional on the share of governors in his party.4 The theoretical
expectations and the results under the condition when the president is dissatisfied with
current law are relatively clear.
However, expectations about whether and how presidents are motivated to use waivers
when they are satisfied with existing law are less clear. On the one hand, we cannot as-
sume that signing a new law means the president is completely satisfied with the policies
implemented by this law, nor that he will remain satisfied with this law over time. On the
other hand, in some cases the president may indeed be satisfied with the law as written
and may not want to grant states flexibility via waivers.5 Further, while the measure Pre
4The assumption here is that presidents who have not signed a new law are dissatisfied with the existing
law they inherited. Evidence in Chapter 2 provides support for this assumption.
5Chapter 6 discusses examples of both situations.
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Law used in the analysis of Proposition 3 is arguably an accurate measure of dissatisfac-
tion, this is less convincingly the case as a measure of satisfaction. Indeed, the results for
the "satisfied" condition are sensitive to different coding methods.6
We need to extend the theory to both develop a better understanding of how pres-
idents use waivers when they are satisfied with existing law and to clarify the role of
Distance and Percent Governors under this condition. We also need a more precise mea-
sure of the president’s satisfaction with existing law that does not depend on whether
the president signed the existing law. A reasonable starting point for creating a more
sophisticated measure of the president’s satisfaction with existing law may be assessing
the vote share in Congress on the relevant law. One measure, for example, might equal
the share of the president’s party in Congress that voted for the law. For example, if the
current president is a Democrat, and the Democrats in a previous congressional session
unanimously voted in favor of a law, we might argue that the current Democratic presi-
dent is relatively satisfied with that law as written. However, this measurement ignores
the possibility that perhaps the Democrats only occupied a small share of the seats in
Congress when the law was originally passed – in this case, there is reason to suspect
that the current Democratic president would in fact prefer to make a number of revi-
sions. Considering this, a measure of presidential satisfaction with existing law should
take into account both the share of the current president’s party in each chamber that
voted for the law as well as the seat share of that party in each chamber of Congress. Ul-
timately, creating a more sophisticated measure of presidential satisfaction that does not
rely on whether or not a president has signed a new law will allow for further empirical
6As I describe in a footnote in Chapter 6, I re-code Pre Law to reflect that Presidents Clinton and Bush
were not fully satisfied with laws they signed, the Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994 and the Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005, respectively. With this new coding, the results for the "dissatisfied" condition (com-
parable to the condition when Pre Law = 1, discussed at length in Chapter 6) did not change meaningfully.
But, I found that the marginal effect of Distance in the "satisfied" condition was positive and statistically
significant, whereas with the original coding, this marginal effect was not significant in the "satisfied" con-
dition (Pre Law = 0). Overall, the results using the alternative coding suggest that the dynamic between
Distance and Percent Governors informs a president’s use of waivers when he is dissatisfied and when he is
satisfied with existing law, although Percent Governors forms the strongest constraint on this strategy when
the president is dissatisfied with existing law.
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examination of how the president’s satisfaction with current law influences his use of a
waiver strategy.
7.4.2 Governor Cooperation with Different Types of Waivers
In this project, I do not distinguish between different types of waivers that presidents
offer governors. I take this approach because the president’s waiver authority across these
policy areas and time periods is very consistent on a critically important dimension: the
relevant secretary, and in turn the administration, enjoys a broad degree of discretion
over this policy tool. As a result, these waivers are highly comparable in terms of the
president’s ability to seek and approve them and the constraints he faces in doing so. For
the purposes of assessing the theory here, then, I treat the different waivers submitted
and approved as observations within one category of policymaking tool.
However, it may be the case that a particular type of waiver is different from the others
considered here, and as such should be treated differently, both in terms of extending the
theory and the empirical analysis. Specifically, as I have discussed, the waivers that the
Obama administration offered under the ESEA Flexibility program were conditional on
states implementing policy changes that were not part of existing law.7 It may be the
case that this strategy is particularly valuable when a sizable subset of governors does
not completely share the president’s preferences, but is nonetheless open to adopting the
president’s policies as a condition of receiving a waiver given their dissatisfaction with
the current law.
Consider, for example, Republican governors in whose states NCLB is unpopular.
These governors may not otherwise be potential allies in the president’s efforts to re-
vise NCLB, but given the political (and practical) reasons to seek relief from burdensome
7In Chapter 6, I describe in a footnote that the central results from Proposition 2 are robust to a spec-
ification that ends in 2010, thereby omitting these conditional waivers from the analysis. Specifically,
the marginal effect of Distance is contingent on Percent Governors, where the marginal effect of Distance in-
creases as the president moves farther from Congress contingent on the share of governors in the president’s
party.
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provisions of NCLB, they may be willing to entertain the possibility of implementing the
president’s new policies in exchange for substantial flexibility from the existing law via
a conditional waiver. In this scenario, we should still expect that the president will use
more waivers when he is far from Congress, conditional on the share of governors willing
to cooperate with him. But the difference here is that whether or not governors are willing
to cooperate with the president’s waiver strategy may require a more fine-grained mea-
sure than partisanship. It may be the case that the president predicts who his likely allies
are based on the share of governors who are dissatisfied with the current law and are at
least amenable to implementing the alternative the president offers through waivers.
This logic suggests a theoretical and empirical extension of the project to more closely
examine the factors that motivate presidents to pursue conditional waivers. In terms of
the theory, the core relationship may be slightly different such that Distance is modified
by the share of governors likely to cooperate with this strategy, where this share is not
determined by the number of governors in the president’s party. Whether or not a gov-
ernor is likely to cooperate may hinge on each governor’s satisfaction with existing law.
While partisanship may play a role here, it may not be the case that it precisely captures
this concept. Empirically, then, the measurement of Percent Governors would be updated
to reflect that the share of governors the president considers as potential allies is not de-
termined by partisanship but, instead, by the combination of a governor’s dissatisfaction
with current law and willingness to implement the president’s required reforms attached
to waivers.
7.4.3 Public Opinion and the President’s Waiver Strategy
Finally, it will be worthwhile to extend the theory to incorporate the role that pub-
lic opinion plays in the president’s use of waivers. Evidence in Chapter 6 suggests that
presidents approve more waivers when their average annual approval ratings drop, and
further, that presidents approve more waivers as the national mood becomes more lib-
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eral. Both of these results are in line with expectations. As discussed in Chapter 6, I
expect that presidents turn to waivers when their approval ratings dip in order to make
progress on their agenda despite lower levels of political capital that may hamper their
negotiations with Congress. In addition, since presidents frequently discuss waivers as
tools that they use to authorize implementation of new programs and, in addition, to spur
state-level innovation, I expect that presidents are more eager to use this tool when the
public is more supportive of government action. Consistent results in support of these
expectations suggest that public opinion, measured along these two dimensions, matters
for explaining the president’s use of waivers.
In addition, the president’s dissatisfaction with current law influences his decision
to use a waiver strategy, as discussed. Evidence in Chapter 2 suggests that presidents
frequently use waivers to revise laws that do not satisfy their policy goals and, further,
that have become unpopular with Americans. Consider, for example, how Presidents
Reagan and Clinton implemented waiver strategies to revise welfare, and further, how
President Obama used a waiver strategy to revise NCLB. Given presidents’ incentives
not only to implement their policy goals but also to win re-election and to leave a strong
legacy, the degree to which the public is dissatisfied with a current law may indeed inform
the president’s own position on the importance of reform.8 Further, evidence suggests
that presidents’ policymaking behavior responds to public opinion on particular issues
(Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004). In all, an extension of the theory developed here should
account for how the president’s popularity, the national mood, and public support (or
lack thereof) for specific laws influences his waiver strategy.
Particularly in this modern era characterized by extreme and increasing partisan po-
larization, as described by McCarty et al. (2006), it may be the case that when public opin-
ion turns against a particular policy or law and the public wants to see government action
to address perceived problems, waivers provide presidents with a particularly valuable
8Of course, public opinion does not exist in a vacuum but, rather, is informed by elite discourse and by
parties’ positions on issues (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Zaller 1992; Jackson and Kollman 2011).
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strategy. As long as presidents can count on enough governors to cooperate with their
waiver strategy, they can deliver on promises of reform much faster than when they are
mired in an ongoing battle with Congress, particularly if the president’s approval rating
is low. Consider, for example, the Clinton administration’s promise to review welfare
waiver applications within thirty days of receipt during the administration’s embattled
campaign with Congress over welfare reform. One of the next steps in building on the
work here, then, is incorporating public pressure for reform and for government action
into the framework that explains the conditions under which presidents use waivers.
7.5 Final Thoughts
In this dissertation, my goal was to explore the conditions under which presidents
use waivers. This inquiry is important for two reasons. First, presidents can and do use
waivers in pursuit of their own policy goals, yet we lack a theory and systematic analy-
sis of how and when they do so. Second, and more broadly, scholarship that examines
how the president’s institutional environment shapes his exercise of authority focuses al-
most exclusively on the horizontal constraints imposed by actors at the national level,
particularly Congress. While this is warranted in many cases, primarily focusing on the
president’s horizontal relationships misses an important component of the institutional
environment that shapes presidential policymaking at the subnational level. Here, I pro-
pose and assess a theory that recognizes the horizontal and vertical relationships that
shape the president’s exercise of power through a waiver strategy.
A number of extensions, discussed above, will be helpful in further clarifying our un-
derstanding of when and how presidents use waivers. At the very least, however, this
project proposes a theory, supported by analysis, that provides an initial framework for
investigating the president’s incentives to pursue a waiver strategy. This theory and anal-
ysis suggest that the president can indeed bypass the horizontal constraint imposed by
Congress through the use of a waiver strategy, although in doing so the president faces
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a vertical constraint from the nation’s governors. From the analysis of presidential pol-
icymaking at the subnational level in this dissertation, we gain additional insight into
the paradox of presidential power in the modern era. The president enjoys broad au-
thority, but the system of checks and balances often frustrates the president’s efforts to
exercise this authority. A waiver strategy provides the president with a policymaking
avenue where otherwise one might not be available given the horizontal constraint im-
posed by Congress. In turn, the federal system’s distribution of authority between levels
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